Мистериозният трети е интригата на излизането на Първанов от президенството. Никой не го е назовал, като герой от света на Хари Потър няма лице, но вече има характеристики:„млад, но доказал се в люти парламентарни битки, показал, че може да генерира идеи, отворен към другите, към партии, синдикати, граждански структури”.

Защо толкова тайнственост? Защо тази обсесия към третия? Към фигурата на тройката?

Тройката не беше измислена от Първанов, а му се случи. Случи се като голям политически шанс, като уникално стечение на обстоятелствата през 2001 г., което го вкара с летящ старт в президентството. Магическото действие на тройката така допадна на президента, че той го превърна в свой любим инструмент. To make the long story short, ще резюмирам десетгодишната сага в три действия.

Действие първо

Третият в надпреварата като първи в президентството

Петър Стоянов се беше вкопчил в люта битка с ген. Богомил Бонев – учебникарски пример за тотална неспособност да идентифицираш основния си опонент. След победоносния му поход към първия мандат, вторият беше хаос, обърканост, безпомощност. Още тогава Тошо Тошев с „Труд” репетираше днешната роля на „преса”, оказваше натиск върху надпреварата, като възхваляваше вътрешния министър като победоносен претендент. Медийният тътен заглуши социологията, която – макар често несъвършена, а понякога купена – все пак мери настроенията на избирателите, не на вестникопритежателите. Политическият арсенал на кампанията също насочваше към героични сблъсъци и позорни загуби и отвличаше вниманието от задкулисните играчи. В архетиповия дебат, който и днес изучаваме със студентите като пример как не трябва да се държат кандидат-президентите, Петър Стоянов направи всички (не)възможни грешки и гафове, Богомил Бонев се радваше на звездния си миг да бъде произведен като главен конкурент, а третият доволно наблюдаваше зад кулисите как народната мъдрост „двама се карат,…” прерастваше в революционната максима, че последните ще станат първи. Така (не)видимият трети Първанов влезе в Президетството.

Действие второ

Тройката – първият прийом на президенстването по първановски

2005 г. БСП печели с малко и не завинаги. Избирателят е пожелал нееднопартийно управление. Коалицията е неизбежна. Но не е неизбежна като тройна. БСП може да управлява само с един партньор, Първанов я орисва на два (НДСВ и ДПС). Тройката вече така е харесала на президента, че никаква политическа рационалност не може да го отдели от нея. Комбинацията социалисти – монархисти – етнически турци – е сложна и крехка. Това не е просто резултат, а преследвана цел: хем отношенията в конфигурацията са толкова сложни, че непрестанно имат нужда от медиатор, хем противореичията не позволяват на никой от партньорите да се еманципира и да стане независим от тройната формула. И от нейния демиург.

Действие трето

Загадъчният трети

На тройката беше възложена високата мисия да подготви победоносната постпрезиденттска политическа кариера на Първанов.

Първият опит беше институционален – АБВ. Заглавието е повече от несръчно, но пък има достойството да е трибуквено. Целта беше аморфно дефинирана политически. Така се и очакваше: АБВ на Първанов не е „третият път” на Блеър, а политическа схема и конфигурация с размити очертания: между партиите и гражданските сдружения, между ляво и дясно, между професионална политическа дейност и симулирана спонтанност. АБВ замря в зародиш.

Първанов вкара новата тройна комбинация, този път в индивидуален вариант – загадъчният трети.

Още в първо действие на президентската кариера се очертават трите принципа, които обясняват привъзраността на Първанов към тройката: не влизаш в битка, а обираш позитивите от загубата на другите. Първанов днес предлага един наратив, който цели да легитимира пасивността като победа: „аз не се предлагам, а в трудни моменти винаги съм бил издиган……”. Не позволяваш битката да се превърне в дуел, защото там се кръстосват идеи, визии, имиджи, харизми. Първанов не беше убеден, че ще спечели откритото противоборство нито срещу Стоянов, нито днес срещу Станишев. Вкарването на третия отмества действието от авансцената към кулисите, защото там се разчертава сценичното пространство, подготвят се персонажите и им се приписват ролите. В дискретната сянка на кулисите важни са режисьорът и сценарият, не актьорите и изпълнението.

Първанов още не разбира, че публиката порастна. Прекалено е гледала представлението, знае интригата, не харесва финала, не иска да има епилог.

Време е Станишев да се събуди. Такъв ПР, какъвто уморената интрига на Първанов му прави, никой не може да му поднесе. Няма трети, който да затъмни престижа на председателя на ПЕС. Няма публика, която да се хване на поредната тройна комбинация на Първанов.

Президент, който за 10 години не може да измисли една политическа иновация, е истински новогодишен подарък за Станишев. На фона на пост-президентския Първанов Станишев изведнъж започна да изглежда поумнял и политически понатежал.

http://tv7.bg/broadcasts/253102.html#3920342

Katarina Tomasevski,

special rapporteur on the right to education of the UN commission on human rights (1998 – 20040, founder of the Right to Education Project

1.Introduction[1]

“I like my school. I really like my school”, shares an eight-year-old girl from Congo in Ireland (Report on Ireland, p. 27).

This spontaneous and joyous statement is wonderful expression of a successful educational integration. Children, as well as theoreticians and policy-makers, know what successful integration feels like. What children are not supposed to know is how to achieve it. The paradox is that adults in their institutional roles as theoreticians, politicians, and stakeholders cannot offer a definitive and convincing answer to this fundamental question but hesitate between varieties of perspectives. The term perspective is understood as a looking at the field from a different angle and thus asking different questions, taking other units of analysis as a starting point and collecting new kinds of empirical material (Pennix, Spenser and Van Hear 2008, p. 11).

The answers vary synchronically and diachronically, between the poles of multiculturalism and non-differentialism, as well as from one period to another. A second paradox is that as a general rule theories are better equipped than policies, the latter being not prepared, not willing, or not ready, to apply knowledge into practice. This is not the case of integration: both policies and theories vacillate, experiment, fail, and develop.

Four methodological preliminaries should be clarified: the first concerns the triangle concepts – realities – normativity; the second focuses on the key target group of the INTEGRACE study – refugee and asylum-seeking children (RASC); the third summarizes the theoretical expectations for the comparative analysis; the final one specifies the relations between the institutional incentive structures and the strategic decisions of migrants.

First, the integration as a concept faces two challenges – one which is empirical and one is normative: it covers a large gamut of practices and is heavily burdened with normative pathos:

The fact that the same concepts are used in different national and local contexts – integration policy or multicultural policies – may create the illusion of similar, if not the same, phenomena. Empirical research, however, has shown not only the ideas and assumptions behind such policies are different, but the practice and measures of such policies vary considerably between both places and situations….. (Pennix, Spencer, Van Hear 2008, p.10).

Second, the project clearly identifies one target group – RASC, yet the national reports differ in their legal and political definitions.

Three cases can be distinguished. The first group comprises countries like Estonia and Netherlands which prefer not to introduce differentiations: “Refugee children are not treated as a separate administrative category: they are simply classified as (first-generation) migrants” (Report on the Netherlands, p. 14). The Czech Republic also applies a common approach to educational integration for both migrant and refugee children (Report on the Czech Republic, p. 21). The second cluster of legal and political invisibility of RASC comprises countries such as Croatia neither migrant children and RASC, nor their educational, integration have been a specific focus of research. Serbia belongs to the same group. The lack of policies and strategies is due to the specific migration profile of source rather than destination state (Report on Serbia, p. 18). The third cluster includes most countries that subdivide the target group in numerous categories. Germany distinguishes six subgroups: asylum seekers, recognised refugees, beneficiaries of subsidiary protection, persons with “tolerated stay” (Duldung), persons with a right of continued abode after several years of “tolerated stay” (Bleiberecht), persons with other forms of regular stay in Germany, persons with irregular stay (Report on Germany, p. 2).

Third, comparative analyses have the capacity to bring knowledge forward. They facilitate the differentiation between practices that are part of a more general trend versus innovative, experimental ones. The present study will build on the strengths of the comparative approach. The reader should, however, be aware of its sphere of validity, since it is based on the findings of the national INTEGRACE reports.

Fourth, integration is conceived of as the result of the intersection of institutional incentive structures and the strategic decisions of migrants themselves (Freeman 2004, p. 950). The INTEGRACE study adopts primarily the first perspective.

The main hypothesis of the present comparative analysis is that integration models and strategies depend predominantly on four factors: the number of refugees; the history of their settlement; the type of host country– transit or target and the political will of elites.

2. Objectives and methodology

3. Integration – typology of models

We need to be in contact with any people! All people! To be able to go to their homes.

I feel a little bit scared because I don’t know the people here.

 16-year-old boy asylum seeker in Norway

Educational integration is understood as a “dynamic approach of responding positively to pupil diversity and of seeing individual differences not as problems, but as opportunities for enriching learning” (UNESCO 2005a, p. 12).

“I’m not comfortable with generalizations or details; only their encounter satisfies me”, writes Tzvetan Todorov (1993, p. XIII). The interplay between generalizations and “details” like empirical realities will be the focus of this chapter. It aims to analyse the concept of integration in two regards:

Typology – different models of management of the ethno-cultural diversity and examples of countries which come more or less closer to the ideal types;

Diachrony – the concept has evolved over the past decades oscillating from more multiculturalist to more civic “republican” understandings.

The author shares Gary Freeman’s scepticism that “efforts to capture variations in typologies of incorporation schemes is likely to prove both futile and misleading” (Freeman 2004, p. 945) and that the variations among countries are significant: “Efforts at accommodation have run from apparent willingness to see immigrant minorities permanently excluded from full membership in the host society, insistence on more or less complete assimilation into a presume national cultural norm, to more or less enthusiastic capitulation to multiculturalism” (Freeman 2004, p. 945).

The European scholarly and political context could be summarized in four peculiarities:

1. Immigration has been a fact in Europe for more than a century, but the road from the reality to the identity has proven to be long and hard. “The European states have consistently seen themselves as non-immigration countries, in contrast to countries like Canada, Australia and the US. While the rhetoric about being “nations of immigrants” is strong in the latter countries, it has been absent in Europe despite the fact that some countries have had higher immigration rates than the classical immigration countries” (Pennix, Spencer, van Hear, p. 5).
2. Controlling immigrant flows and ensuring the inclusion of new settlers were distinct policies for a long period, the first based on national security, the second – on solidarity, tolerance and human rights. Now, they are becoming more and more interconnected: “Integration policy measures are used to select those immigrants that are able and willing to integrate and deter those who are not” (Pennix, Spencer, van Hear p. 6).
3. The European Union is characterized by a large variety of immigration experiences, on the one hand, and a communitarisation of migration policy on the other: a framework for common migration policies started to be introduced after 1997 and for integration policies in 2003.

• 4. One of the political illusions of the post-communism was that the ethno-cultural lesson was an easy one to learn. Post-communism was both eager and ready to learn the correct, democratic way of management of minority and migration issues, and to apply it to respective groups in the various countries. This turned out to be a much more difficult task than originally envisaged for two reasons. First, there are several models of integration in Europe. Second, countries evolve over time; they revise or reject former policies and develop new ones. The elaboration of a balanced and fair model for dealing with change is a test for political maturity of both elites and civil society.

The integration policies of EU countries could be classified to belong to three types: interculturalism/multiculturalism, non-differentalism, human rights approach.

3.1. Interculturalsim/multiculturalism

Interculturalism is based on the idea of public expression of ethnic, linguistic and religious differences between children and a school, which assumes the responsibility to encourage them. Ireland offers an elaborate political definition. It stems from the understanding of integration as a bilateral process aiming to integrate migrants within Irish society and Irish society with migrants. Intercultural education “respects, celebrates, and recognises, the normality of diversity in all areas of human life. It promotes equality and human rights; challenges unfair discrimination” (Report on Ireland, p. 20). The intercultural approach promotes interaction, collaboration and exchange with people of different cultures, ethnicity or religion living in the same territory (Report on Portugal, p. 19). Interculturalism is clearly defined and emphasized is several reports and expresses the authors’ ideological choice.

Poland has chosen this model: “The school has a duty to support students in maintaining their national, ethnic identity, practicing their religion, and using their mother tongues “(Report on Poland, p. 14). The intercultural sensitivity and openness of school to the cultural diversity is expressed in regard of the major indicators of identity like language and religion, as well as in other aspects like dress code and gender relations: “Chechen girls are allowed to exercise in long trousers or skirts during physical exercise classes. Pupils are allowed to attend swimming classes separately from boys” (Report on Poland, p.21). The new reforms of education of migrants and refugees in Luxembourg introduced intercultural approaches, diversity training of teachers, intercultural mediators (Report on Luxembourg, p. 11).

Several stakeholders involved in RASC education and migrant integration share the multiculturalist perspective. In a number of countries, however, it is not supported either by the decision makers, or by the general public. The report on Malta examines such a divergence: the director of a primary school acknowledges that “Malta is a multicultural society – a fact still denied by many Maltese people; some even deny the possibility of Malta becoming a multicultural society” (Report on Malta, p.14).

3.2. Non-differentialism

The liberal understanding of integration is based on the vision of individuals as autonomous beings and sees participation in society as an autonomous choice: “The individual chooses whether or not to participate, to what extent and by which means” (Report on Belgium, p.26).

France has always been the classic example of a civic republican approach. It is reluctant to multiculturalism because of the understanding of a direct link between the state and the citizens, not mediated by the communities. This conception is deep-rooted in the French political culture. The INTEGRACE study provides evidence for this approach. France deliberately chooses not to apply specific programs for RASC. Differentiation is not stimulated; on the contrary, it is considered an impediment to integration:

The offer of special programs for educational accompaniment has never been addressed specifically to the refugees…..This is the result of a deliberate choice not to regard refugees as a particularly weak or needy group. This approach is regarded positively by the interviewees, who consider the school environment a context of integration in which excessive differentiation would not be positive (Report on France, p.26).

Policies in various countries, such as France, Spain, the Netherlands, Sweden avoid ethnic, cultural, religious classifications and construct neutral categories. The focus of integration policies is not on RASC, defined as such, but on “newly arrived” children: “In the last ten years the focus of integration policies has moved to primo-arrivants “(Report on France, p.17). “Students with special needs” (NEE, Necesidades Educativas Especiales) is the social category Spain forged to encompass RASC together with other foreign students: “A student is regarded as an NEE candidate when educational and/or linguistic lacunae are evident. NEE also encompasses students with physical, psychological and/or social problems” (Report on Spain, p. 11). The Netherlands applies a similar approach. The social categories used to refer to RASC are “social disadvantaged” and “children with special needs” in the context of policies for their educational education. The Netherlands is a newcomer in the liberal camp and, according to the famous adage, are ‘more catholic than the pope’, more strict in avoiding multicultural practices. The reasons for this ideological purity will be analyzed below.

3.3.Human rights approach

The right to education has formally been recognized as a human right since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and affirmed in numerous major HR treaties, such as Convention against Discrimination in Education (1960), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966). These treaties establish an entitlement to free compulsory primary education for all children (UNICEF and UNESCO 2007, p. 7).

The Human Rights Based Approach is developed by UN and applied by its Agencies to education, health, employments, etc. Two of its principles are particularly relevant to RASC educational integration: universality and inalienability, as well as equality and non-discrimination. All people everywhere in the world are entitled to human rights. The human person cannot voluntarily give them up. Nor can others take them away from him or her. All human beings are entitled to their human rights without discrimination of any kind, such as race, colour, ethnicity, language, religion, national or social origin, birth or other status (UN 2003). It’s based on the idea of human development as expanding people’s choices with education being one of its three main pillars. The human development paradigm does not regard people as passive beneficiaries of economic and social activities. People must become active agents of social change. This connotes opportunities for participation, empowerment, and access to information (Fukuda-Parr and Kumar 2005). The human right based approach is an alternative to the needs-based or service-delivery approach (UNICEF and UNESCO 2007, p. 9).  People are recognized as key actors in their own development, rather than passive recipients of commodities and services (UN 2003).

Germany and Austria label their approach to integration as based on ‘human rights’. This should be understood as a political and ideological label. By no means does it imply that the other countries are disrespectful to refugee rights. Human rights highlight empowerment of right-holder – here: child refugees and asylum-seeking children – and accountability of duty-bearers – here: primarily the government, with its relevant authorities in areas such as asylum and migration, education, social assistance and child and youth welfare services (Report on Germany, p.1). This thorough and elaborate definition demonstrates the high normative pathos of the human rights approach. The integration conceived by the human rights perspective is extremely ambitious and mobilizes several other politico-normative categories, such as equality, non-discrimination, participation, empowerment, and accountability.

Most countries mix elements, practices, experiences, experiments inspired or imported by one or the other of the main models.

The diachronic analysis is as eloquent as the typological one. It shows that policies are not crystallized models; the same countries can shift from one conception of integration to another, sometimes opposite one. The Dutch report is the most thorough in this regard. Three stages are distinguished[2]:

1. Initially, Dutch policy-makers assumed that migrants’ stay would be temporary and did not encourage any form of integration.
2. Policies introduced in 1983 encouraged these groups to integrate while retaining their own cultural identity, and set up special programmes to improve educational opportunities and increase labour market participation.
3. Towards the end of the 1990’s support for these ‘multicultural’ policies declined sharply, ushering in a new approach to integration. This focused on learning Dutch and accepting Dutch cultural norms. A similar shift can be observed in many European countries, but since Dutch policies had previously been overtly ‘migrant-friendly’, the change was felt all the more keenly (Vasta, 2007, quoted in the Report on the Netherlands, p. 3-4).

For decades the Netherlands had been an exemplary case of multiculturalism. Today, the country is again in the vanguard of a new trend – to more restrictive immigration policies, to a more liberal understanding of integration. The new political fashion shifts the focus – if before the emphasis was on the state and its responsibilities, now the migrant /refugee becomes the main actor of integration and is to assume much greater responsibilities. The host, which used to be friendly and welcoming, has become demanding and insistent. The burden – financial, cultural, and social – of integration is increasingly being placed on migrants’/refugees’ shoulders.

The same policy shift, from integration as a shared responsibility and two-way process to the migrant as a key bearer of the responsibility, is observed in Belgium:

In the 1990’s the term ‘integration’ still implied a two-way process, in which both the host society and migrants would adapt themselves to each other. From about 2000, however, the term was used increasingly to refer simply to what migrants had to do; this shift can be observed in many European countries, as the backlash against multiculturalism set in (Report on Belgium, p.12).

The INTEGRACE study confirms a more general trend that North-West European countries have moved from earlier conceptions of integration policies that “focuses on the position of newcomers in society to one that is primarily focussing on the cohesion of societies as a whole and on commonalities that are supposed to be crucial for such social cohesion” (Pennix, Spencer, Van Hear 2008, p. 6). Gary Freeman is more explicit in describing this shift:

Post-1960s scholarship delegitimized assimilation as either a policy goal or analytical concept, but there is growing concern this critique went too far. Alba and Nee have bravely called for the resurrection of the assimilation model, properly modified. Others [like Brubaker] detect evidence of a return to assimilationist policies in Western democracies (Freeman 2004, p. 946).

The comparative study demonstrates there is no one best model of the educational integration of refugee children, but a variety of experiences which resemble often a patchwork, bricolage of practices, projects, innovation, and experience. The time of the big ideological models is over as the new ones rely more on the imagination and activities of social actors. The INTEGRACE study of educational integration of RASC confirms the more general trend that “states possess a patchwork of multidimensional frameworks that hardly merit the appellation ‘type’. Some elements of these frameworks are similar across states, while others are not; some are consistent with stated government goals with respect to immigrant incorporation, whereas others are not” (Freeman 2004, p. 946).

4.Politics, policies, governance

It takes courage to be a refugee! Everyone comes from desperation.

Everyone would like to live where he was born.

15-year-old boy asylum seeker in Norway

Immigration presents challenges for both politics and policies:

Politics refers to the instrumentalisation of immigration by the political actors and the role of (anti)immigration discourse for the political identity and strategy of a number of parties in various countries. This dimension remains beyond the scope of the present study, but is crucial for making sense of public policies. The political discourse defines the priorities and opens or restricts horizons to policies. In Nordic countries (Norway, Denmark) right wing parties have strengthen their positions. In Sweden the party Sweden Democrats entered the Parliament (2010) with a very conservative agenda to dramatically revise the migration policy qualified as “too permissive and generous” (Report on Sweden, p. 1). The securitization of immigration policy in the last decade strongly influences the modalities, forms, and funding of integration. The UK clearly illustrates this trend. The drive of the previous British government for a comprehensive refugee integration policy led in 2004 to the issuing of Aiming High: Guidance on Supporting the Education of Asylum-Seeking and Refugee Children. “The change of government in 2010 led to the archiving of national good practice guidelines and removal from the website of the Department for Education. The good practice guidelines are no longer being promoted” (Report on UK, p.22). In several countries the reports identify two opposite trends: the societies become more multiculturalist in terms of demography, workforce and cultural practices, yet politics are increasingly reluctant and hostile to multiculturalism. The INTEGRATE project is developed against this opposition and identifies good practices of openness and inclusion.

Policies refers to a variety of public policies among which educational one for the inclusion and integration of migrant and refugee children. The State holds the primary responsibility for the realization of the right to education. It has the obligations to fulfil the right to education by “ensuring that education is available for all children and positive measure are taken to enable children to benefit from it” (UNICEF and UNESCO 2007, p. 39). Governmental agencies should be hold accountable for the access and quality of education. UNESCO sets the standards for a good policy of educational integration: transparency, accountability, access to justice and stakeholder participation (ibid, p. 122). Norway provides an original example of institutionalization of governmental accountability: the Ombudsman for children. Although the Ombudsman is administratively under the jurisdiction of the Ministry for Children and Family Affairs, neither the Norwegian Parliament nor the Government have the power to instruct the Ombudsman. The duties of the Ombudsman are to promote the interests of children (vis-à-vis public and private authorities (Report on Norway, p. 12, 13).

The analysis emphasizes three groups of political factors with impact on educational integration and measures their degree of relevance. The first group of factors concerns the issue of integration and the way it is articulated in political discourse. The second makes visible the political interest in strategies and programs guiding public policies. The third asks the question how the centralisation-decentralisation of education and integration practices influences their effectiveness.

The concept of integration has different political visibility in the analyzed countries. In some it enjoys clear legal and political definitions and is articulated in activities, assigned responsibilities, timetables in strategies and programs. In others, such as Malta, no integration plan has been developed.

Therefore, two opposite cases can be identified. The Maltese one illustrates the first of a negative interdependence: the lack of political definition implies a lack of consistent integration policy and vice versa. Malta has not designed any national integration plan and ranked twenty third among twenty-eight countries in Europe in terms of integration (Report on Malta, p.16). Poland demonstrates the opposite pole: integration is not defined in any legal document, but the country has a good record in RASC integration.

4.1.Politics and representations

Political will and commitment are crucial prerequisites for the success of educational integration. Politics and public opinion are interdependent. The fluctuations of the latter are expressed in political parties’ discourse and the electoral attitudes. They do not determine but largely influence the orientation of both politics and policies. The last half century has seen a significant shift from positive and supportive attitudes towards refugees to more negative representations and demands for restrictive measures. Two factors are crucial for this change: overall numbers and educational levels. The less numerous and the more educated the refugees, the more positive the public support, while the more numerous and less educated they are, the more restrictive and negative the representations. The Dutch report accounts for these developments:

During the period 1950 – 1985, the image of refugees and asylum seekers was very different from that of labour migrants: refugees were often fleeing from despised regimes and many were middle-class, educated dissidents. The public thus held a much more favourable opinion of refugees than of migrants. In the last ten years almost all political parties have adopted an increasingly hard line on immigration and integration (Report on the Netherlands, p. 10).

This analysis is based on the Dutch case, although it more or less applies to all major European countries with significant immigrant flows. Legislative and policy changes in the UK are moving in the same direction: building ‘barriers’, making the legal entry of asylum-seekers much more difficult, restricting asylum-seekers’ social and legal rights, including the right to work, benefits, housing and higher education; tightening the substantive by which asylum cases are judged, so that proportionally more asylum-seekers are refused refugee status or ELR than in the late 1980s (Report on UK, p. 9).

The political discourse on immigration, security, borders, defines the frames within which policies of educational integration are located. The increasing focus on security succeeds in marginalizing them in several cases, however, in some, integration still defends a central position: in Norway the discourse on the need to control national borders competes with the discourse on protection of the child, while in Denmark the former discourse prevails (Report on Norway, p. 20).

4.2. Strategies

The political weight attributed to RASC educational integration could be measured by the type of political documents the policy rests upon. In this chapter, the strategic plans and programs developed by some states will be examined. They testify to the significant political attention paid to integration and contribute to the policy’s sustainability.

The Irish approach is exemplary. Ireland has voted two strategies covering both the object – the children, and the means – the intercultural education. The National Children Strategy (2000) advocates a “whole children perspective”: All children are cherished and supported by family and the wider society; where they enjoy a fulfilling childhood and realise their potential. The right of all children to play and the right to recreational facilities are also identified as basic needs” (Report on Ireland, p.26). Ireland is a pioneer in developing its Intercultural Education Strategy for 2010-2015. It aims to support and improve the quality, relevance and inclusiveness of education for every learner in Ireland, as well as to ensure that:

All students experience education, which “(…) respects the diversity of values, beliefs, languages and traditions in Irish society and is conducted in a spirit of partnership;[3]

All education providers are assisted with ensuring that inclusion and integration within an intercultural environment become the norm (Report on Ireland, p. 20).

Lithuania has developed an Action plan Education for all for the period 2003 – 2015. Portugal has adopted a similar approach exemplified in the Action Plan of the Ministry of Education, elaborated and implemented to support students whose first language was not Portuguese, encouraging cultural pluralism, and making sure immigrant and refugee students are integrated into mainstream education (Report on Portugal, p.17). The National Action Plan on Integration and Against Discrimination 2010-2014 of Luxembourg has provisions concerning education, such as training the educational personnel in intercultural knowledge and launching an overhaul of educational counselling and orientation tools (Report on Luxembourg, p. 10).

The strategic vision and the policy document articulating the priorities in short, medium, and long term perspective is needed in all countries , but still lacking in most of them. Austria formulates clearly this paradox:

In The National Plan of Action for Integration, adopted by the Government on 19 January 2010, refugees are mentioned only once in the beginning of the NPA, asylum-seekers not at all. A comprehensive integration strategy with short-, medium- and long-term measures specifically designed for refugees and asylum-seekers – for adults and children alike –  has not yet been developed (Report on Austria ).

Policy documents such as strategies, programs, and plans formulate the “philosophy” of integration and often define the instruments and mechanisms to achieve it: The Equality Act (2001) in the UK streamlines race, gender and disability duties into a single requirement (Report on UK, p. 13).  British schools are required to produce a three-year school development plan – a strategic document that sets performance targets (Report on UK, p. 27).

The Strategies are an important policy instrument. They attest to the political maturity of decision-makers and contribute substantially to the sustainability of policies. They are of high relevance to the analysis of the positive political factors impacting RASC integration.

4.3.Policies versus projects

The question arises where good practices are to be located. Two loci compete for ‘hosting’ them –namely, policies and projects, i.e. the governmental and the non-governmental sector. The former mobilizes state resources while the latter relies more on the civil society’s actors and short-term funding at lower levels. The first is more sustainable, whereas the second illustrates the vitality of solidarity, the spirit of innovation, and of shared responsibility.

The comparative analysis should start with the assumption that the significance of the distinction between the governmental and civil sectors does not apply with equal force in the different INTEGRACE countries. This leads to the paradox that civil society’s workforce in the Netherlands is thirty-three times greater than in Sweden – yet both countries are welfare states in which voluntary work and the ‘private sector’ play minor roles (Report on the Netherlands, p. 21). The NGOs working on RASC integration in the country belong to two different groups – one which could be described by resorting to the classic definition of an association as a civil society organisation, while the other is institutionally much closer to the governmental sector:

Many of the service providers, advisory bodies and centres of expertise dealing with RASC are only in a limited sense ‘non-governmental’. At the other end of the spectrum can be found more typical NGO’s such as action groups or lobbies, sometimes set up precisely to oppose government policy and usually independent of government funding (Report on the Netherlands, p. 21).

Both policies and projects contain good practices, but their scope, as well as their transferability, varies from country to country. The optimal solution of complementarities of policies and projects is not found in all case studies. The Belgium report describes some integration policies, but does not include examples of projects. Some countries like Estonia have a very limited number of projects, which could be explained by the limited number of RASC. The Bulgarian case is similar to the Estonian one. Poland shares with Estonia and Bulgaria the same political past and for some time had a similar migration profile. Path dependency did not play a role in this case, however, and today Poland can pride itself on its successful RASC integration in terms of both policies and projects.

Path dependency does have explanatory value in another case: the Netherlands has kept a very good record in RASC integration, even after shifting to more restrictive immigration policies. The ‘path dependency’ model explains the paradox that in spite of the increased hostility to migrants, integration policies remain favourable. This is due to the complex ensemble of institutions and individuals perpetuating the former situation (Report on the Netherlands, p. 11).

The two main strengths of the policies are their sustainability and their capacity for anticipation. The former is illustrated by the finding that the structural features of the educational system could be very beneficial for RASC. Belgium, equalizing policies and practices, is an interesting example: “Belgian policies with respect to the inclusion of refugee and asylum-seeking children and adolescents into the educational system are clearly ‘good practices’“(Report on Belgium, p. 22). Policies’ sustainability is expressed also by the capacity of governmental agencies to change and to back the new orientations by funding and personnel. Luxembourg has undergone substantial positive changes in educational integration and secured them by employing an expert on education of refugee children in the Ministry of education, as well as intercultural mediators (Report on Luxembourg, p. 10).

Estonia offers a good example of the capacity for anticipation, of efforts to prepare the educational system for the challenges of RASC. Even though the country has an extremely small number of RASC – five altogether – the Ministry of education has already published the book ‘New immigration children and Estonian education. Educational policy principles and educational administration’ (Report on Estonia, p. 19). This anticipatory policy allows the schools to react professionally to the first RASC:

Projects compete with policies in anticipating probable future trends or even unexpected developments. Estonia again offers nice examples in this regard, developing projects for testing civil servants’ readiness for work with RASC before a possible mass influx of refugees. The projects are more flexible and open to imagination and creativity. They result in the activity and participation of civil society actors and further endorse them. They suffer, however, from two major weaknesses: dependency on EU funding and lack of sustainability. Instruments for a smooth take-over by national authorities funding are still to be developed by most countries (there are good practices like in Austria which already provide follow-up funding for some initiatives) (Report on Austria, p. 36.).

Policies and projects differ also in terms of transferability. Policies are much more path dependent, and they stem from national political cultures and traditions in governance and integration. Projects are smaller in cope and more focused on goals and target groups, which facilitates their transferability. This transferability is hampered by a major contradiction of EU funding schemes, which favor innovation to the adaptation and adoption of established good practices. Another restriction of the transferability of project-driven activities will be discussed in the chapter on good practices.

4.4.Programs

Whether RASC should be identified as a distinct target group for educational measures is a major political question. The existing practices gravitate around two major clusters with a lot of intermediary practices in-between.

One set of practices is characterized by the development of specific programs and the formation of special classes. France offers special classes for pupils according to their level of studies: when pupils have received little or no education at all in their country of origin (Elèves Non Scolarisés Antérieurement, NSA), they are placed in specific reception classes, according to age. If the pupils have already attended elementary school in their country of origin, they are offered some more specific study hours, which generally deal with teaching French. In middle and high schools, recently arrived foreign students are dealt with through CLA (Classes d’Accueil), (Report on France, p. 20). Estonia also gravitates around this cluster with its practices of personalized approach and individual curricula for RASC. It illustrates it by the good practice of a specialized school teaching each child individually, based on their age, language skills and personal preferences (Report on Estonia, p. 20).

The other cluster unites countries which integrate RASC in the general educational system without specific measures. Austria is a case in point: “The Austrian educational system hardly provides specific programmes, pedagogical measures. The development of projects, excursions and exchange programmes dealing with refugees still strongly depends on the individual engagement of teachers and school leaders” (Report on Austria, p. 17). The Austrian report is very critical on the lack of specific attention to the most vulnerable groups, such as unaccompanied children or children victims of crime (Report on Austrian, p.36).

There is also a trend of passing from one practice to the other.  The Netherlands is a typical example of a country in transition from schooling in special classed towards general ones. Schools do not differentiate between nationals and non-nationals. Ireland follows the same path of not segregated approach for educational success. “Over the last decade segregated practice has been replaced in favour of the age-appropriate integrated provision” (Report on Ireland, p. 17).

4.5. Local governance

The aim of this section is to identify whether decentralisation positively impacts RASC educational integration.

Several countries have opted for decentralization of educational integration responsibilities. In Belgium there is a clear division of tasks: the federal level has assumed controls on immigration, while the community level is in charge of inclusion. The three Communities (Dutch-speaking, French-speaking and German-speaking) are in charge of all matters concerning the integration of ‘newcomers’ (including their education) (Report on Belgium, p. 14). Similarly, the main characteristic of Hungary’s public education administration is decentralization (Report on Hungary, p. 21). Germany counts sixteen separate systems of education (Report on Germany, p. 15); there are eleven in Spain (Report on Spain, p. 11). The Austrian educational system is also characterized by a very distinct and complex decentralised system. In general, it can be stated that federal and provincial authorities have mixed competences in the areas of legislation and implementation (Report on Austria, p.14).

In terms of responsibilities for the implementation of RASC educational integration, the clear identification of the relevant level of governance is crucial. In terms of outcomes, it is much less relevant. We see that the countries which have opted for a more decentralised educational administration belong to different models of diversity management: Austria and Germany have adhered to the human rights approach, while Belgium exemplifies the shift from more open to more restrictive policies. The real question is not so much which is the most appropriate level of governance, but rather how to improve integration measures. This paradox is emphasized in the Swedish report.

The decentralization of the educational system impacts in two opposite ways. From one side, it allows schools and municipalities to develop locally tailored solutions adapted to the composition of the migrant groups. From another side, there is a risk that municipalities or schools with less experience may not have the capacity to respond to linguistic and cultural diversity (Report on Sweden, p. 22).

Decentralisation of education

The debate conducted in educational institutions and the media seems to focus on how can improved support mechanisms foster children’s success in the existing education system, rather than explore possibilities for changing the structure of the system itself (Report on Germany, p. 15). Evidence can be found in several reports that one should not privilege any level of governance, but rather develop integration at each of them, as well as improve the relations among them. Finland is a positive example of good practices at local level which together with efficient policies provide newcomers with stable conditions for integration (Report on Finland, p. 24).

5.Education as empowerment

Develop children’s personalities, talents, and mental and physical abilities

to their fullest potential.

Convention on the right of the child

If there is a unanimous consensus among all scholars and decision makers, it concerns education as the royal road to integration. The study develops the idea of education as empowerment. Empowerment means improving people’s capabilities to demand and use their human rights. The goal is to give people the power and capabilities to change their lives and influence their destinies (UNICEF and UNESCO 2007). The empowerment aims at helping people to overcome their passive powerless position by giving them tools (knowledge, skills) to become active agents in the fight for a better life. Empowerment s a powerful concept, because it emphasizes both on right-holders and their participation, as well as on duty-bearers with their obligations and responsibilities. The concept of empowerment develops the idea that “people cannot not be developed; they must develop themselves” (UNICEF and UNESCO 2007, p. 14). The Right to education project stresses children should be recognized as key actors in their own development, rather than passive beneficiaries of services (ibid).

Education can contribute to: overcoming the marginalisation of vulnerable groups; combating poverty and deprivation; integrating migrants; developing the full potential of pupils intellectually, socially and morally; empowering youngsters. The idea of the long term positive impact of education is nicely formulated in the title of one Lithuanian project “Active integration today – success tomorrow” (Report on Lithuania, p. 10).

INTEGRACE project conceives education as “one of the most effective tools towards breaking the cycle of intergenerational poverty and deprivation” (Report on Ireland, p. 1) and that empowerment leads to self-sufficiency. A strong political expression of the idea of empowerment is the understanding of children as full citizens. The Irish report emphasizes this high awareness from which stems the national policy on children’s integration: “children are respected as young citizens with a valued contribution to make and a voice of their own” (Pasiut Report on Ireland, p. 26).

Education is valued and ranked high among the key public issues. For such a perspective to be successful, it should be relatively independent of the governmental majorities and political fluctuations. It requires a national consensus and legal procedures to back and guarantee its high status. Austria is a case in point: “Enacting educational laws is similar to constitutional amendments, as it generally requires a qualified two-thirds majority in parliament and therefore an agreement/compromise among the main political parties” (Report on Austria, p. 35). ‘Educate and empower’ is a powerful idea which has inspired several projects and programs in Austria, among which Dynamo and its large network of participating partners. The lesson to be learned from their experience is the comprehensive approach. Empowerment can be achieved only through a broad range of qualification skills and educational achievements of RASC aiming in the short term at integration into the educational system, and in the long term – at integration into the labour market (Report on Austria, 21-24). The same comprehensive approach is applied also by the Minerva program, facilitating RASC integration into the Austrian education system, as well as offering basic education, based on the concept of life-long learning (Report on Austria, 29 – 30).

A strong empowerment effect can be achieved by the active participation of refugees in various campaigns and civic initiatives. This is the conclusion of the assessment of the Spanish “chatting” campaign: participation is “an important opportunity to give meaning to one’s experience, and to gain a definition of one’s situation in the community to which one has recently been introduced” (Report on Spain, p. 15).

5.1. Child-centred pedagogy

In all aspects of the education system, consideration of the child’s best interests

must be a primary consideration.

Education must seek to promote children’s optimum development.

Convention on the rights of the child and education

“The child-friendly learning concept promotes child-seeking, child-centred, gender-sensitive, inclusive, community-involved, protective and healthy approaches to schooling and out-of-school education” (UNICEF and UNESCO 2007, p. 66). The child-centred approach conceives the child as the centre of the educational universe and requires that programs and methods adapt to his/her needs rather than the other way round. It presupposes more flexible forms of teaching and organization. In the classical approach different curricula have been developed for children with specific (dis)abilities and problems, in the new one the regular curricula should be taught in an adapted way to children with different needs (UNESCO 1994). A flexible structure and timetable allow a less rigid and more inclusive approach. This pedagogy is particularly relevant to the RASC.

5.2. The case of the unaccompanied children

Unaccompanied minors are a case in itself. They have specificities in regards of the procedures for recognising refugees and in the system of reception and integration. They are considered an extremely vulnerable group. Some of them are not identified at the ports of entry and may be for a long time before they come to the attention of authorities.  The Irish study reports the alarming fact that “traffickers were most likely aware of the locations of the UAM hostels and whether they were staffed appropriately by qualified childcare workers” (Report on Ireland, p. 6). Unaccompanied children are sometimes victims of trafficking and thus highly risk group: “The majority of UAM are adolescents, who are at risk of engaging in unsafe sexual behaviour, drug and alcohol abuse. They are particularly at high risk of sexual exploitation and of being trafficked or re-trafficked” (Report on Ireland, p. 2).

The unaccompanied minors are relatively recent phenomenon – it emerged in mid-end 90-ies. Europe is the favourite destination and hosts 81% of the flows. In 2009, 15,100 of the 18,700 claims lodged globally (Report on UK, p. 7). The flows of UAM are uneven and vary significantly from one country to another. At one pole we see Estonia where they are not identified. At the other pole are United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Sweden. The data are particularly scarce and unreliable; the different reports provide different figures. Analysing the contradictions in data is not the object of this comparative report aiming to identify the main types of countries and trends of UAM. France has a very high record of about 6000 in total and 500 entries per year; the stock is considerable and the trend is growing (Report on France, p. 3, p. 5). In Germany the total number is high (3000), yet the trend is decreasing significantly over the last decade (from 1075 in 2001 to 180 in 2007), only in 2008 the figures raised to 324 (Report on Germany, p. 5). In Sweden the number of unaccompanied minors constantly increases (from 398 in 2005 to 2, 250 in 2009) (Report on Sweden, p.7).

Between the two poles we could distinguish different cases: uneven flows in Norway, very low numbers in Malta and the Czech Republic, increasing trend in Hungary and Luxembourg, decreasing trend in Ireland, the Netherlands. The legislation also varies. Policies and law in Estonia do not distinguish unaccompanied minors from other RASC. In most countries UM enjoy good protection; they cannot be subject to expulsion and benefits from the same treatment as native minors.

The best practices concerning education integration of UM could be summarized in four groups:

• Specialised schools with qualified personnel for dealing with kids in post-traumatic situation. An interesting example is the supplementary public school in Munich for unaccompanied minor refugees, in which “social workers and teachers developed a particular school concept incorporating the special needs of young refugees, who have often been traumatized by violence and armed conflict” (Report on Germany, p. 24).
• Mentoring programs. An original example is the Big Brother Big Sister “Mentoring Programme” in Dublin where young people are matched with a designated adult volunteer for the purpose of developing a long term supportive friendship (Report on Ireland, p. 25). Another interesting initiative of the Dublin Vocational educational committee is the Homework Club where Leaving, Junior Certificate and Third Level students receive evening individual tuition in a variety of subjects by a designated adult volunteer (Report on Ireland, p. 25). SAMIE (Reception centre for isolated minors) in France facilitates the educational integration of UAM organising classes in literacy, French and Maths (Report on France, p. 24). Human rights of unaccompanied minors are particularly sensitive issues. In Norway an unaccompanied child is always appointed a guardian. The guardian is to ensure that the child receives all the benefits he/she is entitled to and to promote the child’s legal and financial interests (Report on Norway, p. 10).
• Reception and orientation centres. CAOMIDA in France is an innovative example, because it “allows young people who have never gone to school first to learn the basics of reading and writing, while also adapting to the rules and rhythms of school” (Report on France, p.23). The Centre offers a variety of educational services: internal classes and accompaniment of UAM through their education in the public system, cultural activities, classes in French language. A key factor for the sustainability of this good practice is the national funding which guarantees that the services are stable and reliable.
• Recreation and personal development programmes. Art and sport are mobilized for UAM: the Dublin Vocational educational committee exemplifies a rich bouquet of Multi Media, Dance, D.J Mixing, Football, Swimming, Outdoor Pursuit’s, Communication Skills, Sexual Health, Rights and Entitlements (Report on Ireland, p. 25).

6. Good practices – typology and transferability

Before there were policies, there were practices:

schools could not wait for policies to be formulated

and debated when pupils were sitting in their classrooms

who could not follow the language of instruction

Glen and de Jong 1996, p. 406

The policies – practices interrelations are problematic, but they will not be discussed below. Having already introduced the policy context, I will address the twofold objective of this chapter:  to “organize” the good practices in meaningful subgroups and to analyze the peculiarities and the conditions of transferability of each of them.

The comparative analysis is inspired by the concept of the four A – availability, accessibility, acceptability and adaptability, developed by the former UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, Katarina Tomasevski (Tomasevski, 2006): availability – that education is free and government-funded and that there is adequate infrastructure and trained teachers able to support education delivery; accessibility – that the system is non- discriminatory and accessible to all, and that positive steps are taken to include the most marginalised; acceptability – that the content of education is relevant, non-discriminatory and culturally appropriate, and of quality; that the school itself is safe and teachers are professional; adaptability – that education can evolve with the changing needs of society and contribute to challenging inequalities, such as gender discrimination, and that it can be adapted locally to suit specific contexts (Right to education project).

6.1. Right versus access to education

Education must be provided without discrimination on any grounds.

Convention on the rights of the child and education

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes education as a human right: “Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory”.(Universal Declaration…1948). The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights develops the idea of the “right to everyone” and states that primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all (The International Covenant 1966). The international standards for educational integration, equally applicable to RASC, are defined by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child: access to education should be maintained during all phases of the displacement; every child irrespective of status should have full access to education, without discrimination, in particular, unaccompanied girls; access to quality education should also be ensured for children with special needs, in particular for children with disabilities; any child should be registered with appropriate school authorities as soon as possible and get assistance in maximizing learning opportunities; children have the right to maintain their cultural identity and values, including the maintenance and development of their native language; adolescents should be allowed to enrol in vocational/professional training or education; early learning programmes should be made available to young children, children should be provided with school certificates or other documentation indicating their level of education, in particular in preparation of relocation, resettlement or return.

All INTEGRACE countries are inspired by these principles, but prioritize them differently and apply them with varying success. The right to education is translated in different policies with a changing proportion of universalism and multiculturalism. The practices form two clusters: the first offers equal access, the second – a differentiated one.

The first cluster of countries guarantees immigrants the same educational opportunities as the natives. The Irish report formulates clearly the equal access approach based on “the understanding that enrolment in school is without prejudice related to status” (Report on Ireland, p. 17), the Spanish approach is identical: “every child from the ages of 6 to 16 has the right to education, notwithstanding their judicial status” (Report on Spain, p. 10). The Czech Republic extends the age of compulsory education irrespective of the legal status till the age of 18 (Report on  Czech republic, p. 21).Similarly, the UK guarantees open and equal access for all RASC, even for irregular (Report on UK, p. P, 13, 18). The right to educational instruction in Norway is applied to both asylum seekers[4] and rejected asylum seekers (Report on Norway, p. 17). Czech Republic and Finland shares the same approach: the main objective of Finnish education policy is to offer all residents equal opportunities to receive education, regardless of age, domicile, financial situation, sex or mother tongue (Report on Finland, p. 14). The right of the children has as a counterpart the obligation of the school authorities to apply the equal access and to not look for alibis for escaping this duty: “Poor knowledge of the Czech language is not an obstacle and does not waive the duty from the schools” (Report on the Czech republic, p. 21).

The political weight of the principle of equal access is reinforced when endorsed by a specific policy. Flanders developed ‘equal educational chances policy’ aiming at offering all children, without exception, the best chances to learn and develop. Additionally, this policy aims to stand against exclusion, social separation and discrimination (Report on Belgium, p. 17). The Netherlands offers an excellent example of the transformation of the legal regulations into a tangible political goal: “By 2011 the government aims to achieve 100% participation in early childhood education programs for immigrant and disadvantaged children” (The Netherlands, p. 24). A positive practice is strengthening the institutional structure responsible for access to education. Malta created in 2009 an Advisory Group for the Education Entitlement of Immigrants (Report on Malta, p. 10). The Local cooperation board in Belgium seeks to guarantee the right to enrolment (Report on Belgium, p. 17). Britain has introduced a variety of good practices enriching and diversifying the policy of equal access: the New Arrivals Excellence Program covers areas such as school planning, welcoming, initial assessments, teaching and learning strategies and promoting children’s participation. The Ethnic Minority Achievement Grant has similar aims (Report on UK, p. 21-22).

Granting RASC equal access to education is undoubtedly a good practice. Its application, however, could lead in specific circumstances to ambiguous implications. The Bulgarian report provides an interesting example when RASC could be enrolled in the very first grades of schooling despite their age and years of schooling as there is no official proof of school attendance in the country of origin and no system of validation of knowledge (Report on Bulgaria, p. 17). Some countries guarantee equal accesses of RASC, but the institutions do not apply this principle in a systematic and sustainable way. The Croatian report notes the lack of transparency in the integration policy of the Ministry of science, education and sport and of efficient measures for dealing with the diversity of language and culture (Report on Croatia, p.12).

The right to education is interpreted also as an obligation of education by most European countries. This approach is by no means a good practice guaranteeing that RASC parents do not withdraw their children from schooling for one reason or another. Some countries are quite strict in applying this policy: in cases of children who often miss classes without a sufficient reason, the National Education Welfare Board in Ireland is obliged to take legal action against parents (Report on Ireland, p. 18). Poland does not pay allocations to RASC’ parents whose children do not attend regularly school (Report on Poland, p. 18).

The second cluster of countries comprises practices of differentiated access. The main argument and criteria for differentiating access to education is legal status. The authorities of most countries are reluctant to offer educational services for irregular migrant children. Germany distinguishes two groups: minors with insecure residence status i.e. tolerated persons and asylum seekers and children without any status. Both groups face obstacles in their access to education (Report on Germany, pp. 13-14). Sweden distinguished three groups: for children with a residence permit school attendance is compulsory and free of charge; asylum seekers have the right to attend school, but it is not compulsory; children who have been refused entry or expelled are not entitled to education (Report on Sweden, p. 13), still the municipality can offer them instruction (ibid, p. 15). This ambiguous policy which contradicts the UN Convention of human rights has been criticized and recommendations have been formulated for granting all children the right to education (Report on Sweden, p. 15).

Other countries differentiate access in financial terms. The Czech Republic excludes asylum seeking children from the free language courses (Report on the Czech republic, p. 21). Poland has opened up its public educational system for children with refugees and tolerated stay status. Immigrant children with a different legal status are entitled to education in public schools on a commercial basis (Report on Poland, p.11). Hungary applies a similar approach and has introduced fees for irregular migrants and those who stay for less than a year (Report on Hungary, p. 25).

Another criterion for differentiating the access is time. Hungary has introduced the requirement of one year of residence as a precondition for full entitlement to enter the public educational system (Report on Hungary, p.21).

Sometimes restricted access is presented in terms of lack of availability of places. RASC can attend schools in Hungary only if there are places available in the few schools which accept them (Report on Hungary, p. 31). If policy is formulated this way, not surprisingly practices are even more restrictive and the report describes cases of schools refusing to accept Roma children from Kosovo (Report on Hungary, p. 28). The crisis was resolved thanks to the EU-funded “Schooling programme” initiative of the Hungarian Interchurch Aid (Report on Hungary, p. 29).

A specific aspect of the access to education is the recognition of education in the country of origin. A specific paradox could be noted: the legislation provides condition for the recognition of certificates, but the administrative procedures are extremely long, complicated and often require the cooperation of the country of origin difficult to obtain from a family who has escaped it.

Transferability

There is an urgent need for the transfer of good practices to overcome some negative phenomena of closeness and refusal to accept RASC in some countries. As a general principle, the good practice of linking rights and obligations to education has a high degree of transferability. As for concrete instruments – parents are given allowances for the regular school attendance of their children.

6.2. Quality of education

Quality of education is conceived not as a technical term, but in its high sense as schooling that is respectful of human rights: “both in words and in action, in schoolbooks and the schoolyard” (UNICEF and UNESCO 2007, p. XII). Two interpretations of quality compete. One mobilizes a more ‘classic’ argument and evaluates the quality of education in regard to achieving its objective. The other is oriented more to the promotion of creativity, to fostering equality and to the recognition of cultural values.

Two roads for assuring the quality of education are discussed. The first focuses on an equal and early access to the national educational system. It is of universalist inspiration and insist on the immersion of RASC in the pool of natives. The second shares the affirmative action approach and requires specific measures so that RASC are assisted to reach the native pupils’ level. The former is discussed in the previous chapter, a typical illustration of the latter are the individual educational plans. The Czech schools develop them in cooperation with a psychologist and the parents. The plan is reviewed and, if necessary, changed throughout the school year (Report on the Czech Republic, p. 24). Luxembourg has introduced a ‘school passport’, a kind of small portfolio. It is completed on the arrival of the children with help from an intercultural mediator and outlines the school record and languages learnt in the country of origin as well as language learning attainment and progress at school in the host country (Report on Luxembourg, p. 11). A factor for the successful implementation of the individualized approach are the teacher assistants that helps RASC better integrate ­­­to the school environment, to support teachers during classes, to facilitate communication among pupils, parents, community and the school.  Another good practice is when the assistant is employed by the school (Report on the Czech Republic, p. 24).

6.3. Language – the main vehicle of integration

The national language is the vehicle of the community of citizens, affirms and argues Dominique Schnapper (1994). Its high symbolic and political meaning is shared by both unitary states such as France and federal ones with two or more national languages such as Belgium. The importance of language training is further emphasised in a large comparative study by Glenn and de Jong (1996, p. IX), who concluded that inadequate proficiency in the language of the school is a primary reason for poor academic performance.

6.3.1.National language

All reports emphasize the crucial importance of the education in the national language. The good practices cover a large spectrum – from national programs for language immersion to summer camps, from introductory classes to courses in reception centres.  They could be classified into three groups. The first refers to educational policy, the second – to language classes designed for RASC and incorporated in regular school programs, and last one – to a variety of extracurricular activities.

The first concerns the political level and is expressed in guidelines, programs, and strategies. The impact is twofold. First, is emphasizes the high political priority of the national language teaching. Second, it guarantees stable and sustainable funding. Estonia has developed a National program of language immersion. It is aimed at the acquisition of Estonian as a second language and is mainly designed for Russian speaking children, but is also applicable to RASC (Report on Estonia, p. 17). National languages classes are included in the Czech State integration program which ensures stable financing (Report on the Czech Republic, p. 22).

The second group forms the larger cluster with a variety of introductory language classes (the Netherlands, p. 16, p. 25, p. 24), special language classes (‘classes passerelles’) in the French speaking part of Belgium to support minor newcomers to learn French and to become familiar with the Belgian school system (Report on Belgium, p. 17), intensive language classes (Report on Lithuania, p. 11), preparatory studies facilitating entry into secondary education (Report on Finland, p. 13). Hungary provides extra funding for language integration programs (Report on Hungary, p. 22). Poland offers language classes in Reception centres (Report on Poland, p. 7, p. 14), and Bulgaria has similar practices (Report on Bulgaria, p. 15). In Portugal, upon arrival in the school, the student takes a diagnostic language test and according to the result he/she is placed in a specific proficiency level (Report on Portugal, p. 18). Trilingualism – the requirement of speaking the three official languages – is a major difficulty for all children in Luxembourg and particularly for migrant ones. The public educational system offers special classes for French and German and pre-school classes for Letzeburgesch. They are adapted to the very early age of children and enable newcomers to acquire Letzeburgesch by imitation and practice rather than by learning rules (Report on Luxembourg, p. 9, p. 11). Classes can be distinguished in regard of the number of children enrolled. The Check Republic organizes both group and individual classes (Report on the Czech Republic, p. 22). Finland has introduced an original and interesting practice decreasing the symbolic distance between national language and mother tongue: “Immigrant students can take the test entitled “Finnish or Swedish as a second language” instead of the test in mother tongue intended for Finnish or Swedish-speaking students “(Report on Finland, p. 14). Sweden also offers Swedish as a second language (Report on Sweden, p. 19). Transition and preparatory classes facilitate preparation of RASC for inclusion in schools. They are important tool for inclusion, yet suffer of a one weakness: “Introduction classes are often physically segregated from the regular education. The pupils feel segregated and have few Swedish friends” (Report on Sweden, p. 28).[5]  The same concerns are shared by the Norwegian report which seeks for a solution and finds it in bilingual tuition[6] (Report on Norway, p. 21).  It is important that pupils are moved to an ordinary class as soon as possible. Some countries apply different approaches on the base of similarity/difference of the RASC mother tongue in regard to the national language (Report on Croatia, p. 15). A key factor for the success of the language classes is the individual approach that takes into consideration the needs of children (Report on the Czech Republic, p. 22).

The third group of good practices are extracurricular activities, such as summer language camps, where children enjoy communication with other RASC and native children, as well as learn the language in a stimulating environment. Malta has positive experiences with summer schools (Report on Malta, p. 12), and the Red Cross in Bulgaria has been organizing summer camps for several years already (Report on Bulgaria, p. 15-16), while innovative summer courses in Ireland teach the language through drama and sport (Report on Ireland, p. 28).

The importance countries attribute to the national language is expresses also in some restrictive measures – countries like Croatia require that an asylum-holder or foreign citizen under subsidiary protection who fails to attend the compulsory course shall have to reimburse the costs of the course (Report on Croatia, p. 14). It is debatable if such measures could be considered good practices.

6.3.2.Mother tongue

The right to enjoy their own culture, language and religion

Convention on the rights of the child and education

The Convention on the rights of the child stresses the right of the child to enjoy their own culture and to use their language. UNESCO supports mother tongue instruction as a means of improving educational quality by building on the knowledge and experience of the learners and teachers (UNESCO 2003). In opposition to the consensus on national languages, the views are divided on the question of mother tongue. Most reports agree on the importance of mother tongue for the children cultural identity, but differ in regards of which institution should assume the responsibility for the tuition. Two opposite visions can be identified.

The first considers that the immigrant communities and their organisations rather than the state should offer the teaching of mother tongue. Germany is a case in point: In several of the Länder the consulates of the countries of origin are responsible for voluntary mother tongue teaching, not least for financial reasons (Report on Germany, p. 19). Several countries such as Poland and Bulgaria prefer to “outsource” the tuition of foreign languages. The Polish Report formulates this pragmatic approach: schools have no obligation to organise lessons in immigrant languages, but are obliged to provide room for any organization or embassy willing provide those kinds of classes (Report on Poland, p. 14). A number of countries do not have any legislation concerning mother tongue education, Latvia being such an example (Report on Lithuania, p. 12). As a general rule, mother tongue tuition is provided outside the normal school hours (ibid).

The second cluster of countries considers that the state should assume the education in both the national and the mother tongue languages. Sweden with the New Education Act (2010) assures the opportunity for children to develop both their mother tongue and the national language (Report on Sweden, p. 16). Austria, which in other regards, such as the human rights approach, is similar to Germany, assumes a different perspective on the mother tongue education which is provided for all pupils with a different first language than German, including migrant children as well as RASC without distinction (Report on Austria, p.17). In Finland immigrant pupils in basic education may study their native language as their first language within the school’s normal curriculum. There is no country able to provide this opportunity everywhere; it is available only in a few schools (Report on Finland, p. 14). Luxembourg encourages the mother tongue tuition at the pre-primary level and ensures a mother tongue teaching assistant (Report on Luxembourg, p. 9). Norway offers both mother tongue instruction and bilingual teacher: “If the school’s ordinary teaching staff cannot provide mother tongue and bilingual subject teaching, the municipality must arrange alternative instruction and training adapted to the pupil’s situation” (Report on Norway, p. 18).

Mother tongue education is undoubtedly one of the most divisive issues – countries similar in their integration policies and practices, such as the Baltic states, diverge considerably in this regard: “Estonia and Lithuania have issued regulations that make express reference to the importance of providing mother tongue tuition for immigrant pupils, while in Latvia legislation makes no provision for measures of this type” (Report on Lithuania, p. 12). Estonia and Lithuania form part of the smaller cluster of countries such as Austria, Sweden and Norway, where mother tongue tuition is included in the normal school timetable or its inclusion is recommended (Report on Lithuania, p. 12). Lithuania and Estonia have developed bilingual teaching arrangements for the national minorities established in their countries that may also benefit immigrant pupils. This positive and optimistic vision remains still to be tested with higher numbers of RASC.

The lack of consensus among INTEGRACE countries on if and how to teach the mother tongue is supported by similar conclusions of the UNICEF study:

There is no simple solution, nor any one correct approach. Whatever approach is adopted, however, governments have obligations to ensure that children do not experience discrimination, that respect is afforded to their culture, and that every effort is made to prevent social exclusion and educational disadvantage as a consequence of speaking a minority language (UNICEF and UNESCO 2007, p. 36).

Transferability

Transferability in the two different cases of national and mother tongue tuition is poles apart. The importance of education in national languages is paramount: all practices are embedded in the same understanding of the importance of inclusion in the national community. Therefore, the good practices are easily transferable.

The policies of mother tongue training demonstrate two different visions. The first argues that the respective communities should assume responsibility for the preservation and development of their language and culture, and these activities should be located outside the public educational system. The second perspective’s emphasis is on the recognition of cultural differences and on schools as arenas for their expression. The transferability of practices is higher within each of the policies than between them.

Transferability depends also on the number of transferable practices. It is no coincidence that the variety of good practices promoting national languages is greater than is the case with those promoting mother tongues.

6.4. Social and intercultural competences and acculturation

We have to learn everything when we come here.

For example, learn how to use a knife and fork!

Also the way of reading and writing, we have to learn it in a new way.

We read from right to left in my homeland.

13-year-old girl asylum seeker in Norway

Language is a crucial, yet not a unique way to integration. Children are entitled to stimulating learning environment in multiple spaces. Acculturation involves learning the visible and invisible cultural rules. Language learning should be complemented by social competences training. Germany’s experience is stimulating in this regard:

The school also stresses that not only language, but also mutual respect is one of the most important lessons children have to learn. Moreover, school rules (e.g. being on time, doing one’s homework, no cell phones etc) and democratic principles play an important role. (Report on Germany, p. 25).

Temporality is among the most invisible, yet one of the most crucial characteristics of culture. Most RASC, coming from diverse backgrounds, have a different perception of time, and have to learn western time management. The Maltese report is sensitive to this subtle dimension of acculturation and describes the experience of a teacher with intercultural expertise: “Most of the children did not have the concept of timetables and the need to be ready on time. I helped them with this” (Report on Malta, p. 13).

Respect the right of children to rest, leisure, play, recreation,

and participation in arts and culture

Convention on the rights of the child and of education

Integration means learning, yet also creating. Learning the cultural and democratic rules of the host society, but also (re)constructing the child’s Self in the new environment, as well as transforming the society in the interaction with the new comers is paramount. In Homo ludens Johan Huizinga developed the inspiring idea that playing means creativity, imagination, construction, and self-perfection. The right to play is a crucial right which should be guaranteed to all children with special attention to the most vulnerable – the unaccompanied minors. Playing is present in the good practices in two ways:

• by the claim of the right to play for all children with a special focus on unaccompanied ones and victims of trafficking;
• as a rich gamut of extracurricular activities aimed at integrating RASC in stimulating, interactive and creative environments. Two types of good practices can be posited: one type which aims to develop creativity, and second one aimed at enhancing communicative skills.

Creativity and art are among the most powerful instruments for integration and empowerment. A plethora of good practices illustrate the potential of art for building bridges, creating understanding and promoting dialogue. Unaccompanied minors with video camera in hand is an inspiring Norwegian example with wonderful results: the children work with their own histories, providing them with a “space” to process and reflect upon experiences; they have been proud that they have made their own film which considerably increased their self-esteem; the films were presented at an opening night and national media reported the event (Report on Norway, p. 30). Visibilization of the invisible is the most significant outcome – the invisible children have been given a voice

As for good practices whose goal is to develop creativity, Malta’s Ministry of Education organized two creative programs (i.e., acting, dance, an improvised theatre and art) for RASC and unaccompanied minors (Report on Malta, p. 12). Polish NGOs organize cross-cultural workshops, which include areas as diverse as film, art, music, drama, dance and photography, as well as cooking classes. An appropriately named NGO – the Foundation of Fun – organized an Intercultural Kids Club where children from different countries play together (Report on Poland, p. 20-21). Refugee and Romanian children play together in the Diversity club and enjoy dances, theatre, painting, sports (Report on Romania, p. 36). The Netherlands is even more ambitious, aiming directly at happiness. The unambiguously named organisation National Foundation for the Promotion of Happiness provides creative workshops and projects for asylum-seeking children. “For children and teenagers it is of great importance to be able to demonstrate during their development who they are and who they can be. This can be done through music, sculpture, theatre, play and games” (Report on the Netherlands, p. 29). Spanish good practices are particularly susceptible to art, and mobilize a rich variety of artistic expressions: theatre, films, photo exhibitions, even string-puppet shows, which expectedly, happened to be an excellent means of communication for small pupils (Report on Spain, p. 18). In UK schools events such as International Week, Refugee Week, Black History Month, and End of Year Assemblies provide opportunities for creating displays, staging performances, storytelling, cultural and sports activities, sharing of food events (Report on UK, p.19 – 20). The Shpresa (Hope in Albanian) program is a nice practice of local schools to promote an understanding of Albanian culture and traditions through traditional dancing, songs, poetry and storytelling. It aims at building confidence and appreciation in Albanian speaking children in the culture they come from, which would help them successfully integrate into their host community, as well as/while at the same time introducing this culture to local communities to increase understanding and co-operation (Report on UK, p.25).

All topics could be addressed in a playful way. Irish school experiments teaching transport through music. A teacher is enthusiastic about the results: “there was more fun, they were learning more… it’s fantastic for children, they learn so much faster” (Report on Ireland, p. 28).

The second group of good practices address communications in intercultural environment. Ireland experiments a new practice of placing separated children with families from a similar culture, religion and language (Report on Ireland, p. 27). A number of Irish schools have organized events to celebrate their international communities. Those events give pupils an even greater understanding of diversity (Report on Ireland, p. 29). A Polish school has organized an Intercultural Club where foreign pupils can learn their mother tongues and present their cultures through various activities to Polish students (Report on Poland, p. 23). “Refugees into Schools” is a British initiative. The aim is, through interactive presentations of their experience, to help children understand conflict, and what refugees often go through. The communicative outcome is twofold: British students better understand refugees, and refugee children start sharing their experience: “hearing an adult speak about their problems often helps refugee with similar experience to speak out” (Report on UK, p. 25). Lithuania offers excursions and trips to museums and historical places to children in reception centres (Report on Lithuania, p. 13). A Slovakian foundation organizes a Festival week of new minorities for promoting intercultural exchange and understanding (Report on Slovakia, p. 21). To facilitate communications Luxembourg introduced intercultural mediators who provide ad hoc assistance with the reception of new pupils, interpreting services for information meetings on the school system, meetings between teachers and parents, or visits to school doctors or psychologists (Report on Luxembourg, p. 9).  The Norwegian Children’s and Young People’ Migration Site, organized by The Directorate of Integration and Diversity, is a virtual space for information and communications of migrant children among themselves and with local pupils, as well as of teachers with pupils on intercultural issues (Report on Norway, p. 23).

Culture has high and everyday expressions; some practices address art, while others – the material culture. The Intercultural Education Foundation in Poland has published a series of books on the cuisines of a variety of countries around the world. “Food – the basic need for both adults and children is a starting point for stories about the country and the daily lives of its citizens (education, work, ways leisure, family, etc…)” (Report on Poland, p. 18).  Spain launched an original initiative of “chat” between refugees and pupils, very much appreciated by all participants (Report on Spain, p. 13-14).

A Dutch school experiments a nice communicative practice: the headmaster welcomes every child by name with a handshake. In this way, children can feel that they are seen, recognized and respected (Report on the Netherlands, p. 19). Portugal has introduced the intriguing infiltration technique and used it during debates or introductions to sessions, raising awareness about the situation of immigrants in the country. “It consists of the unexpected entrance of a migrant/actor in the auditorium or classroom where the activity is taking place” (Report on Portugal. P. 21).

Sport is a favourite activity with an extremely strong integration potential. Ireland reports for a nice success story: a soccer camp held for boys and girls. Interestingly, this football team is very successful in local league (Report on Ireland, p. 7).

Transferability

The transferability of good practices related to social competences depends on one key condition: the intercultural expertise of teachers and volunteers. The training of teachers in intercultural communication is a precondition for the application of good practices of teaching time management, democratic principles, and cultural rules to pupils with diverse cultural backgrounds. The creative potential of NGOs activists and volunteers is the crucial factor for the production of the rich variety of initiatives and techniques.

Good practices developing creativity and imagination are relatively easy to transfer, because of two facilitating factors: they do not need significant funding and children everywhere enjoy them. Some practices like placing separated children with families from a similar culture, religion and language (Report on Ireland, p. 27) are interesting and promising, but need further experience and assessment in the respective country before their multiplication in different national contexts. The creativity of generating intercultural forms and forums, stimulated and reinforced by the importance of the social and intercultural competences, opens a large horizon for innovations.

6.5. Information and awareness

Raising awareness and sensitizing the public opinion to refugee issues through antidiscrimination activities are the pillars of creating a positive environment for successful educational integration. Some countries are more aware than others of their importance and implement various good practices. They provide bridges between the larger public with the worlds of education and migration through creative and innovative methods. These activities can be divided into three groups: raising awareness; antidiscrimination; public lobbying and information dissemination. They all aim at providing accessible, rich and interesting information on, and for, refugees and asylum seekers. The information providers also lobby for the interests of these groups, they offer advice and advocacy.

6.5.1. Raising awareness

The crucial importance of awareness campaigns is emphasized by Spain and so highly appreciated that most of its good practices are indeed examples of such campaigns. A number of nice examples are presented: “A week of refugee population” in Andalusia, “Listen to refugees and the displaced” in Catalonia, “Chatting between refugees and secondary school pupils” in Barcelona (Report on Spain). The argument is that in a country with relatively low RASC numbers and a lack of specific measures promoting RASC educational integration, the efforts should be concentrated on awareness-raising and building the capacity of the Spanish population of receiving foreign students (Report on Spain, p. 20). “Croatia – E(de)nd on Earth” campaign aims at promoting the rights of asylum-seekers and  improvement of asylum policy (Report on Croatia, p. 10).

Austria is the most consistent in including awareness raising initiatives in most of its projects. Art projects, forums, discussions, volunteers are focused to foster intercultural understanding by means of self-designed theatre plays, documentary films, discussion forums and exhibitions. Understanding the great importance of awareness-raising activities leads to impressive results: they are part of any project and every project invents its own intercultural forms.

Art allows exteriorizing and transforming the challenges of alterity into cultural imagination. An interesting example is the theatre piece on the topic of “being foreign” performed by the theatre of Salzburg in which took part the participants in one intercultural project. Many school-classes visited the play and learned about intercultural topics, racism and tolerance (Report on Austria, p. 26).

Estonia is an original example of a country with an extremely limited number of RASC and very good understanding of the need to prepare and form the public in the spirit of openness and tolerance.  The project ‘Public Awareness Raising on the Notion of Asylum and Migration: Refugees? Who? Why?’ is a positive example of a mix of diverse activities, among which: information campaign targeted at the general public; “Me and refugee?” competitive games for young people; awareness-raising among youths through information sessions and other interactive tools; building capacities and raising awareness among teachers through workshops and the “Not Just Numbers” toolkit; inviting youngsters to share thoughts on the matter; translating the web based game Against All Odds into Estonian; talking about refugees and asylum seekers in class; workshops for watching and analysing study films regarding refugees and asylum seekers, etc. (Report on Estonia, p. 14-15).

A targeted approach addressing the group of children aged five to ten is described in the Portuguese report. It is based on the Karlinchen book (translated as A Pequena Carlota), by the German writer Annegert Fuchshuber. The book was adapted into a didactic and it has already been adopted in the United Kingdom, Spain, Mexico, and Portugal. The book is accompanied by a seven-minute-long DVD and further exercise materials (Report on Portugal, p. 20). The playful atmosphere stimulates an awareness of diversity and tolerance. Poland has developed a project addressing a more professional public. Migroteka includes 12 collections of books on migration, interculturalism and refugees located in ten Polish cities (Report on Poland, p. 20).

6.5.2. Antidiscrimination

Malta has adopted a different, more militant approach aimed at mobilising NGOs, church-based organisations and private individuals for a coherent policy and promotion of tolerance and diversity. ‘Building coalitions’ for tolerance towards vulnerable groups, including RASC  is an interesting good practice (Report on Malta, p. 10). The UK has implemented the Equality Act, whereby all public bodies, including schools, are bound by the duty to eliminate discrimination, harassment and victimisation, and advance equality of opportunity. “The Act stipulates that fostering good relations includes the need to tackle prejudice and promote understanding” (Report on UK, p.13). An innovative project to challenge racism and overcome hostility towards new refugees through art and football has been experimented in British schools in the Dover area (Report on the UK, p. 29). It is also one of the relatively rare successful projects combating discrimination against Roma.

6.5.3.Public lobbying and information dissemination

National campaigns and information dissemination sensitize the public opinion and challenge cultural barriers. Information dissemination is practiced by all countries in a variety of forms: websites in different languages being the most common practice[7], complemented often by other technologies – DVD, online video, etc.  Poland offers an elaborate example of information dissemination through the Intercultural Education website, providing interesting scenarios for lessons, delivered to children with various cultural backgrounds, at the pre-school level and through integrated teaching; proposing a rich selection of educational materials, and presenting examples of interesting projects run by NGOs (Report on Poland, p. 18). The new technologies foster information dissemination, as well as exchange, and interactivity. Another good practice, again originating from Poland, is the website “Refugees go to school!“ – an outcome of the „Awareness campaign for teachers” – gives information on RASC, helps teachers and volunteers create a network, exchange ideas, experiences, practices (Report on Poland, p. 19).Traditional toolkits, providing information on how to address migration issues, are also practiced in several countries. “At Home in Ireland: An Integration Guide for Immigrant Youth and Parents” (Report on Ireland, p. 27) is an illustration of this practice.

Most NGOs lobby publicly for supporting vulnerable children. Some like ECPAT (Nationellt Metodstöd mot prostitution och människohandel) in Sweden focus on the most vulnerable among the vulnerable and deal with issues related to child prostitution, child pornography, and children trafficking.

Transferability

Raising awareness is among the most unevenly distributed good practices. It is often reduced to information dissemination and is rarely complemented by antidiscrimination activities. The main factor for successful transferability is the application of a systematic and comprehensive approach, as conceived and implemented by Austria.

7. The actors of educational integration

A major goal of the comparative report is to identify the crucial engines for successful integration. When policies fluctuate or stall, the time comes for the active and responsible citizens, professionals, and civil society activists. Although the States has a primary responsibility for education, the civil society with its organisations and activists is vital for the diversification of participation and the success of integration.

The Human rights based approach requires the identification of the human rights claims of rights-holders and the corresponding human rights obligations of duty-bearers as well as the immediate, underlying, and structural causes of the non-realization of rights (UN 2003). The capacity of rights-holders to claim their rights should be assessed, as well as the capacity of the duty-bearers to fulfill their obligations. If necessary, strategies should be developed to build these capacities (UN 2003).

For the schools to successfully implement the four A[8] means that all actors have to embrace them:

The 4 As are to be respected, protected, and fulfilled by the government, as the prime duty-bearer, but there are also duties on other actors in the education process: the child as the privileged subject of the right to education and the bearer of the duty to comply with compulsory-education requirements; the child’s parents who are the ‘first educators’; and professional educators, namely teachers (Right to Education Project[9])

7.1. Intercultural teachers

The INTEGRACE study clearly demonstrates the key role of teachers with intercultural sensitivity, expertise and experience. Teachers “translate national policies into practical action in each school” (UNICEF and UNESCO 2007, p. 93) and a quality education depends significantly on their commitment, enthusiasm, creativity, and skills. Creating an inclusive and child-friendly environment necessitates different skills and styles from teaching in a traditional school. Teachers need to develop competences and capacities on learning through participation; positive forms of participation and class management (UNICEF and UNESCO 2007, p. 72).

Several models have been experimented. UK has introduced the role of refugee support teachers/new arrivals teachers (Report on UK, p. 24). Belgium has recently introduced follow-up coaches (2009 on), aiming to provide support to minors who have attended newcomer classes during the previous school years. More specifically, schools are appointed extra hours to support “ex-minor newcomers” by providing extra language hours, or extra teaching support for certain courses, to concert with teachers on how to deal with language barriers in regular education classes. (Report on Belgium, p.15). Some British schools with large numbers of children from the same ethnic group employ bilingual staff: “Even when they are not qualified teachers, they help the children understand the new school they have arrived to better and provide an insight into the child’s feelings and problems” (Report on UK, p. 28). In 2009 on Malta introduced the role of the peripatetic teacher – a complementary service offered by the national education system. They give additional lessons on Maltese, English, and math, but also resolve intercultural tensions and misunderstandings. One of their tasks was to discuss with Muslim girls and their parents the nature of mixed schools (Report on Malta, p. 10). Similar is the role of the complementary teacher active in some Maltese schools (Report on Malta, p. 14).

Another interesting good practice is the “buddy-system” whereby a native child will team up with a RASC or immigrant child, who experiences difficulties integrating because of linguistic and other reasons, and help them accordingly (Report on Malta, p. 14). Poland has experimented with the practice of providing bilingual/ bicultural teacher assistants with the knowledge of immigrant languages attending the classes (Report on Poland, p. 19).

All teachers need training – teachers in intercultural classes even more so. This issue is perceived as a need by teachers, who express the necessity of enhanced attention to the specificity of teaching in a multicultural setting (Report on Spain, p. 19). Norway develops several online learning resources for bilingual education (Report on Norway, p. 25). The easy accessibility enlarges the circle of teachers consulting them and improves the quality by facilitating the involvement and participation of various stakeholders in their development. Formative assessment, action-research, second language acquisition, and intercultural education should be the key competent of teachers training. These competences are so universal that all would benefit – immigrant, but also native students (Report on Sweden, p. 23).

7.2. The successful nexus

The Teachers – pupils – parents nexus is crucial in order for integration to be instituted and function in a sustainable and successful manner. The school ethos should be impregnated by a culture in which human rights are respected for all members of the school community. Human rights “need to be incorporated into all school policies in order that children and teachers are aware of what their rights, and consequent responsibilities, are and how to exercise them” (UNICEF and UNESCO 2007, p. 76). Children have rights, as well as responsibilities. Mutual respect should be the norm in their relations with teachers: “As teachers have responsibilities to children’s rights, children have responsibility towards teachers…” (UNICEF and UNESCO 2007, p. 22).

Consulting and involving parents is the aim of numerous good practices. The objective is twofold: stimulate parents’ participation, as well as support them in building their capacity and promoting their willingness to ensure their children’s attendance at school.

The school has to meet the parents with respect and through an open dialogue, stresses the Report on Sweden (p. 23). Trust and confidence of parents and children in teachers and schools are paramount for the sustainable integration in the educational system. The country reports describe a variety of ways of building them. Several Polish practices are open to parents’ participation. The Intercultural Kids Club is visited by kids, accompanied by parents/carers (Report on Poland, p. 20). The “Intercultural school” in the “Multicultural city” which has offered initial intercultural trainings, was attended not only by children and teachers, but by parents as well (Report on Poland, p. 20). The Belgian report lists several forms of successful collaborative models for communication between schools and parents, such as home visits, informal conversations with teachers, with the school’s coordinator for newcomer’s education, and especially with the school’s intermediaries (Report on Belgium, p. 24). The Finish report also stresses on building an efficient cooperation system with parents of RASC (Report on Finland, p. 20). Norway has established well articulated and developed scheme of relationships and responsibilities among various partners: pedagogical leaders, parents, interpreters, mother tongue assistants, etc. It covers three aspects: ‘what’ (activity/event), ‘responsibilities’ (who is in charge of a certain activity/event) and ‘when’ (time of the activity/event) (Report on Norway, p. 28).

The nexus school-pupils-family is further developed and conceptualized in the holistic model of integration. It “considers the child’s and his/her family’s competences, knowledge and needs and how there are interrelated” (Report on Sweden, p. 29). It pays attention to education, as well as health and leisure time. All measures and activities are realized in close operation with the family.

7.3.Diversification of actors

Civil society organizations play a triple role: they are a pool of expertise on both the needs of migrant children and the ways to satisfy them; they act as service providers and contribute for making the duty bearers accountable.

The more stakeholders are involved, the more balanced the approaches and the more diverse the good practices. Belgium shows an interesting example of an organisation called Local Cooperation Board, representing local school boards, parents’ organisations, staff members of the local supporting centre, local organisation for integration of newcomers, ethnic minorities’ organisations, health care services (Report on Belgium, p. 17).

Refed Network of Professionals in the UK is a network of 1400 practitioners dealing with refugee and asylum seeking children, young people and families, primarily in the area of education, but also in healthcare and social protection. It provides a platform for exchanging information, as well as for sharing and developing ideas (Report on UK, p. 230). Irish teachers are particularly proud of the “Together Towards Inclusion” Toolkits. It is an innovative and original initiative, addressed to all stakeholders involved in the educational integration of foreign pupils. These toolkits aim to help schools create and sustain a welcoming and inclusive environment for pupils and parents from all backgrounds, and ensure equal access for all. (Report on Ireland, p. 24). Bulgaria has experimented a good practice of mediation of the State agency for refugees between the parents and the administration in two public schools (Report on Bulgaria, p. 26).

Integration could not be carried out only by professionals. Volunteers are needed and welcome – Malta presents their involvement (Report on Malta, p. 11).

Transferability

Some of the good practices have already been presented and transferred to other countries, the “Together towards inclusion” Irish toolkit being a stimulating example. It has been warmly welcome in Romania, Germany, Norway, Switzerland, and Slovenia. These positives examples could be successfully used in different international contexts (Report on Ireland, p. 24). The Nordic cooperation aimed at providing digital learning resources in various languages has already given fruitful results, such as the transfers from Sweden to Norway (Report on Norway, p. 26).  The Norwegian scheme of relationships and responsibilities of stakeholders is a very good practice. Its transferability depends on the competence of good planning.

8. Conclusion

The present comparative analysis has verified some of the hypothesis and has falsified others. The classic European models of integration – assimiliationist/non-differentialist and multiculturalist – are vanishing. Their contours can still be identified, and some countries come closer to the ideal types, but what prevails is a common trend towards securitization – with more restrictive, less hospitable policies.

The question arises as to what the most relevant factors are that influence policies in contrast to the initial hypothesis, the number of refugees has only relative relevance. The INTEGRACE sample is extremely heterogeneous – Germany and UK ranks among the ten top hosting countries in the world, France is among the top three in Europe, while RASC in Estonia can be counted on one hand.  The numbers are similarly low in other countries, such as Malta, Lithuania, Hungary, etc. Numbers do count when they are very limited like in Estonia; namely, the law does not distinguish between the different groups of RASC. Only much higher numbers allow the specification of RASC as children with disabilities, children with special needs, ex-child soldiers and militia workers, separated children, victims of crime, children involved with drugs, prostitution, and exploitative labour, or “street” children. At the same time, numbers do not count when targeting policies. Children with subsidiary, or temporary, protection status are more numerous than refugees everywhere, yet integration programs are conceived in reverse proportion – they are more comprehensive and numerous for refugees. Also, numbers of refugees do not count significantly when choosing the model of integration. This conclusion is illustrated by the fact that countries such as the Netherlands have shifted from more multiculturalist to more assimilationist policies for political not for statistical reasons. Furthermore, numbers do not count considerably either when access is defined: countries such as the UK, with a very high proportion of refugees, offer open and equal access to education, including for irregular migrants, while others, with much smaller numbers of RASC, apply a more differentiated approach.

The history of settlement – i.e. the time of arrival and the duration of the stay – can influence the choice of good practices, but not so much the integration model. Countries with relatively recent immigration focus more on awareness campaigns, while others, with settled refugee populations, are more concerned with integration. The same difference is less relevant concerning the type of integration and we see among the multiculturalist camp countries with different migration histories and profiles (transit or destination). The rapid and radical shift of policy, Romania, Germany, Norway, Switzerland, and Slovenia as in the Dutch case, also relativize the path dependency factor.

Policies are influenced, but not determined, by the size of migrant flows and the history of migration. These conclusions imply that the decisive factor is political voluntarism.  Elites assume the responsibility for introducing and changing policies. Some good practices disappear with changes of government. A relevant example is the project with the emblematic name “Aiming high”, introduced by the previous British government, and abandoned by the current one.

The State bears the main responsibility for conceiving and implementing efficient policies of educational integration. A plethora of positive measures and practices have been identified, all of which are promising but likely to succeed only if they are backed up by solid commitment and careful monitoring.  Public authorities are not always able, capable, or willing to meet their obligations with regard to RASC educational integration. The reasons could be summarized in three groups: • lack of resources – financial or human (skills and institutional capacity); • lack of responsibility – lack of political will and commitment to accept obligations; • lack of coordination between institutions and stakeholders. ‘Aiming low’ is the political choice on integration of numerous political forces and governmental majorities across Europe.

Who are the bearers of good practices in a situation of more restrictive policies? The most amazing conclusion that can be reached as a result of reviewing the reports, is that actors of integration – teachers, volunteers, NGO activists – play a crucial role. Most good practices are both initiated and implemented by active individuals, inspired by the values of tolerance, antidiscrimination, intercultural dialogue. Their motivation, energy, innovation, and activism are the extraordinary engines which foster dynamism and makes integration happen. A strong, vibrant civil society is the productive counterpoint to restrictive policies. Civil society’s good practices remedy the shortcomings of the state system.

The comparative analysis identifies the following criteria for sustainability and transferability of good practices:

The concept of RASC should be deconstructed and two different types of integration strategies should be identified and developed. Asylum-seeking children live in the separate world of the asylum seeker centres, and only some of them attend school in the local community. The children with refugee status are not distinguished from other children of migrant origin, and are the main target of integration policies. Policies makers should be aware of the differences in temporality of stay and sensitive to the peculiarities of integration of each group.

Strategies and action plans have proven to be the best policy instruments, and the optimal institutional incentive structures to legitimize the importance of integration and to allow for a comprehensive approach. Some of the reports define the latter as holistic. “Practices should be understood in the wider framework of measures and policies aimed at increasing the benefits related to migration and minimising the negative aspects through the promotion of a diverse and multicultural society” (Report on UK, p. 20).

The dilemma between concentration in specialized schools/classes or dispersion of RASC in regular classes does not have a definitive resolution. However, desegregation proves to be a better practice. The high concentration of migrant children, and the lack of interaction with native pupils, present obstacles to learning the language reducing inter-ethnic contact and social cohesion.

Project-driven activities should be replaced by programs with medium- and long-term funding by local and state authorities in order to avoid frequent staff changes and to allow the implementing partners to develop required capacities.

Furthermore, greater transparency in the educational system, as well as the establishment of a feedback culture at schools, would be necessary. A main criterion for transferability of good practices is the mechanisms of reliable evaluation. Thanks to the feedback gathered through such mechanisms, it is possible to re-formulate and modify good practices according to perceived needs of the target population. It’s crucial to collect the feedback not only from the initiators of the good practices, i.e. teachers and NGOs activists, but also from the RASC and their parents.

Training teachers in intercultural communication is crucial for promoting diversity in schools and society, as well as being an asset and opportunity for mutual benefit. The practice of utilizing support teachers, including teachers and volunteers with migrant backgrounds, has proven to be beneficial and could be easily transferred. Creating networks of professionals in intercultural education for the exchange of information, ideas, initiatives, is an efficient, non-costly, and easily transferable good practice.

The inclusive ethos and environment promote a culture of respect for difference and introduce approaches to support all children, irrespective of legal status, language or ethnicity. Interculturality is a crucial dimension of the inclusive curriculum tailored to the needs of children. The learning materials should not send negative representations of any migrant groups. Child-friendly schools and participatory methods take account of the evolving capacities of the child and assure safe, welcoming and encouraging environment.

Educational integration is about what children learn, but also – as importantly – about how they learn. Crucial for its success is the respect for the agency of children, their active involvement and participation. Schools should respect the dignity of the child and promote self-esteem and self-confidence.

The teachers – pupils – parents nexus should be strengthened and expanded to include volunteers and NGO activists. The participatory approach enables the input of a large spectrum of stakeholders – teachers, parents, children, community leaders, and civil society activists. Children’s perspective is indispensable. Policies to support refugee children need to be seen as the responsibility of all school staff. Engaging parents is a factor crucial to both pupils’ success in schools and the integration of refugee families in the local communities. Parents should be considered as partners, though some of them could lack the knowledge and skills to interact effectively with teachers, and therefore should be supported in building these capacities.

Art and sport activities demonstrate impressively high potential. They allow preventing or overcoming misunderstandings and tensions, foster creativity and intercultural communication, create opportunities for playful exchange and dialogue, and empower participants. Stimulating opportunities for play and recreation are essential element of child-friendly environment. Guaranteeing the right of playing for all children is a powerful instrument for children’s self-fulfilment and self-esteem. A child asylum seeker in Norway synthesizes the empowering effect of the creative project of a book with stories of exile: “So we make a book about our different ideas and experiences, then one boy can be ten boys!” Creativity could transform traumatic experiences into artistic artefact and thus strengthens the symbolic capital of young creators.

Browsing through countries, policies, and practices, one realizes that what counts most – more than policies and programs which vacillate from one model to another – the main engine for successful integration are committed and active persons with intercultural sensitivity, ready to innovate, experiment, build bridges of understanding and intercultural dialogue.

Building inclusive, participatory and accountable education systems which treat children with dignity as result of sustainable policies and innovative local initiatives is the royal road for RASC integration

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И диагнозите, и прогнозите са апокалиптични. Ще я има ли десницата в България?

3 не е магическо число, но за аналитична симетретия ще сглобя образа на десницата от 3 дискурса, ще разгранича 3 периода и ще очертая 3 сценария.

Трите перспективи, трите дискурса, на чиято пресечна точка искам да изградя образа на десницата, са партийният, коментарният, гражданският. Първият изразява начина, по който самата партия се дефинира и позиционира на политическата сцена. За целите на този кратък анализ ще сведа втория до т.нар. медийни интелектуалци , които медиите избират за сутрешните си блокове и коментарни рубрики, за да коментират, но още повече за да формират обществено мнение. Най-трудно уловима е гражданската перспектива, но пък тъкмо тя е решаващата за (пре)структурирането на партийната карта в четиригодишен цикъл.

„Времето е наше”

Дори когато пред 1990 г.на първите плуралистични избори спечели БСП, всички знаеха, че времето е на десницата.

И защото реформите – пазар и либерализъм – бяха десни, и защото България беше понесена от вълната на демократизация в Източна Европа и трудно можеше да избира или определя посоката. Различия, разбира се, имаше. В началото на 90-те години десни партии спечелиха в Полша, Унгария, Чехословакия и не спечелиха в България, Румъния. Това не бяха разлики в целите – самият лозунг времето е наше” откриваме в доста пост-комунистически страни – а в темповете и зрелостта на елитите. Вишеградските страни имаха опозиция, закалена в дисидентство, Унгарско въстание (1956), Чешка пролет (1968), Солидарност. Само десни говорители можеха убедително да произнесат новите цели – ЕС и НАТО, леви лидери с такъв дискурс биха разгонвали своя електорат поне още 7-8 години.

Преходът е златният век за пост-комунистическата десница: историята гарантираше и силата и легитимираше насоката. Общият за цяла Източна Европа „вятър на променит” в България бше подсилен от партиен: десницата имаше едно лице и то се казваше СДС.

Не че лидерите винаги бяха на висотата на историята, но историята беше с тях.

Това беше и златното време за медийната подкрепа на десницата. И Клара Маринова, и Красимир Райдовски не успяваха да осигурят пълен медиен комфорт за БСП, дори когато беше на власт. Медиите множаха и засилваха синята визия за ставащото. Като истински гуру бяха възприемани не непременно най-аналитичните, а най-патетичните. Коментарното и политическото говорене интерферираха, бяха вълни, които взаимно се подсилваха и разливаха. Беше времето на интелектуалците-трибуни. Ако на Запад революционното се свързва с лявото, пост-комунистическият преход предостави комфорта на един необичаен микс: хем подкрепящ властта, хем си бурен опозиционер[1]; хем си революционер, хем си десен.

Това беше златно време и за гражданите. Те знаеха точно какво е десницата и или я харесваха или не. Както в живота, така и в политиката харесването е по-приятното, но по-ефемерно състояние. Страстите по площадите останаха завинаги гравирани в спомените на съвременниците на ставането на демокрацията, но урните бяха по-прагматични. Там нарастващ брой избиратели отказаха да мислят цветно и идеологически, а управленски. И създадоха правилото, ненарушено до края на прехода – на всички избори сменяха управляващите.

„Когато му дойде времето”

Симеон Сакскобурготски фино и точно назова новия етап и новата насока: на неясни очертания, заличени граници, на отлагани дефиниции. Родните медии дълго мислеха, че царят-премиер не може да говори, а той говореше точно както искаше да говори – малко, кратко, неопределено, така че всеки да разбира, допълва, интерпретира, конкретизира, както пожелае. В политическата теория това се нарича „празен символ” и е мощна символна стратегия, защото се предлага рамка, която е привлекателна – западен, европейски, „успял” лидер – но без съдържание, така че всеки да твори това съдържание, както му харесва.

НДСВ се разположи в никога незаемания център и широко се отвори и към лявото, и дясното. И преди монархическо-социалистическата коалиция с етнически привкус беше ясно, че за Симеон партиите са формални структури, чиито граници е добре да бъдат ерозирани.

Това би могло да бъде силно време за сините, защото НДСВ остави празно пространството на десницата. Вместо с дясна опозиционна политика сините се заеха с деструкция във впечатляващо разнообразие от форми: от мълчание на обиден на електората лидер през партийно роене, лидерски амбиции, нериязън, дребни сметки…НАТО и ЕС станаха факт. Десницата загуби носещите си теми и се загуби в дребнотемие.

„В крак с времето”[2]

Този лозунг, който стремително премина от арта към политиката, изразява искрено и интензивно желание да се усети пулса на политическото време и да се напипа неговата посока, които станаха толкова неразпознаваеми за традиционната десница. Това днешно политическо време напомня картината на Theo van Doesburg „Ритъмът на танца”[3], в която сини, червени, жълти линии са разположени в различни посоки. Суровият фактологичен материал – естетически или политически – няма ясно послание, всеки трябва сам да го пренареди, така че да се оформи послание.

Красиво в изкуството, объркано в политиката. Това е периодът, в който не се знае какво е десницата, думи и реалности се разлитат в различни посоки.

Нямаше политическа грешка, която да не беше направена. Да избереш лице без лице е грешка, толкова любима на сините, че те с настойчива мазохистичност си я повтарят. ДСБ пръв я направи с Неделчо Беронов – достоен човек, напълно неразпознаваем, без харизма, която да блесна в кампания. СДС разви този почин: Румен Христов остана още по-неразпознат, а харизма и достойнство биха били само на водещи пизиции в дългия списък дефицити. Наистина е скучно – няма нито една грешка, която да не е правена преди. Много пъти. СДС е име-памет, име-символ. И то беше заличено, толкова пъти с него беше злоупотребено: „Това СДС не е онова СДС”.

Най-фундаменталната грешка е да загубиш усета към избирателите си. Колкото по-агресивно сините лидери говорят срещу ГЕРБ, толкова повече те гласуват за ГЕРБ.

Този период остро постави въпроса какво определя идентичността на една партия: собствената й идентификация, вотът на избирателите, коментарните и политически етикети. ГЕРБ печели избори след избори, но още се бори да бъде признат за автентична десница. Сините в разнообразни конфигурации губят избори след избори, но продължават да убеждават себе си, че са истинската десница.

Големият проблем на ГЕРБ е, че си взе медии, но не отгледа своите публични интелектуалци. Десните му анализатори се колебаят или миксират две стратегии. Едната е на „махалото” –някои коментатори изумително напомнят Яне Янев, който вчера уволнява Боросов, а днес го венцехвали като най-великият държавник, мъж, футболист…Лупингите на позициите от разпни го до осанна радват жълтите вестници и отегчават мислещите. Другата стратегия е  не „Или Или” , а „И И”: толкова дълго са хвалели Костов и сие, че сега не върви съвсем открито да пристанат на Борисов, и засукват едно умно и обтекаемо говорене, така че и едните и, и другите да ги мислят за свои.

Гражданите са най-нечуваните в този период. Те гласуват за ГЕРБ – първо като за поредния месия след Кобурготски, после – защото не виждат друга работеща дясна алтернатива. Не ги чуват добре и сините, които след изборите правят точно същите грешки като преди тях. Не ги чува добре и ГЕРБ, защото не се съсредоточава върху промяната на мотивацията за вота – тя е устойчива, когато избирателят вижда политическа енергия за промяна, и по-крехка, когато просто не вижда друга алтернатива.

Quo vadis, българска десница?

3 сценария

ГЕРБ като „класическа” дясна партия

Първият сценарий е ГЕРБ да се утвърди като класическа дясна партия. Сега е златното време за това. Тази легитиимност, която изборите не успяват напълно да му дадат, може да се роди от протестите. От зърнари до железничари – страната е залята от протести срещу пенсии, субсидии… Народно недоволство е изпитание за всички правителства, но то е предизвикателство към самата идентичност на популистките. Сега е времето да се разбере дали правителството на ГЕРБ отново ще зафлиртува с всички, ще вземе от нямащите модерни трактори, за да даде на имащите модерни трактори, ще раздаде Коледни усмивки и подаръци – малки, но от сърце, или може да мисли държавнически и да прави стратегически важни, но болезнени реформи.

Протестът като лек срещу популизма. Предстои да проследим.

Меглена Кунева като ново център – дясно

Няма коментатор, който да не претегля и премисля 500 000-ната резевна армия на Меглена Кунева. Амбиция има и самата тя, и авторите на проекта й.

Няколко фактора подриват основата за десния характер на този проект. Първият е левият финал на неутралния предизборен спринт на кандидата-президента Кунева. Като един от безбройните куриози на родния политическия ПР ще остане смайващо неуместния опълченски призив. „Свиквам опълчение”  е толкова наивно и несръчно, че го оставям без коментар. Не несръчно, а съвсем професионално, след като кандидатът Кунева официално не подкрепи никого на втория тур, шефът на предизборния й щаб пое задачата да обясни на избирателите как точно да разбират декларираната неутралност и в пространно интервю в тиражен вестник открито призова да се гласува за двойката на БСП.

Втората причина е, че авторите на проекта й имат твърде богата червена биография, за да успеят убедително да направят десен проект. Фактът, че доста се бяха заиграли и с царя, също не ги прави по-кредибилни. Трудно е хора, които двадесет години миксират бизнес и социология с ляво, дори и понякога с монархически привкус, да сътворят интересна, мобилизираща, стимулираща дясна алтернатива.

Дали ще разгърнат Кунева като ляв проект би било предмет на друг анализ.

Новото дясно

Преди още новото дясно да има форма и идея, то вече има и анализатори, и медии, които системно го лансират. Имаше надежда, че мантрата – „думите правят неща” – ще проработи. Но изглежда и авторите на сценарии са поизчерпаха – малко автори, а нужда от все нови и нови сценарии… Пък и трябва едновремнно хем да се поддържат действащите сценарии, хем да се фабрикуват новите, които да преобърнат предходните. Политическото инженерство не е лека работа…

Знаем вече както новото дясно не трябва да бъде:

• да не е загубило виталност, посока, престиж;
• да не е оплетено в лидерски дразги, драми и деструкци;
• да не е загърбило позабравеният десен избирател, който предпочита да мисли, дори когато се вълнува;
• да не е популиски, нито екстремистки;
• и най-вече и най-важно да не е ГЕРБ. Синята коалиция остана в предишните епизоди.

Сега на сценаристите предстои да напишат както новото дясно е. А на режисьорите да го поставят.

Хубавото на демократичния театър е, че гражданите решават дали да го гледат.

Sofiia_kato_darvo_na_jelaniiata_ili_10_shtrihi_ot_kmetskata_kampaniia_2011/

Почитателите на съвременното изкуство свързват „дърво на желанията” с прекрасната творба[1] на Йоко Оно в Склуптурната градина във Вашингтон, миксираща природа, интерактивност, арт.

Феновете на ОДС в столицата и други градове свързват „дърво на желанията” с кампанията за местни избори – в София то беше инсталирано пред Парламента и подканваше столичани да записват своите желания, та от гражданските пера – право в политическите „уши”.

И едните, и другите, както и всички българи – и от София, и от страната – знаят, че и без арт и маркетингови усилия столицата си е едно голямо желание за политици от всякакви разцветки и във всички времена – пред- и пост-електорални.

Не случайно започвам така арт този текст, защото след многото Каинови братоубийствени обвинения кой социолог най-малко позна и след тежкоартилерийни диагнози предлагам да обърнем поглед към политическата поетика, към „високата мода”[2] в политиката, каквато трябва да бъде кампанята. Родните кампани само по изключение се издигат до това определение, но понеже черният ПР и негативните кампании най-много се дискутират, тук ще ги загърбя и в малкото, което остава извън тях, ще откроя 10 тенденции.

Деидеологизация на посланията

Едно арт събитие през лятото вкара България в световните медии – осъмването на Паметника на съветската армия като американски комиксови герои, които – както знаят и на Изток, и на Запад – са В крак с времето.

И леви, и десни имиджмейкъри се оказаха еднакво изкусени от политическото разиграване на този арт феномен. Прошко Прошко реши, че синята идея така категорично притежава монопола на времето – то си е тяхно[3], че без никакъв превод, интерпретация, адаптация си взе арт декларацията за политически слоган.

Лявото се оказа по-амбициозно. Смисловото деконструиране чрез естетичния акт на подмяната на персонажите от пролетта се оказа недостатъчна за Кадиев. Може би счита, че на част от електората си трябва по-подробно да обяснява. 3D взривът, подгрят със световен диджей, трябваше да развърже новия ляв от лявата символика.

Никога СДС не се е добрижавало символно толкова до БСП. Има ли връзка между деидеологизирането на символите и свиващията се като шагренова кожа СДС/ДСБ електорат тепърва ще анализираме.

Национализация на местната кампания

Пътувах до Пловдив и доста се впечатлих от изобилието билбордове. В ситуация на криза скромният избирател е готов да бъде съблазняван за местен вот само в населеното си място, пък да остави пътищата и магистралите на националните играчи. Когато последните се населят с кандидати за кметове, ясно е, че амбициите не са само кметски. Именно затова наричам втората тенденция национализация на местната кампания.

Слоганът на кандидата Кадиев – Да променим София, за да променим цялата страна – също категорично формулира национална амбиция.  Не така видимо декларирана, но със сигурност национална е самата цел на кандидата – не реално да седне на кметския стол. София няма откъде да вземе толкова  червен електорат, а любителите на 3D не винаги са любители на този цвят и често политичеките цветове им се струват точно толкова привлекателни колкото вестник Трета възраст. Амбицията е наистина лидерски стол – но не кметски, а партиен.

Привкус на национализация на кампанията имаше дори у кандидати с изявена софийска идентичност като Софиянски. В дълго интервю в голям ежедневник той през цялото време се упражняваше по икономически и кризисни теми, вдъхновяващ се очевидно от краткия си опит като министър председател отколкото от дългия си опит като кмет.

Национални амбиции имаше и у Прошков – идеята отново  е близка до червената формулировка: достойно представяне в София, което да реабилитира национално ДСБ.

Прекаленото натоварване с амбиции на една кампания не само не води за реализация на националните амбиции, но често пречи и на локалните.

„Развод ми дай, развод ми дай…”

Толкова публични разводи, драми и раздели не си спомням от предишни избори.

Даниел Вълчев официално заяви, че няма да подкрепи Владимир Каролев от собствената си партия НДСВ, а ще даде гласа си за Фандъкова.

Красимир Райдовски в пространно интервю категорично подчерта, че „Кадиев е неизбираем и не може да му се вярва”.  Припомни, че фактът, с който започва всяка публична биография на Кадиев – специализацията в Харвард, младият навремето социалист я дължи на Мултигруп. Припомни и всеизвестния от миналото факт, че Кадиев загуби изборите през 2009 г., за да заключи и за бъдещето „Кадиев никога няма да стане кмет на София”.

Кадиев и Корумбашев застанаха на противоположни позиции в скандала с брокерите и макар и не така гласовите като Райдовски взаимно се обвиниха в лъжа.

В непрестанните преракания между Мартин Димитров и Иван Костов последният изнесе поредната си назидателна беседа: „Синьото вече е загубило политическото значение, което е имало преди години. Това е друго синьо – откраднато синьо. И ОДС не е онова ОДС. ОДС в момента е на тези, които откраднаха Общинска банка и Софийски имоти”.

Трудно е да се повярва, че само хармония цари сред вътрешните редици на ГЕРБ, но партийната дисциплина не позволи националните медии да станат трибуна за изясняване на различията.

Толкова разводи очевидно са свързани и с не малко изневери.  Толкова извънбрачни връзки имаше в двойката СДС – ДСБ, че даже и чезнещите им фенове не успяха да ги запомнят, разберат и простят. Подкрепата, която Прошко Прошков реши да прие от РЗС, бе запомнена, но неразбрана и нехаресана – малкото класически сини избиратели са дълбоко алергични към димки, флашки, Алексей Петров, секретни служби…

Тези раздвоени партии родиха раздвоени, та и даже разтроени кандидати.  Моя приятелка във Фейсбук обяви на цялото интернет войнство колоритния си избор: Кунева – за президент, Прошков – за кмет, Зелените – за общински съветници.

Политиците да четат и да мислят кой печели от избиратели, раздвоени от собствените им раздвоения.

И маратон, и крос

Най-практикуваният предизборен спорт е кросът – от дясното до центъра и от лявото до центъра. Други по-мобилни тичат и от дясното към крайно дясното, както и от лявото към крайно лявото.

На изборите обаче имаше един шампион, който тичаше от крайно ляво до крайно дясно, и от двата полюса до центъра – и отново, и отново. ..Истински маратон през цялата кампания, набиращ скорост крос през горещата фаза.

Кадиев започна да загрява още през 2009 г., когато непрестанно ухажваше десните софиянци и дори накрая призова: „Ако Борисов има разум, ще гласува за мен”. Дали Борисов пратикува разума си по предписания от специфичния социалист Кадиев начин остана тайна на тъмната стаичка. По-същественото е, че десните жестове на Кадиев започнаха дори още преди офциалната кампания 2011: той демонстративно взе участие в предварителните избори на Синята коалиция. Наистина впечатляващ шанс да можеш да си избереш желания политически опонент.

Левият електорат, естествено, също не беше забравен. Не само не беше забравен, но дори най-беловласите сред него не успяха да открият сред комунистическите си спомени такъв рог на изобилието, какъвто им обеща модерният ляв кандидат: безплатни карти за транспорта,  30 000 рабони места, 4 000 общински жилища…

И левият, и десният електорат се изумиха, когато Кадиев с устрем навлезе в крайнодясното поле. То електорално се оказа доста празно, както показаха изборните резултати, но никак не страдаше от липса на кандидати – и Николай Пехливанов от Атака, и Андрей Георгиев от Партията на хората от народа. Докато щабовете им изобретяваха ексцентрични ПР похвати – от безплатен сладобед до стриптиз – за привличане на вниманието, Кадиев грабна основната тема в тяхното политическо пространство. През последните дни от кампанията мощно затръби за сигурността. Дянков има малко фенове в образователните среди, но докато дори и той взе от МВР, за да даде на образованиео, Кадиев предложи да вземе от образованието, за да се даде на сигурността.

Дисциплината крос в кампанията се практикува по политическата сцена. За да му придадат видим израз, множество кандидати се качиха на возила – с открит автобус Пехливанов разходи журналистите в ромската махала, с автобуси обикаляха града и Кадиев, и Каролев. Едни привидяха американски привкус в кампанията, други решиха, че автобусите са визуални репери на политическата мобилността, за да не се изгубят избирателите в превода й. За да не се задълбочава гражданинът прекалено много в смисъла на политическата мобилност – тичането из цялото политическо поле и едновременното излъчване и на леви, и на десни послания – му се предлагаше физическа мобилност.

Най-изкусен от мобилността – и в политическия, и в буквалния смисъл – отново беше Кадиев, който откри сампанията си с 24 часа маратон. Това наистина е добре усвоен урок от западни избори. Спомням си 2000 година и героичната битка, в която Ал Гор спечели повече гласове, но не и президентския пост в САЩ – той завърши кампанията си с 48-часов маратон: в голямата американска страна амбициозният политик все може да е в ден, като преминава от една часова зона в друга.

Един имидж, много политици

И студентите по политология знаят, че главна задача на всяка кампания е да изкове имиджа на успешния кандидат, а после да намери политик, който да го въплъти. Имиджът, който изковаха много щабове, може да се резюмира така:

Ò  Високообразован

Ò  Владеещ чужди езици

Ò  Успял

Ò  Комуникативен

Ò  Непосредствен

Ò  Блогър

Ò  Младите – афиширан таргет:

É  По-важните електорални таргети (верният беловлас електорат, големите софийски фамилии на реститути) остават по-дискретни в публичната комуникация.

Впечатляващо е, че отново и леви, и десни предложиха един имидж.

Интернет:

електорален или комуникационен ефект

Витаеше усещането, че тези избори ще се решат в Интернет, че той не само ще бъде среда за кампанията, но и решаващ фактор за успех.

Избори 2011 не коронясаха Интернет като печелившият. Българският политически елит не успя да излъчи своя Обама.

Интернет кампанията е обект на друг анализ. Тук ще откроя само три тенденции.

Първата е иновация на политически сезон 2011 – блогърите бяха признати като таргет група. С тях имаше срещи още преди предварителните избори на Синята коалиция. После отново с блогъри се срещаха блогърите-кандидати Прошков и Кадиев.

Втората беше предвидима и предопределена – преходът от сайтовете към социалните мрежи. Първо, самите сайтове и блогове станаха по-интерактивни. Второ, Фейсбук е идеалната среда –и съобщенията са по-кратки, изискващи по-малка инвестиция на време, и е по-любим на младите. А и преходът от по-аналитичното към по-малко аналитичното и към по-комуникативното искрено допада на редица родни политици. А и на редица граждани.

Третата е минималистичният „превод” на гражданския акт на вота като Фейсбук събитие.

Голата истина

Слави Бинев въведе имиджовата иновация, когато преди години като кандидат кмет в „Атака за София” блесна гол до кръста в таекуондо устрем.

Кампания 2011 не можеше да отиде по-далече, без да навлезе в полето на Лари Флинт. Тя обаче доразви темата, като новата вариация заложи на случването на голотата, на стария като света, но нов за родния политически фолклор стриптиз. В клипа си[4] световно неизвестен кандидат решава, че само радикално може да преодолее дистанцията от запознаването с гражданите до спечелването им като избиратели: първо захвърля сако, после дарява връзка, следва риза….докато гордо покаже и на дамския, и на мъжкия електорат своята гола истина.

Неустоимият чар на зеленото

Избори 2009г въведоха една интересна политическа иновация:  от тема на Зелените зеленото стана тема на централните играчи.

Дотогава – включително и тогава – зеленото беше тема на Зелените. От политическата периферия на симпатични, но малки кандидати  един от кандидатите – бъдещият кмет –  вкара Зелена София в центъра на своя дискурс, програма и послания. Две години по-късно нямаше централен играч, който да не направи същото. Един кандидат предпочита да не е червен, а зелен кмет. Зелен и чист град буквално прескача от една програма в друга, трета търси по-разгърнати формулировки, но зеленото трайно и неизменно присъства като велоалеи, електротранспорт, намаляване на вредните емисии…

Този пример е изключително интересен как позиционирането на едно послание деконструира политически играчи и пренарежда политическата сцена.

Приватизация на зеленото от „генералистите” – големите играчи, първоначално маргинализира и накрая буквално заличи „специалистите”-  зелените играчи.

Хитът на следващия сезон:

умен град

Ще завърша с малка прогноза. Хитът на следващия политически сезон ще бъде интелигентният град. Филолозите още спорят как да преведат smart city – умен или интелигентен град.

Темата беше зачената още в този сезон под скромната формулировка електронна община. Всички централни играчи единодушно я считат за гарант за прозрачност, ефикасност и отчетност на администрацията.

Това, което предстои, е обличането на пожеланията за електронна община в конкретна политика. Втората, по-трудна и по-важна стъпка, е изграждането на цялостна визия за управление, която се разбира под понятието smart city.

Тя изисква израстване на кандидатите. Имат четири години за целта.

ТЯЛОТО И ИНТЕРНЕТ

Дискутант: Ивайло Дичев, професор по история на културата в Софийски университет Св. Кл. Охридски

Модератор: Анна Кръстева, доктор хонорис кауза на Университета Лил 3, доцент в НБУ.

 12 ноември 2011, събота,16 ч.

Клуб DADA , ул. Бенковски № 10 (на ъгъла с Московска)

Превод на български

Какво наистина вижда Интернет? Едно тяло. Привидно тяло, но какво всъщност представлява едно тяло? И какво гледа това тяло? Интернет. Когато тялото гледа Интернет, то не гледа де факто никога някое тяло. В най-добрия случай образ на тяло. В същото време Интернет позволява да се виждат и да се гледат тела. Има, следователно, проблем.

Защото няма тяло срещу тяло, има само привидност. Но защо тази привидност функционира, защо успява да примами? Как става възможна тази грешка, тази илюзия?

Франсоа Сулаж е философ, професор в Университета Париж 8 и в Националния институт по история на изкуството в Париж, директор на Центъра Изкуството на образите& Съвременно изкуство. Работи едновременно във Франция, Латинска Америка, Магреб, Азия и Европа.

Първото кафе ще изпием около интригуващата тема Тялото и интернет. Тя ще бъде въведена от френския професор Франсоа Сулаж.

Всички, които обичат интелектуални предизвикателства и общуване с интересни хора, са добре дошли.

Искаме в София да стават все повече креативни и иновативни събития. Ще бъдем едно от тях.

Мястото също е емблематично и разпознаваемо – културен клуб Dada.

Иницативата е на група интелектуалци от различни университети и институти. Осъществява се с активното участие на Асоциация АMOPA-България и приятели и на Френския институт в София.

Очакваме ви във Фейсбук (Café debat).

Чакам идеи и интересни предложения.

Communist solidarity – imposed, but impossible

         Pavlik Morozov was a Soviet youth who lived in the first decades after the Bolshevik revolution. A fervent participant in the youth communist movement, he denounced his father by accusing him of supporting the enemies of the revolution with forged papers. His family could not forgive Pavlik and murdered him.

This young man’s dramatic story and the choice he made take us straight into the heart of the Bolshevik idea of solidarity. Pavlik’s story became part of the mainstream art of the time – his short and tragic life was glorified in six biographies, several theatre plays, many songs, a symphony, and even an opera – it was one of the important pillars of communist propaganda.

This example presents a synthesis of the three pillars of the communist understanding of solidarity:

• Detonation of the traditional source of solidarity – the family. Trust, affection, and mutual support are perceived as something natural in the close interpersonal relationships between relatives. Family is at the centre of traditional society as well as the core of the communitarian idea of social solidarity. It plays such a significant role, that even liberal thinkers such as John Rawls and J. S. Mill acknowledge that small communities are a favorable medium for social capital and morals.  The ambitious political project of communism destroyed this key traditional source in order to provide the space for a new understanding of solidarity;
• “Expropriation “of solidarity from the social and its inclusion in the political. Its spontaneous displays are being punished while its formal manifestations are encouraged;
• Introduction of a radically different idea of solidarity based on political and party loyalty, rather than interpersonal relationships;

Communist understanding of solidarity is paradoxical. On the one hand, solidarity is being promoted to a significant position in official ideology. Its remarkable high ranking is related to its close interconnectedness to the concept of homogenizing of the social individual. The purpose of the gradual diminishing and elimination of the differences between workers, peasants, and intellectuals was widely promoted. The more homogenous the society, the quicker the variety of interests would disappear and solidarity and mutual support would become more natural and widespread. The communist ideal[1] “From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs” represents the utopian vision of perfect solidarity: there is no direct connection between inputs and outputs, between contribution and benefits. This direct connection is not even sought as it refers to a different type of society which is meritocratic in its essence and has the individual at its centre. This utopian communist ideal creates the vision of a social world based on the principle of solidarity.

On the other hand, solidarity was suffocated where is most spontaneously originated and flourished: the family and the small communities. The various free associations – clubs, cooperatives, guilds, etc. – did exist, but were anything but free. A variety of associations used to exist: professional unions of architects, writers, scientists; cooperatives of agricultural workers; chess clubs or folk singing groups – all of them, however, were part of the network of organizations officially approved, as well as officially controlled, by the communist party and state.

In both cases we see the third characteristic of the communist model of solidarity manifested: the top bottom approach.

This contradictory idea led to an ambiguous result: the more solidarity was imposed from the top, the more the micromechanisms that turn solidarity into a producer of trust and social capital, were suffocated.

Post-communist solidarity – marginalized, but possible

         Post-communism radically turned the situation upside down – solidarity was not a priority any longer, but there were no restrictions for it to develop and spread in its spontaneous and varied forms.

There are three groups of factors which determine the attitude of reserved distance towards solidarity: ideological, sociological, and political. The first are related to the dominant role of liberalism, the second – to the widespread display of individualism, and the third – to the peculiarities of post-communist social democracy.

A typical characteristic of the post-totalitarian transition was that the ruling communist ideology was not immediately replaced by actual pluralism, but by a radical re-positioning of the pendulum in the opposite direction towards liberalism, including its extreme, libertarian versions.

Liberties – both positive[2] and negative[3], and not solidarity, are at the centre of the universe of the liberal political philosophy.

It is important to highlight the fact that post-communist departure from solidarity is part of the more general tendency of liberal skepticism towards the concept, which Klaus Rippe defines as “Diminishing solidarity” (1998):

„A look at the modern classics of liberalism (such as Ronald Dworkin or John Rawls) appears to confirm that  justice, and not solidarity, individual rights and not social ties or mutual obligations are the central themes of these theories” (Rippe 1998, pp. 355-356).

The sociological factor is linked to the rise and flourishing of individualism.  In “The Care of the Self” Michel Foucault (1994) defines individualism in three aspects: individualistic attitudes; the absolute value attributed to the individual; the intensity of the relations to self in order to transform, correct, and purify oneself.

The new post-communist individualist is less tempted by the existential dimension and is much more attracted by the liberation from social commitments and the proud asserting of the self as the centre of his/her own world.  There is an advertisement which illustrates this ambitious credo: “Some observe the rules, we create them” (Krasteva 2008). The post-communist individualist transgresses the moral standards of society in order to announce his/her own rules. Such an egocentric world does not provide enough space for solidarity.

The third factor is related to the lack of a convincing political discourse on solidarity. In the early stages of transition, post-communist socialist and social democratic political parties were not explicitly compliant with the left-right distinctions; they tended to promote a specific vision of social change relying on gradual and not radical transformations, rather than social justice. Solidarity did not manage to become one of the key messages of the left-wing parties.

Reinventing solidarity:

new relations in a new field

Is solidarity possible in a society which does not place collective values and shared responsibility on a pedestal – neither before, nor after the democratic changes? The present article aims to give a moderately positive answer to this question.

The invention of solidarity presents a challenge to post-communist countries. The current situation is a mirror image of the previous regime: solidarity is not part of the new ideology, but does not interfere with it on the social level. The political and social priorities, on the one hand, put forward liberalism and individualism. On the other hand, the developing pluralism – both political and social – differentiates society and creates space for alternative political values.

In summary, the ever more democratic political scene in Eastern andSoutheastern Europe, does not promote solidarity as a key value and a mobilizing factor, but does provide the spaces required for its development.

I will discuss the invention of solidarity in the sphere of migration and integration. I choose this particular case study because of three sets of reasons: ontological, symbolical, and cultural.

The ontological reasons are linked to the extremely intensive flows of the 90ties, which made the West Balkans the most dynamic region inEurope:

The Balkans constitute one of the most remarkable regions of the world for the complexity and extent of its recent refugee and migration movements. Between 1990 and 2000, over 10 million people — out of a total population of some 80m in theBalkan Peninsula—had moved. Furthermore, these population movements, unusually, had ramifications for security within the Balkans and also forWestern Europe, thus implicating both the EU and NATO (Baldwin-Edwards 2005, p.31).

Every second inhabitant of Bosnia and Herzegovinaenters the flow of people seeking asylum. Many other citizens, both voluntarily and by force, become migrants of all sorts – refugees, internally displaced persons, or economic migrants. Various types of migrations are differentiated: forced, ethnic, circular, labor, trafficking. [4] The pattern of migration in the Balkans is rather interesting both in its typological and diachronic aspects. The beginning of the new century was marked by new tendencies: from forced migration to return, from ethnic to economic logic, from permanent to temporary migration (Krasteva 2010).

The second set of reasons – the symbolic – is related to the excessive production of foreignness. Over a few yearsYugoslavia disintegrated into 7 states.  New borders cut through the already fragmented territories: in addition to the larger number of national borders, we now have the European ones ofSlovenia,Bulgaria, andRomania. Entry visas for neighbors who were able to travel freely until recently increased the symbolic distances between the inhabitants of the Balkans. Free movement around the territories of the former federation has nowadays been transformed into migration and recent fellow citizens have become foreigners. This multitude of new borders, divisions, and foreignness needs to be counterbalanced, need bridges and new relationships.

The third set of reasons constitutes the cultural ones.  The ethnocultural differences on the Balkans have traditionally been regarded in terms of minorities, of populations who have lived on the territories ofSouth Eastern Europe for tens or hundreds of years.  Over the past decade a new phenomenon is beginning to unfold – immigration. The Eastern Balkans but alsoCroatia andSlovenia have started attracting immigrants. In the new member states of the EU this process is complemented by the free movement of citizens from other European countries. This new source of ethnocultural differences demands the creation and implementation of a new type of integration policies, the invention of new forms of solidarity.

What is shared by the three sets of reasons is the novelty of the phenomenon. And this is the particular goal of the present article: to study solidarity as a new value in relation to the new tendencies in migration[5].

I am going to discuss the relationship solidarity – migration in tree problematic areas:

• solidarity versus security;
• solidarity versus individualism;
• solidarity versus citizenship.

A specific issue concerning migration will be at the centre of each of the different themes as follows: human rights; remittances; return. Each theme will analyze the manifestations of solidarity as part of a different social cross-section: the first in civil society; the second in interpersonal relations; and the third – in the relationship of the state towards citizens.

Solidarity is conceived in the sense defined by C. Arnsperger and Y. Varoufakis:

“Solidarity is about identifying a condition which makes those who ‘suffer’ it worthy of one’s concern independently of (a) who those people are, (b) whether or not one cares for them personally” (Arnsperger and Y. Varoufakis 2003, p. 158).

The present chapter will analyze solidarity in relation to migration. Migrants can be members of our family, friends and relations, but as a general rule they are strangers who often lead a life completely different from our own. This is why it is essential to understand one other dimension of solidarity, namely its impersonal character:

Solidarity may, of course, coexist with reciprocity, person specific sympathy and Kantian duty. The point is, however, that solidarity motivates generosity independently (that is, even in the absence) of these other-regarding motivations (Arnsperger and Y. Varoufakis 2003, p. 171).

Solidarity versus security

         Arevik, an Armenian young woman from Armeniaand David, an Armenian young man from Bulgariameet on the Internet. Arevik visits David in his country, virtual love becomes real and she cannot imagine life away from her beloved. Love is blind – in this case the saying has a real power to describe the situation: the two young people in love forget the fact that they do not have the required papers.[6] The romance is brutally interrupted, the girl’s visa has expired and she is shut in a temporary detention centre. This is where Arevik realizes that she is pregnant. She lives through hard times, but is not discouraged. A student in Fine Art, she fills her time in confinement by drawing portraits – of other detained migrants and superintendents.

Civil society in the country engages in a widespread campaign in support of Arevik – a young lawyer specializing in migrant rights advises her, a subscription appears on the Internet, activists organize demonstrations outside the detention centre. The story is beautiful and romantic enough for the media to engage as well. Pressure becomes large-scale and powerful, the institutions give in. The girl is set free.[7]

This contemporary story of Romeo and Juliet of migration clearly singles out several elements, essential for the present analysis:

• concerns about security come first and are a priority in migration policy. Even in cases where there is no threat to national security whatsoever the strictest measures provided by the law are applied, such as expulsion order or detention, instead of lighter measures, such as daily subscription at the local police office;
• civil society, and not the state, is the main proponent of the values of human rights and is able to display high levels of mobilization to support them;
• the protagonists of the story are very young, beautiful and so much in love that they unquestionably provoke strong sympathy and this explains the support “front” that appeared naturally amongst the non-government sector, the media, and the people. The question remains whether civil society would demonstrate the same levels of maturity and solidarity if the migrants were not so irresistibly attractive.

This case is an introduction to the first problematic area in which the relationship between migration and solidarity will be analyzed through the prism of human rights. It will be structured in three parts: Europe and the concept of human rights; the three waves of non-government organizations inEastern Europe; and typology and characteristics of the migration NGOs.

Europe’s contradictory signals

         Zhelju Zhelev, the first Bulgarian president, promoted Husserl’s idea ofEuropenot as a geographic reality, but as a spiritual entity whose intellectual substance was philosophy and whose political realization – democracy. The post-communist transition was inspired by the high ideal ofEuropeseen as the birthplace of human rights. The adoption of international practices for the protection of immigrant rights was perceived as part of the democratization process.

The International Convention of the UN on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families was signed on 18 December 1990. It declares that the states should provide “sound, equitable, humane and lawful conditions” in relation to the management of migration flows. The Convention regards migrants not just as workers or economic units, but also as social subjects who have families and “have the right to have rights”.[8]

The overlap between the beginning of post-democratic democratization and the adoption of the international legal framework concerning migrants is a historical contingency, but it carries a significant symbolic importance for the present analysis.

The Convention’s merits can be seen working in several directions:

• it is a sublimation of the philosophy of human rights which emerged gradually after 1948, stating that fundamental rights should be accessible to all irrespective of nationality or status;
• it complements and renders more specific other international documents such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;
• it acts as counterbalance to globalization that is powered by and benefits mainly large corporations. Migrants’ problems and their rights are sent to the periphery of globalization and the Convention aims to serve as a corrective to this injustice. (Gauchteneire et Pecoud 2008, Batistella 2008, Taran 2008);
• it supports the idea that irregular migrants also have rights.

The role of the Convention is invaluable for all citizens, organizations, and institutions striving to carry out and implement policies for the integration of migrants, based on the respect of human dignity and rights.

The signals that Europe sends out to the new member states and to candidate countries fromSoutheastern Europeare contradictory. On the one hand, the European Union is a geopolitical area, which not only gave the world the idea of human rights, but still provides the highest standards for their observance. On the other hand, the EU adopts policies leading in the opposite direction. Markets and security are the two pillars of European policies. Both of them seriously undermine the normative and political significance of the Convention of 1990, as well as the holistic approach to the protection of human rights.

The market seeks labor that is cheap, obedient, temporary and easy to dismiss. The market approach treats migrants only as labor force which has to fulfill the demands of the labor market, only when and to the extent that is needed.

Security has been raised high as an unquestionable priority and the centre of European policies.  Migration is discussed from the perspective of control, sanctions, and criminalization of irregular migrants. An expression of this restrictive approach is the unwillingness of EU member states to ratify the Convention of 1990. The fact that the new member states easily adopt the security approach is indicative. A profound explanation would require a separate analysis, but here we could briefly mention that the communist regime relies on security and this is why post-communist elites master this lesson much more easily and quickly than the message of solidarity and human rights.

How are these contradictory signals understood and “translated” in SEE?

The waves of the civil sector

         The undisputable bearer of the idea and the discourse on human rights in the post-communist countries is the civil sector. A panoramic view of its development would reveal four directions. They could be examined both typologically – according to the priority areas on which the NGO’s efforts are concentrated, and chronologically – as periods, or waves, each one of them focusing on a specific issue:

• Minorities and conflict resolution. Ethnic and religious tensions were the typical conflicts from the beginning of the transition which escalated into wars and ethnic cleansing in formerYugoslavia. It is only natural that reconciliation activities are at the centre of civil organizations aimed at restoring trust, building bridges, and display solidarity;
• Anticorruption. The lack of responsibility and accountability in the dealings of the various types of elite requires counterbalancing on the part of the civil sector;
• Environment. Civil society “going green” stretched the borders of solidarity to include nature and our responsibility for the future generations;
• Migration. These NGOs come closest to the first group and this is why they are often their logical continuation. They face a new challenge: to formulate, defend and realize a new understanding of solidarity which includes not just “our own”, but “the foreign” as well.

The NGOs focusing on migration – diversification of the forms of solidarity

         Solidarity is a trademark of the civil sector. There is a variety of numerous associations, organizations, and initiatives that operate within it. I would differentiate among five types of migration NGOs: humanitarian, those for human rights, the information hubs, those for intercultural dialogue, and the migrants’ own organizations.

The first group is formed by the humanitarian organizations. They are mainly focused on the most vulnerable groups among migrants: those looking for asylum, internally displaced persons, and victims of forced migration. The activities of these organizations are of primary importance in (post)conflict situations such as the wars in formerYugoslavia.

The humanitarian domain is the preferred field of action of religious charities. Representatives of various religious communities play an active part in the process of reconciliation and in the setting up of spaces for dialogue between the different communities in post-warBosnia and Herzegovina. A characteristic feature here is that this key mission is adopted both by representatives of the big religious communities: Muslims, Catholics, Orthodox, and by small minorities such as the Jews.

A typical example of a humanitarian organization is the story of the creation and the work of Group 484 in Serbia. The idea was proposed by Jelena Šantić, a famous ballet dancer. In 1995 she set up an organization to help 484 refugees and their families who had found asylum inSerbia after fleeing Krajina and Operation “Storm” of the Croatian Army.  This humanitarian gave the name to the organization in order to express its aim to continue helping the victims of forced migration. The founder of the organization was awarded the Pax Christi International Annual Peace Prize in 1996. This organization is a vivid example of the vitality of civil society in which particular individuals achieve formidable results by relying on their willpower, their desire for solidarity and their ability to mobilize others.

Group 484 has so far been able to help more than 100 000 displaced people, refugees, and migrants. The solidarity they promote is looking back in time – trying to relieve the consequences of forced migration and empower migrants; at the same time it is looking ahead through the active work with the young generation directed towards the formation of tolerant and open attitudes towards cultural differences.

The second group of NGOs comprises those which focus on migrants’ rights. We need to stress that all migration organizations are based on the philosophy of human rights and develop various initiatives to protect them. There is a group of NGOs, however, for which this is central. A typical example is the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights. It has organizations in all the Balkan countries. Its activities are directed against discrimination of all types, including ethnic and religious. Some of the national organizations have dedicated departments to deal with migrants’ issues.

Some small-scale local initiatives which originate without considerable international funding and are the result of the commitment and voluntary participation of young activists are even more interesting. I would like to single out two organizations from Sofia: the Legal Clinic for Refugees and the Centre for Legal Aid – Voice in Bulgaria. Both are the creation of young legal professionals who work pro bono to provide free legal advice to asylum seekers. It is amazing to notice the discrepancy between the lack of substantial financial support and the significant public activity such small organizations are able to carry out. An important strand in the organizations’ activities is the sensitizing of public opinion and exerting pressure on Parliament for the stricter application of human rights standards in legislation.

The third group of organizations could be defined as information, coordination, and migration policy development hubs. They are not typical of the region and are a relatively new phenomenon. Their emergence is determined by the geopolitical fragmentation of the Balkans and by the need to establish mechanisms for coordinated activities and policies. The initiative to set these up often does not originate from the actual civil society, but from international organizations.

An interesting example is MARRI – Migration, Asylum , RefugeesRegionalInitiative. Its members are six countries form the Western Balkans –Albania,Bosnia and Herzegovina,Macedonia,Montenegro,Serbia, andCroatia. It was formed in 2003 based on an idea of the Stability Pact. Its aim is to develop the capacity of the Balkan countries to cooperate, align their policies and contribute to the stabilization and development of the region.

The next group of NGOs I would describe as organizations for intercultural understanding and dialogue.  The distinctive feature of the migration phenomenon in SEE – which differentiates it from the classical immigration countries – is its relative novelty, as well as its substantial differences in comparison to immigration inWestern Europe. It is essential that the actors of solidarity are not “lost in the translation” of intercultural differences. The first step that is needed is the accumulation of expertise, research, and analyses on which the understanding of migrants will be based. The second is the invention of new forms of solidarity with the new form of intercultural differences – immigration.

A characteristic example of this type of organizations is CERMES – the centre for refugee and migration studies in Sofia.[9] Its primary mission is the overturning of research priorities: the numerous researches on emigration need to be complemented by the study of immigration[10]; a transition from the loss of the own towards welcoming the foreign, from identity towards solidarity, needs to take place. The other mission of the organization is to provide immigrants a voice so that they are not the subject of public debates[11], initiatives[12], and forums, but their active initiators and implementers.

The last group of NGOs are the migrants’ own organizations: most often they are formed on the basis of nationality: Ethiopian, Syrian, Chinese; in some cases – on the basis of gender – women migrants; and in other cases depending of the type of migration – there are special organizations of refugees because of the specificty of their problems. The palette of their activities is varied and ranges from setting up of clubs and schools, to publishing of newspapers and magazines, and mediating the relationships between migrant communities and the institutions.

There is no “pure” type of NGO; most of them are a blend of the different types. What is essential for my analysis is the diversification of activities along two axes: the types of solidarity and its subjects. The problems of asylum seekers, irregular immigrants and refugees are so much different from those of economic migrants that they are usually the focus of specialized NGOs. They face the most challenging task of relativizing security by complementing it with solidarity, of asserting the idea that every person has rights, even if they might have entered the country and remained in it without the required papers.

Activities can be summarized in three groups: legal, informational, and intercultural. In the first case solidarity is related to migrant rights; in the second – to policies and the need for them to apply the standards of human rights; and in the third – in regard to integration, inclusion and empowerment of migrants.

Civil society – the discourse that serves as a connection

         Political theory and political ethics rarely look in the same direction. H.-G. Gadamer points at one of the key areas of their divergence:

“Our public life appears to be defective in so far as there is too much emphasis upon the different and the disputed, upon that which is contested or in doubt. What we truly have in common and what unites us remain, so to speak without a voice” (Gadamer 1967, in Walhof 2006, p. 571).

Politics stresses too much on what differentiates between people and creates sources of tension and conflict. The normative approach is seeking voices that are able to unite.

Civil society is the alternative voice that undertakes the mission of creating topoi of solidarity in post-communist societies. Efforts are twofold. On the discursive level, the discourse of security is opposed to the discourse of human rights. If the one legitimates and consolidates borders – national, ethnic, symbolic; the other overcomes them with the idea that the highest level of human security is contained in an environment of sharing and solidarity.

The second level of the creation of solidarity is in the relationship between the receiving societies and migrants, in the accumulation of experiences and multiplication of the practices of intercultural understanding and dialogue.

Civil society in Southeastern Europeneeds to go a long way until it achieves the high goals it has set for itself. Firstly, because of the weaknesses of its own functioning.[13] Secondly, because the mission itself would be unbearably hard to achieve in the foreseeable future. It is essential that, despite of all the deficits, it is civil society, much more than the state, that undertakes to be the herald of solidarity.

Solidarity versus individualism

         “I had the opportunity to work as an engineer abroad. I sent 1 000 dollars to my wife, son, daughter, brother, sister, and best friend each. I did not make any savings, but times were like that. These were years of scarcity forBulgaria: hyperinflation, complete uncertainty about what might happen on the next day. One thousand dollars was a considerable sum, a breath of air until the crisis was over”.

An interview with a former migrant, male, aged 45

The above excerpt from an interview leads us to the next type of solidarity which looks at the migrant as a person concerned about the survival of his/her closest people – relatives and friends, rather than an atomized individual seeking personal prosperity.

One of the antidotes of individualism is sibling solidarity. Researchers highlight two key elements: kinship functions as a social network; the significance of kinship solidarity transcends the narrow limits of the family and corresponds with important social values:

While some aspects of kinship organization appear antithetical to many social institutions in modern society, sibling solidarity is consonant with the equalitarian ethic…” (Graham 1977, p. 177).

Remittances are one of the points of intersection between sibling solidarity and migration. Unlike many other forms of sibling solidarity where geographical proximity plays an important role, with remittances, the lack of the latter not only diminishes, but enhances solidarity between the migrant and the non-immigrants belonging to his/her family.

Remittances can vary within an extremely wide range. According to the calculations of the World Bank, in the decade 1996 – 2005, they represented almost one third (29%) of the GDP of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a considerable part of  Albania’s GDP (16%), and a smaller part of that in Bulgaria (3,6%) and Croatia (3.3%)[14] (Roberts at al 2007). Remittances play a significant role in guaranteeing education for the children or a decent life for the parents when they reach old age; for sustaining the family calendar – provision of funds for significant events such as weddings, etc.; for building and maintaining the family home, etc.

A whole series of arguments around the negative sides of remittances are discussed in the literature as they are seen as discouraging autonomy and creating a dependency. In my analysis I discuss their value as a mechanism for solidarity.

This mechanism has its historical roots in gurbet – a migration practice of the inhabitants of the Balkans, which today could be translated as circular or temporary migration: the head of the family works abroad during the summer or for a set period of time in order to support it. The interesting fact is that despite the disintegration of the patriarchic model in the sending countries and the much more developed forms of individualism which the migrant enters in the receiving countries, the mechanism of kinship solidarity continues to operate. The second peculiarity is that solidarity not only exists but diversifies and multiplies its forms in terms of gender and generations: not only from the fathers to the wives and children, but from the wife to the husband and children; not only from the parents to the children, but from the children to their parents.

The significance of these funds for the families is invaluable in the material sense of survival, for supporting a decent life and raising the level of well-being. Even greater and all-embracing is their importance in their symbolic sense: as a specific token of kinship solidarity which transcends the separation of space and affirms a real alternative to individualism.

Solidarity versus citizenship

         “I want to return to die at home”.

This is the typical attitude of the first sociologically significant group of returnees to the new countries that inherited former Yugoslavia.[15] It clearly illustrates the interconnectedness between the existential and the political and shows the extent to which the most intimate of impulses can depend on the successful application of returnee policies.

Every policy of return is based on solidarity. As a rule it is generally perceived as “natural” and is seen as lacking any problems: it is our compatriots that are returning and they re-integrate without any trouble. The case I shall analyze is the exact opposite:

“Regrettably, return and reintegration are far from being a “natural” and smooth continuation, especially in post-conflict situations. All fixed concepts of identity, belonging, and territorialization should be deconstructed” (Mesic and Bagic 2010, p. 134).

Let me briefly introduce the context. The wars in formerYugoslaviaproduced a huge number of refugees and internally displaced people:

“At the climax of armed conflict among former Yugoslav nations in 1993, there were around 2.5 million refugees and displaced persons in the region, which made up 1/5 of the total number of forced migrants in the world (15 million). Contemporary Serbia hosts the largest number of refugees and internally displaced persons in Europe” (Bobic 2010).

This complex and traumatic situation makes return a long and intricate process. It is not possible to reduce it to a one-off act and is a subtle process that takes time:

“return as such is not enough, it should be also effective and successful” (Mesic and Bagic 2010, p. 135).

In this type of return solidarity is two-edged: on the one hand, it is problematic because of the ambiguity in the meaning of “own” and “foreign” and the intricate transitions between the two; on the other, it presents a fundamental condition for the actual return to take place and be sustainable.

The challenges, from the point of view of returnees, are of two major types:

• lowering of the social status. Some of the returnees used to live as part of one of the big nations in the federal state ofYugoslavia, but return to a status of a minority in the newly-formed state. Two thirds of the Serbian returnees toCroatiaare dissatisfied with their position of a national minority (Mesic and Bagic 2010).
• homogenization of the social space. Having grown-up in a more mixed environment in terms of ethnicities and religions, they have to return to a more homogenous one. The weaker the return, the more ethnically “pure” the environment remains:  before the war 73 000 Croatians used to live in the Bosnian town of Banja Luka, today[16] their number is merely 6 500; out of 39 000 Serbs who left Herzegovina, only 9 000 returned to their homes (Marinkovic 2007).

Both the status of a minority and the changed environment of ethnic culture weaken the traditional mechanisms of solidarity and require the creation of new ones. In a post-conflict society, the major proponents of solidarity – and guarantors of its application – are the international community and states such asBosnia and HerzegovinaandCroatia. The latter need to accept as “own” the ones, who during the wars were defined as “foreign”, for example,Croatiaset up programs for the sustainable return of Serbs.

Returnees are expected to display loyalty to the new state, and the state is required to show solidarity towards its new minorities.

This type of solidarity is at the very heart of the new Balkan citizenships. They are formed with a strong nationalistic charge. To be acceptable for the European Union, this ethnic nationalism has to be shaded and balanced by a moderate policy towards minorities, returnees, and immigrants.

Solidarity presents a major challenge and a key condition for the evolution of the civil spirit from an ethnic to a civic model.

Conclusion:

the new topoi of solidarity

         “Among the tasks of politics today, I think a top priority should be to make us more generally aware of our deep solidarities. This is particularly crucial in the age of interrelated foreignness, where we do not even know our neighbors” (Gadamer 1999, in Walhof 2006, p. 572).

Gadamer singles out solidarity as a key political priority. The present text unfolds precisely in the spirit of that understanding which, on the one hand, gives proof of solidarity’s political role, and on the other, connects its understanding to otherness.

Migration is one of the areas which have the greatest difficulty in producing solidarity because, as a rule, the latter is bound to nationality. Even more problematic is its appearance and protection in post-conflict countries or in societies in transition which are not prepared enough or are not enough focused on the integration of migrants. It is this less favorable context that makes the identification of new topoi of solidarity in the new sphere even more significant.

One of them is the family. Remittances are a mechanism of solidarity which unfolds on the level of the social structure of society and creates antidotes to the escalating individualism both in sending and receiving countries.

The other mechanism of solidarity – provision of conditions for the return of individuals who have been forcibly displaced or have left as a result of ethnic conflict and wars – is realized on the level of public re-integration policies. It involves two key political subjects – the national state and the international community.

The third mechanism of solidarity – the protection of migrant rights and the forms of intercultural understanding and dialogue – is fundamental as it contributes to the development civil society. It is fundamental because of three reasons. The first is that it covers the huge social space between individuals, on the one hand, and the state, on the other. The second is that, especially in a civil society, immigrants can be actors in and not just subjects of integration practices.

And the third and most substantial reason is that it is the civil society in post-communist countries that heralds the noble mission to produce the public discourse of connectedness and solidarity.

Arnsperger  C. and Y. Varoufakis (2003) Toward a theory of solidarity.- Erkenntnis, vol 59, N 2, 157 – 188.

Baldwin-Edwards M. (2005) Balkan migrations and the European Union: patterns and trends.-

Berlin, I. (1969) ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, in I. Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty,London:OxfordUniversity Press. New ed. in Berlin 2002.

Battistella G. La naissance d’une Convention. Les difficiles relations entre migrations et droits de l’homme.- Hommes et migrations, N 1271, 20 – 31.

Bobic M. (2010) Serbian unfinished business : refugees and IDPS.- In: Krasteva A., A.Kasabova, D. Karabonova (eds) Migrations from and to Southeastern Europe.Ravenna: Longo Editore.

Foucault M. (1994) Histoire de la sexualité. Tome. 3. Le souci de soi. Paris : Gallimard.

Gadamer H.-G. (1967) The limitation of expert. Qtd. in Walfoh D. R. (2006) Friendship, otherness and Gadamer’s politics of solidarity.-Political theory, 2006, vol. 34, N 5, pp. 569 – 593.

Gadamer H.-G. (1999). Friendschaft und solidaritat. Qtd. in Walfoh D. R. (2006) Friendship, otherness and Gadamer’s politics of solidarity.-Political theory, 2006, vol. 34, N 5, pp. 569 – 593.

Gauchteneire P. de et A. Pecoud (2008) La Convention des Nations unis sur les droits des travailleurs et migrants.- Hommes et migrations, N 1271, 6 – 19.

Graham A. (1977) Sibling solidarity.-Journal of marriage and family, vol. 39, N 1, 177 – 184.

Krasteva A. (2008) L’individualisme post-communiste.-Dans : Payet J.-P. et A. Battegay (eds) La reconnaissance a l’épreuve. Presses Universitaires de Septentrion, 2008, 295 – 302.

Krasteva A. (2009) Being a citizen – not a profession, but a commitment.-In: Hristova-Valtcheva K. (ed.)  New actors in a new environment: accession to the EU, civil society and multi-level governance.Sofia: BECSA,  2009, pp. 35 – 43.

Krasteva A.(2010)  Introduction.-In: Krasteva A., A.Kasabova, D. Karabonova (eds) Migrations from and toSoutheastern Europe.Ravenna: Longo Editore, 2010, 9 – 14.

MacDonald E. et R.Cholewski (2008) L’Union européenne face a la Convention sur les travailleurs migrants.- Hommes et migrations, N 1271, 54 – 66.

Marinkovic D. (2007) Strengthening cross-border cooperation in the Western Balkans regarding migration management. The case of Bosniaand Herzegovina.- In: Migration flows in Southeast Europe, a compendium of national perspectives.Belgrade: Group 484, 43 – 75.

Mesic M. and D. Bagic (2010) Serb returnees in Croatia– the question of return sustainability.- International migration, vol. 48 (2), 133 – 160.

Rippe Kl. (1998) Diminishing solidarity.- Ethical theory and moral practice, vol. 1, N 3, 355 – 374.

Roberts B. at al (2007) A study on determinants and remittances flows inMacedonia.Skopje: Centre for Economic Analyses.

Taran P. (2008) La Convention, symbole d’une approche alternative des migrations internationales Hommes et migrations, N 1271, 32 – 41.

Walfoh D. R. (2006) Friendship, otherness and Gadamer’s politics of solidarity.-Political theory, 2006, vol. 34, N 5, pp. 569 – 593.

 Voix de femmes

La nomade

Elle fait très jeune avec son chapeau drôle et original et ses vêtements artistiques. La Bulgarie n’est qu’un des arrêts dans ses voies globales. Elle a vu un jour dans Internet l’annonce pour un petit boulot et a pris l’avion Tokyo-Sofia.

Elle enseigne Japonais aux enfants d’un club de tae-kwon-do. Elle habite dans une auberge de jeunesse au plein cœur de la capitale bulgare en aidant le jeune propriétaire – un migrant lui-même qui vient de renter au pays – à le gérer.

Elle a vécu en Australie et Nouvelle Zenlande, a fait le tour de l’Irlande. Elle s’y plait partout et ne reste longtemps nulle part. Ne veut pas s’installer. Ne sait pas ou elle veut aller, mais sait qu’elle ne veut pas vivre au Japon. Elle le trouve trop régulé, sous trop de contrôle social, avec des rôles trop strictement définis. On attend des filles de son milieu à recevoir une bonne éducation, à se marier, etc.

Elle me ravit par son style artistique et original. Avec un grand sourire elle me raconte la surprise des Bulgares qui n’arrivent pas à réaliser comment une Japonaise peut vouloir s’habiller à l’occasion. Elle est attirée par la découverte. Chaque article est unique. On fouille, on cherche, il y a de la chance à se trouver soi-même, on est toujours différent des autres.

Elle rit à haute voix, fait des grimaces drôles, n’est pas pressée et offre généreusement de son temps. Ne comprend pas la frénésie de la sur occupation et fait « du bon usage de la lenteur ». Plusieurs de sa génération aspirent aux marques et standing, elle cherche l’unique et l’authentique.

La militante

Elle faisait des math à Leningrad, aujourd’hui Saint Petersburg. Soudain, un grand haut fort homme bulgare est apparu dans sa vie. Le tourbillon a été tel qu’avant de réaliser le changement elle s’est retrouvée mariée. Le premier fils est vite venu, dans le foyer son premier lit a été une vielle valise. Le temps passait rapidement et le second enfant a suivi, puis le troisième. Le mari a soutenu son doctorat, elle s’est diplômée et ils sont venus en Bulgarie.

Jeune famille intellectuelle, les enfants les accompagnaient au théâtre et cinéma des le plus jeune âge. Lire, aimer lire, parler lecture, vivre entouré de livres fait partie des marques de distinction de l’intelligentsia russe. Les trois enfants, déjà adultes bien diplômés et encore mieux installés dans trois pays différents, sont tous dans les nouvelles technologies, les livres restent une partie inséparable de leurs vies. La mère est toute heureuse que la langue a véhiculé la culture qui s’est cristallisée en identité.

La militante dirige une petite ONG qui accueille des femmes vulnérables. Elles colorent des poupées et surmontent trauma, solitudes, dépression. Certaines de ces femmes sont refugiées, la plupart – Bulgares, la Russe n’en fait aucune différence. Elle parle de son travail avec fierté, pas pathos, avec compréhension, pas pitié. Ses yeux brillent quand elle raconte les réussites de ses ex clientes, dont certaines déjà indépendantes.

 « 3 en 1 »

« D’où viens-tu » est invariablement la première question qu’on lui pose. Elle hésite toujours comment répondre, car elle est d’ici  – de naissance, langue maternelle, citoyenneté.  Les gens n’écoutent pas comment elle parle, mais regardent comment elle est. Son père Nigérien et sa mère Bulgare l’ont dotée d’une exotique beauté.

Différence rime avec regard. Elle décide de le capitaliser, de transformer être regardée en profession – modèle et hôtesse de l’air . Elle fait partie de la génération «  3 en 1 » et réussit avec légèreté plusieurs activités : du défilé de mode va à la fac pour son cours de sciences po et de la continue vers l’aéroport pour prendre le vol suivant.

Etre représentante de minorité visible pourrait dégénérer en stigmate ou se convertir en chance de carrière brillante. Elle choisit le second, transformer la différence en réussite. Ses occupations sont artistiques, ses études universitaires – sérieuses.

La Bulgarie est sa patrie ; sa curiosité et ses origines la pousse à parcourir et découvrir le monde. Elle se sent confortablement dans le mouvement et la mobilité.

La prof de dance

Je l’avais d’abord connue à travers les récits de ses élèves – toutes éprises de la sagesse, la beauté, l’art de vivre de la culture indienne dont elles s’imprégnaient pendant les classes de danse. Professions libérales, carrière brillantes ou prometteuses, ces jeunes Bulgares dynamiques et mobiles étaient surprises de se découvrir toutes passionnées pour cette danse ancienne dont la prof ne promettaient aucune maitrise définitive – on ne fait que s’approcher de la perfection sans jamais l’attendre. Eprises encore plus de la prof qui – par le discours musical et chorégraphique – arrivait à toucher leurs plus profondes sensibilités interculturelles.

« Quand je suis plongée dans la poussière, le brouhaha, les vagues de personnes dans rues et marchés, des larmes chaudes ont commencé à couler, je sentais que j’étais rentrée chez moi ». C’est le récit magnifique de cette Italienne, mariée à un Bulgare, qui visite l’Inde pour la première fois dans sa trentaine bien avancée. La « patrie »comme pure construction symbolique, totalement déterritorialisée, enracinée que dans l’imaginaire, l’identitaire, l’interculturel. Danses et culture indiennes sont sa passion et vocation, la traduction reste sa profession. Un métier qui ne pourrait entre mieux choisi renvoyant à la métaphore de Simmel de pont qui connecte cultures et personnes.

L’écrivaine

Nomade de sort, pas de choix, elle est née en Cote d’Ivoire dans une famille libanaise, puis s’installe au Maroc. Considère le Liban comme sa patrie, mais y a vécu moins de temps qu’en Afrique ou en Europe. Les aléas des politiques migratoires l’emmènent en Bulgarie qui se trouve un des rares pays ou elle arrive à s’installer avec son mari – refugié Palestinien.

La vie de refugié est souvent problématique. Son mari perd le petit business, la famille perd peu à peu le petit capital, elle ne perd jamais le courage. Sa propre famille fréquemment en difficulté, elle n’arrête pas à initier et participer dans des initiatives caritatives.

Plus encore, elle se refait une autre vie à elle-même. Dans sa soixantaine elle se met à écrire, poèmes blancs, essais, notes et commentaires. Sublimer trauma, insécurité, espérance dans l’écriture, le« Le refugié solitaire , son poème emblématique, en atteste.

***

Si j’ai commencé par ces portraits de femmes, c’est pour trois raisons :

• théorique . Ils illustrent différents types et logiques migratoires que je vais articuler par les concepts de mondialisation, système-mode et système migratoire, super-diversité, « eurostars and eurocities », « empowerment ». Je vais questionner ces concepts  à travers les expériences migratoires postcommunistes.
• empirique. Faire sentir le terrain, encore sous-étudié et sous-analysé. Les recherches du phénomène migratoires est-européen sont fortement marquées par la domination du regard occidental. Cette occidentalisation des perspectives politiques et analytiques est réductrice par rapport à la complexité de la condition migrante postcommuniste. Elle assigne des localités aux facteurs push et pull, les nouveaux pays européens se retrouvant surproducteurs des premiers et dépossédés des seconds. Un petit exemple en illustration : Dans l’ouvrage collectif récemment publié Women in new migrations. Current debates in European societies  (Slany, Kontos and Lapi 2010) le concept de « nouvelles migrantes» couvre surtout les émigrées des pays de l’Est. Bien que publié en Pologne, le livre ne traite les immigrées en Europe de l’Est que dans deux cas (sur dix)[1].
• civique : Invisibilisées, parce que sous-étudiées et sous-écoutées, les immigrées dans les pays d’émigration ont besoin de prendre la parole.

L’objectif de l’article est double :

• proposer une approche inédite et analyser l’immigration postcommuniste à travers la perspective des femmes. L’intention est de présenter une alternative aux recherches des femmes migrantes qui se concentrent sur leurs particularités et risquent parfois de les « ghettoïser » théoriquement ;
• polémiquer avec le mainstream conceptuel des études des femmes qui les conceptualise prioritairement en termes de discrimination, vulnérabilité, inégalités, laissant peu d’espace théorique à l’empowerement.

(Im)Possible mondialisation par le bas

“While there is no agreement about what globalization is, the entire discourse on globalization is founded on a quite solid agreement that globalization is” (Bartelson 2000: 180).

C’est la formule un peu paradoxale par laquelle Bartelson résume, d’un coté, l’énorme intérêt pour la mondialisation qui produit des bestsellers (Huntington 1996, Bauman 1998,  Beck  2000) et une avalanche de publications(Mercure 200, Elbaz and Helly 2000, Krasteva et Todorov 2004) et, d’un autre coté, la diversification des modèles explicatifs. Cet intérêt marque le passage d’une conception de la société vers une autre, la première basée sur le temps, la seconde sur l’espace[i]. Cette transition épistémologique ne cherche pas à tourner le dos à la temporalité et à la durée. Ses ambitions s’orientent dans deux autres directions : relativiser le déterminisme, part inhérente de l’historicisme, et donner une chance à la contingence (Krasteva 2004).

Trois caractéristiques de la mondialisation sont pertinentes à l’analyse de ses relations avec la migration : l’émergence du système-monde[2], la confirmation de la métaphore des réseaux et la self-réflexivité des acteurs.

“The international realm is a patchwork of countries… The global sphere is constituted by networks of supranational flows” (Scholte 1996: 572, in Bartelson 2000: 190).

Le remplacement de l’Etat –nation par réseaux et flux détermine l’imaginaire social et politique à l’époque de mondialisation et confirme la migration comme sa manifestation inévitable et nécessaire.

L’autoréflexivité est la troisième caractéristique fondamentale de la mondialisation. Etre conscient de soi-même comme global est le premier pas vers se transformer en global. Se penser comme mobile est le premier pas pour entrer les flux globaux.

La Japonaise nomade en est un des innombrables exemples. Elle parcourt le globe se frayant des chemins imprévisibles et individualisés. Elle illustre le passage des « flèches aux spaghettis » (Herzlich 2004), des grandes routes migratoires tracées par de fortes logiques économiques et politiques vers les itinéraires atypiques, inattendus, non répétitifs. La nomade est un cas unique, exceptionnel, mais d’autant plus révélateur pour la diversification et l’individualisation des parcours qui caractérisent la condition migrante postcommuniste.

Paradoxalement, le postcommunisme n’est pas un nouveau début, mais plutôt une fin radicale, même deux  – « la fin de l’histoire » et « la fin de la géographie ». F. Fukuyama a défini la fin de l’histoire comme l’extinction des alternatives à la démocratie libérale. Je vais élargir le cadre théorique en soulignant que la fin du communisme signifie aussi la fin du temps clos et l’entrée dan le temps global. U. Beck développe l’idée que le « globe est devenu compact en termes de temporalité :

Events from different parts of the world and with varying significance can now be relocated on a single temporal axis, instead of many different ones. The many times in the many regions of the world are being drawn together into a single standardized and standardizing world-time…“(Beck  2002: 21)

R.O’Brien a annoncé une autre fin – « la mort de la distance » et « la fin de la géographie » (O’Brien1992).

Les deux sont des expressions de la mondialisation. L’Europe de l’Est a quitté les cadres de l’espace et du temps, tous les deux clos et subordonnés au projet communiste, pour entrer dans l’espace global et la temporalité de la post-modernisation.

C’est notamment ce temps-espace plat et synchronisé que a permis la rencontre de la société bulgare avec l’immigration d’origines lointaines et exotiques, non déterminée ni par histoire, ni par géopolitique, comme celle plus grande de la Chine, comme l’autre beaucoup moins nombreuse de l’Inde et comme le cas de la Japonaise nomade, unique et sympathique.

Système-monde ou système migratoire

Un des paradoxes du communisme était qu’il avait érigé le marxisme en idéologie officielle, mais l’ignorait par rapport à ses nouveaux développements théoriques. C’est le cas notamment de la conception du système-monde.

Le premier à élaborer l’idée que le monde globalisé n’est pas juste l’interaction entre ses différentes parties, mais quelque chose de plus, est I. Wallerstein . Il définit ce « plus » à travers la notion de « système-monde » (Wallerstein 1981). Dans son cadre théorique la société globale a une hiérarchie, centre, périphérie, une structure unifiée. Le capital, aussi bien que la force de travail, opèrent sur la scène mondiale, mais le font de manière asymétrique. Les capitaux et les marchandises circulent librement, la force de travail est tenue à la périphérie – nationale et globale. Le capital transnational « exproprie » des travailleurs le droit de décision de migrer au nom de leur développement et prospérité individuelle pour les soumettre aux intérêts des marchés et de la domination économique.

Cette conception d’inspiration néo-marxiste n’était ni appliquée, ni connue.

La femme russe de mon second exemple illustre une autre logique d’immigration. A la différence de la Japonaise, elle est un cas typique. A plusieurs égards. D’abord, parce qu’elle représente la plus grande communauté immigrée en Bulgarie – russe. Second, parce que la formation de cette communauté a été possible grâce aux liens géopolitique des pays d’origine et d’accueil. Ce type de migration s’inscrit plus dans le modèle de système migratoire.

Dans le cas du système-monde la logique est économique et rime avec profit et domination, dans celui du système migratoire la logique est politique – la Bulgarie tournait dan l’orbite de l’URSS. La même logique de soutenir des alliés politiques a produit d’autres immigrations comme celle des étudiants africains et arabes.

L’attrait de la Bulgarie se nourrit de deux sources : démographique et symbolique. La Seconde guerre mondiale a créé un déséquilibre démographique effrayant entre les genres que plusieurs femmes russes essaient de remédier par des mariages à l’étranger. La composition majoritairement féminine de l’immigration russe en Bulgarie en est une des expressions. Dans les années 70 l’Ouest connait la transition du travailleur migrant à la famille migrante (Morokvasic and Catarino, 2010). La Bulgarie vit la transition opposée : de la famille mixte des années du communisme vers la migration économique du post communisme.

La seconde raison renvoie aux représentations : la Bulgarie était perçue comme l’Ouest de l’Est. Ce facteur politique est parfois plus important que le facteur culturel – proximité des langues slaves, Orthodoxie, alphabet cyrillique…. Cet Ouest imaginaire continue à marquer les itinéraires des Russes de la seconde génération  – dans les narrations et dans les mobilités. Les mères ont fait le premier pas vers l’Ouest en s’installant en Bulgarie, perçue comme plus ouverte et moins dure que l’URSS. Plusieurs filles ont appris la leçon et ont continu éla migration vers la terre promise, de l’Ouest de l’Est vers l’Ouest.

Super diversité – factuelle et imaginaire

La vitesse avec laquelle la notion de super-diversité forgée par Steven Vetrovec (2007) est devenue un concept-phare montre qu’elle a été longtemps attendu. Il la definite comme :

A notion intended to underline a level and kind of complexity surpassing anything the country has previously experienced. Such a condition is distinguished by a dynamic interplay of variables among an increased number of new, small and scattered, multiple-origin, transnationally connected, socio-economically differentiated and legally stratified immigrantswho have arrived over the last decade. Newpatterns of super-diversity pose significant challenges for both policy and research (Vetrovec 2007, p. 1024).

La super-diversité est la « traduction » migratoire de l’hyper modernité de G. Lipovetsky (2009) ou tout aspire à croitre, à devenir plus grand, plus important, plus puissant. La force du concept est qu’il met l’accent sur la diversification de l’immigration et la temporalité compacte du changement migratoire. Les deux caractéristiques sont pertinentes aux sociétés postcommunistes. Plus encore, elles sont renforcées par le double passage : de société fermée vers société ouverte ; de la politique communiste de « migration zéro » extrêmement réduite et contrôlée à la double découverte simultanée de l’émigration et de l’immigration.

La jeune Bulgare de père Nigérien et de mère Bulgare illustre une autre dimension de la super-diversité – la (in)capacité de la société à absorber la diversité, à l’accepter et la reconnaitre.

La multidimensionnalité de la super- diversité est le cadre théorique dans lequel je dresserai le portrait de l’immigrée en Bulgarie.

La féminisation de l’immigration est un phénomène relativement récent à l’Ouest. Le décalage entre l’Ouest et l’Est après la SGM – plus le premier s ouvrait à l’immigration, plus le second se fermait – n’a pas retardé la féminisation de la dernière. Paradoxalement, l’immigration en Bulgare est advenue comme féminine. La première et plus grande communauté qui s’est formée après la Seconde guerre mondiale et aujourd’hui reste toujours la plus nombreuse est largement féminine. Elle est composée de ressortissants de l’URSS – Russes, Ukrainiennes, Biélorusses, etc.

Les femmes sont inégalement présentes dans les différentes communautés: elles sont largement majoritaires dans le groupe russe ; à quelques exceptions, les Africains et les Indiens ne sont que des hommes ; les communautés arabe et chinoise se situent entre ces pôles et les femmes comptent entre un quart et un tiers.

En manque de politique d’intégration, les stratégies d’insertion  sont conçues, forgées, changées en fonction de trois facteurs : l’entrecroisement et l’interaction de modèles culturels des rapports gendrés, l’individualisation des approchements/éloignements envers la société d’accueil ; les jeux d’images et représentations réciproques entre femmes Bulgare et femmes immigrées.

L’Arabe préfère souvent le rôle traditionnel de la femme au foyer. Elle est aussi la plus impressionnée par la Bulgare active et autonome. L’indépendance et la liberté de la dernière joue comme un catalyseur pour la transformation des rôles traditionnels – les filles de la seconde génération revendiquent plus d’autonomie, les mères commencent à participer dans le business familial et même a faire une carrière indépendante. Une des raisons que des informantes chinoises évoquent pour le choix de la Bulgarie est le modèle familial semblable entre pays d’origine et d’accueil qui ouvre un large espace à l’activité de la femme. La Chinoise est entreprenante, laborieuse, active. Les Russes sont presque indiscernables des Bulgares . Le concept de niche ethnique leur est totalement inapplicable : on les retrouve partout dans l’échelle professionnelle – du business à l’éducation, des services au tourisme. L’administration continue à rester largement monoculturelle, les Russes sont les seules à y travailler.

La super -diversité renvoie à la fois à la croissance rapide et significative du phénomène migratoire, renforcé par la diversification de la féminisation, mais encore plus à l’intensification des regards interculturels croisés. Les femmes Bulgares n’ont jamais eu auparavant la possibilité de voir à cote d’autres modèles de rapports gendrés, de se comparer, de se comprendre mieux. Elles découvrent cette position inédite de référence, cette image d’autonomie, d’activité, d’indépendance qui leur est renvoyée par l’Autre et dans laquelle elles voient plus encore que leur expérience vécue, leur propre modèle de réalisation. Altérite et autoréflexivité interfèrent, les changements de rôles et rapports gendrés sont facilités et catalysés, la réussite – valorisée.

 « Old » Eurostars in new eurocities

La mondialisation accélère le mouvement des capitaux et des marchandises, mais n’arrête pas à bâtir des barrières pour contrôler, empêcher, orienter la mobilité des personnes. L’Europe s’ambitionne à remédier cette asymétrie, à bâtir un large espace de mobilité :

Freedom of movement of persons may just be the most remarquable achievement of the European Union, of is slow fifty-pus year progress towards integration, enlargement, and unity (Favell, 2009, p. 3).

Liberté est le mot-clé de cette mobilité – liberté spatiale, sociale, culturelle, existentielle :

… freedom from the nation-state, denationalized freedom : in both the spatial(economic) and cosmopolitan (cultural) sense (Favell, 2009, p. 9). The liberating feeling can even get to be addictive. It could even hold the key to the deepest freedom of all: freedom from your self  (Favell, 2009, p. 11).

L’Italienne – interprète de profession et prof de danse indienne de passion – illustre cette mobilité et incarne ses principales caractéristique : caractère urbain[3], mouvement Europe-Europe, travail hautement qualifié, sensibilité interculturelle, gout pour la découverte et l’altérité. A. Favell labélise cette mobilité par le terme réussi d’« eurostars » dont les fortes connotations renvoient à la fois à mobilité et à réussite. Cette mobilité est exceptionnelle. D’abord, parce qu’elle est aimée par décideurs et responsables politiques. Si toutes les autres formes de migration sont restreintes, les eurostars sont stimulés, ils sont l’incarnation la plus tangible de la construction européenne. Elle remédie aussi à la perte de cerveaux fortement attirés par les paradis de la haute technologie, recherche et développement comme les Etats Unis.

Experts, investisseurs, consultants, conseillers, professions libérales, ou aventuriers, le nombre de citoyens européens à s’installer dans les nouveaux membres croit considérablement pour atteindre le rang de seconde communauté après le groupe russe.

A la lenteur des reformes, à la pauvreté et manque de perspectives, au désenchantement du postcommunisme, nombreux citoyens des PECO ont réagi par une triple réponse : émigration, émigration, émigration. Dans ce contexte la mobilité opposée – Ouest-Est, des vieux vers les nouveaux membres – reçoit tout son sens. Déterritorialisé par l’émigration de nouveaux Européens, l’Est se découvre reteritorialisé par des « anciens » Européens.

Empowerment

Deux pôles structurent les débats sur l’immigration féminine. Le premier localise la question de la femme à l’intersection des structures de pouvoir et de domination. Il est articulé lui-même en deux interprétations : le concept de patriarchie est central dans une des approches, tandis que dans l’autre les inégalités entre les genres façonnent les position sociales et la distribution des ressources. Le travail des femmes est positionné dans le système capitaliste mondialisé :

Women migrant provide the flexibility the global capital needs. They are located within a secondary, service-oriented, and often hidden labor market, which is divided into male and female jobs and reproduces a labor market divided ethnically and by gender (Anthias and Cederberg 2010, p. 24).

Le second pole renverse la perspective et conceptualise la migration féminine non pas en termes de structures économiques et de pouvoir, mais en termes d’acteurs. Il interprète la migration dans la perspective d’émancipation et d’opportunités (Morokvvasic and Catarino, 2010).

L’écrivaine qui se met à écrire à un âge senior, qui milite dans des ONGs et participe dans des forums migrants sur Internet s’inscrit dans cette seconde interprétation. Si je l’ai choisi pour clore ce bref panorama des femmes immigrées dans un pays d’émigration, c’est pour deux raisons – empirique et théorique :

• Ukrainiennes en Pologne (Slany, Malek, Slusarczyk 2010), Bulgares en Grèce et Italie, Philippines un peu partout, le travail domestique est « calqué sur le modèle de la domesticité traditionnelle, producteur de domination dans l’espace mondial » (Rouleau-Berger, 2011). Le travail de care fonctionne  à la fois comme image économique et comme métaphore de la condition migrante féminine. Il ne s’applique pas au cas bulgares. Les homologues Arabes ou Chinoises des domestiques Ukrainiennes en Pologne ou des Bulgares en Grèce travaillent dans le petit commerce , la restauration ou le business familial, des occupations pas toujours mieux payées, mais mieux valorisées.
• Le débat sur la question migrante féminine est présent dans la littérature, le tableau théorique reste pourtant asymétrique, l’accent étant surtout mis sur inégalités et domination. Les migrantes restent « enfermées » dans les structures  et soumises à des pouvoirs économiques, traditionnels, familiaux. Ce cadre analytique ne permet pas de concevoir la complexité des profils féminins, la conception et la réussite des projets migratoires, la (re)construction de soi dans la mobilité. Le pathos du présent article est de défricher le terrain théorique pour ouvrir de l’espace a l’autonomie et l’activité des acteurs, la capacité de se reconstruire dans la migration, de transformer la migration en opportunités, émancipation, empowerment.

Conclusion

Nous assistons à des phénomènes de déterritorialisation-reterritorialisation qui mettent au jour des disjonctions et des conjonctions entre espaces sociaux, politiques, économiques et symboliques de légitimité variable  (Rouleau-Berger, 20010, p. 175).

Cette logique de déterritorialisation-reterritorialisation à légitimité variable est au cœur de la question migrante post communiste. Si l’émigration de la Bulgarie s’inscrit dans les modèles classiques de centre-périphérie, même si tous les deux européens, l’innovation est au niveau de l’immigration. L’immigration simultanée et non pas successive à l’émigration, distingue le postcommunisme du modèle méditerranéen et des sociétés d’immigration plus ancienne. Ici nous sommes au niveau de la temporalité politique et historique.

Le plus intéressant est au niveau du profil de l’immigration – générale, aussi bien que féminine. Les cinq portraits de femmes l’ont illustré : différentes dans tout – parcours migratoire, langue, culture, profession, elles sont semblables dans l’essentiel  – autoréflexivité et (re)construction de soi, autonomie, indépendance. Ce profil ouvre des perspectives pour une conceptualisation positive de l’immigration comme nouvelles opportunités, émancipation et empowerment.

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• Висок престиж, който продължава да расте. Институционалният му израз е, че политическите науки имат статут не просто на ‘регулярна’ университетска дисциплина, а преподаването им изисква специализирани престижни висши учелни заведения – Институти по политически науки, които влизат в категорията на т.нар. grandes ecoles.
• 35 000 кандидати за 3500 места, конкуренцията е опсорвана, влизането – трудно. Ако в университетите се влиза като правило след матура (bac), за Институтите по политически науки кандидатите се готвят в т.нар. подготвителни класове – от скъпи до много скъпи частни курсове.

Целта на този кратък коментар не е да ‘мери’ престижа на родната и френската университетска политология, а да открои някои разлики, няколко насоки, в които ние вървим в посока, различна от френските колеги.

Политическите науки във Франция се мислят в множествено число. Институтите за политически науки наблягат и се гордеят със своя плуридисциплинарен характер. У нас картината е по-пъстра – сходно разбиране за многодисциплинарност[2] съжителства със случаи на мисленето й в единствено число и с аргументи доколко ‘чист’ политологично е даден текст при оценка на докторат или хабилитация. По-съществено за формирането на младите политолози е ‘роенето’ на департаменти и катедри и произтичащото дисциплинарно отдалечеване на европеистика, публична администрация, ПР. и т.н.

Politics и policies са тясно обвързани, различни страни на една голяма машинария – така учим студентите в първи семестър на първи курс. Университетсктото образование у нас все повече ги раздалечава, а се учудваме колко близо до реалния сектор са множество френски магистърски програми, фокусирани върху отделни политики. И колко разнообразна и успешна е професионалната реализация на притежателите на престижната диплома „Политически науки”.

PR е голямата мода у нас през последните години.  Изкусени от атрактивността на новото, непознатото, чуждоземно звучащото са не само младите. Политическите партии назначават PR експерти преди – ако въобще – да потърсят политически консултанти. ‘Пакетирането’ на посланията става по-важно от самите послания. Не случайно Christo е българин, но при него пакетирането е посланието, а в бг случая пакетирането често е вместо посланието. Липсата на идеи, програми, визии (не)умело се прикрива зад шоу, спектакли, 3D. Тези политически резултати се подготвят още на университетските скамейки, където често политолози и PR не седят заедно.

Повече престиж и признание за политологията е добре и за политологията, и за политиката.

Пътят предстои.