Mobile Balkans: from forced to labor migrations

“Migration  today is for work”[3] – this is the clear and concise conclusion made by the International Labor Organization that is supported by figures as well: those employed and their families comprise 90% of all migrants. The statement of the International Organization for Migration is identical: “Labor migration continued to be in demand among countries of origin and destination, despite the economic crisis”[4].

Southeastern Europe has gone a long way before becoming part of this global migration normality. The present paper analyses the basic milestones along that way – European, regional, national, and local.

The economic crisis – catastrophe or opportunity

“A global economic crisis – potentially the most serious one that the world economy has ever faced”[5], „the most severe crisis since the Great Depression”[6]– the media, analyses and forums overflow with similar dramatic descriptions of the crisis. Our everyday experiences constantly provide us with empirical illustrations. The obviousness possesses a great power of attraction because it easily produces theoretical and political consensus. I do not intend to succumb to it, however; my aim is the opposite – to diversify the theoretical interpretations of the crisis. The analysis, of course, will place it at the point of intersection with migration. I will outline four different visions.

“New times? Economic crisis, geopolitical transformation and the emergent migration order”. The theme of the ambitious conference organized by the Centre on migration, policy and society, University of Oxford, that was held in 2009, sums up the basic message of the first interpretation. It is summarized in two statements: the scope and range of the economic crises are unprecedented; its impact on immigration is direct and crucial. The changes are seen as significant enough to lead to discussions about the emergence of a “new migration order”.

“I don’t think these are ‘new times’. The impact of the global financial crisis on migration is in abeyance. Around the world migrants have not been laid off or returned at the scale once predicted. There have been no seismic changes that compare for example with the migration impacts of the Great Depression or the Oil Crisis. I also think it’s too early to speak about geopolitical transformations. Neither I’m sure we can really speak of an ‘emergent migration order.”[7]. Khalid Koser from the Geneva Centre for security policy clearly formulated the second vision which explicitly problematizes the previous. Its major argument could be summed up in the statement: the crisis is global, but the strategies for dealing with it are national. In addition, the more all-embracing the crisis becomes, the more the cooperation decreases and the national protective mechanisms flourish[8].

The third interpretation introduces a radical criticism. It stresses that the economic crisis should not cover up another, much bigger and much deeper crisis – that of the increasing social inequalities[9]. This vision shifts the accent from unemployment to inequalities, from the economic to the social. It un-economizes the crisis and offers a rendition that is close to the spirit of Wallerstein’s world-system concept[10].

The crisis as opportunity is the central point of the third interpretation[11]. A new publication of the International Labor Organization with the telling title of Don’t waste the crisis: critical perspective for a new economic model calls for thought and debate so that the end of the crisis is not just return to business as usual, but the grounds for a new economic and social order[12].

Regardless of the variety of interpretations, among the numerous researchers, there is consensus, about the consequences that the crisis has on migration[13]:

• Reduction of migration flows. It started in 2008[14] when legal migration was reduced by 6% in the OECD countries – this was the first reduction after a five-year period of steady growth. Another indicator is the number of work permit applications. In the UK they were reduced by 24% in 2008 and by 32% in 2009; the percentages for Ireland are even higher: 42% and 60%[15];
• Increase of unemployment among migrant workers because of their traditional employment in sectors that are more sensitive to the economic cycles such as construction, tourism, and trade. In 2007 unemployment reached record low levels in OECD – 5.8%, but grew to 8.7% in the first quarter of 2010. Another 17 million people joined the ranks of the unemployed. Two groups have been affected most – the young[16] and the immigrants. Unemployment among immigrants reached its highest levels in Ireland and Spain, where it grew by 8% and 11% respectively. Its average for EU-15 is twice as higher than that among the citizens of the European states. If the most vulnerable groups are those of the young and the immigrants, it is only logical that the most affected would be the young immigrants. Disproportionately they carry the burden of the crisis – every one in four migrants (24%) in the EU, aged between 15 and 24 does not have a job[17];
• Return of migrants because of lower income or unemployment;
• Reduction of migrant remittances. The OECD report quotes the figure of 6%[18];
• Increasing hostility towards immigrants[19].

These general tendencies need to be colored and articulated. I will single out one political consequence of exceptional importance, and two types of migration which avoid the direct negative influence of the crisis.

The political consequence is related to the management of migration. If the years in the recent past were marked by efforts to increase coordination on regional and global levels, the crisis is about to mine them by “retreat away from multilateralism and global governance towards unilateralism and national self-interest”[20]. A growing number of governments are moving towards restrictive migration policies and the global/national ratio in the management of flows is increasing in favor of the second. The distance in management discourses on national and global levels is increasing.

The crisis affects differently the different types of migration. I will mention one low-skilled and one highly-skilled type which happen to be more resistant. Both are characteristic of Eastern European migrations.

Care and domestic services continue to be a niche that relies on migrant labor and it is attractive to the numerous female migrants from Eastern and Southeastern Europe[21]. It is probably this type of employment that provides one of the reasons that in the period when male migration employment decreased, that of females slightly rose. The wives of men who lost their jobs entered the labor market in order to stabilize the family budget.

Student migration is the other interesting example. It has doubled in less than a decade to reach the impressive figure of 2 million.[22] Of the five most preferred destinations in the world, three are in the EU – the UK, Germany, and France[23]. An increasing number of accepting countries enable university graduates to remain in the country in order to meet the need of the labor market for highly-skilled work force. One-fourth of the students seize this opportunity and student migration becomes professional. Another fourth prefer to practice their professions in their home countries[24]. I would qualify both tendencies – the migration of every one in four and the return of the rest – as positive. The second – having in mind the countries of origin which reduce the trauma of brain drain; the first – having in mind the migrants themselves who are given the right of mobility, corresponding to their qualifications and innovative potential.

The specifics of the present crisis are better seen when compared to previous ones. The migration profile of Europe changed after the petrol crisis of 1973: the South changed from and emigration to an immigration centre; mobility adapted to the restrictive politics where the restrictions for labor migration were compensated for increased family migration, the model of the gastarbieter was finally buried, the joining of families and the permanent settlement led to the creation of long-term ethnic communities[25]. This historical experience suggests that a distinction has to be made between the short-term and long-term effects of the crisis[26]. Authors tend to be considerably more cautious when forecasting the latter.

The diversification of the spokespersons of the two perspectives is quite interesting.  Governments, because of the political logic of the four-year election cycle, tend to be more focused on urgent measures. International organizations are much more systematic in adopting a mid- or long-term perspective.

“Current economic difficulties will not change long-term demographic trends and should not be used as an excuse to overly restrict immigration. It’s important that immigration policy has a long term perspective”[27].

OECD “translates” this long-term vision into the language of public policies and explicitly recommends that governments should offer immigrants the same support that they offer to the rest of the unemployed as well as the same assistance in finding jobs[28]. The ILO is even more specific in relation to the need to manage migration in the spirit of human rights in its new publication “International labor migration: a rights-based approach” (2010).

Economists still argue whether the crisis is V-, VV- or L-shaped: whether after reaching the bottom there will be an upward movement, or after the recovery there will be another quick fall, or whether the upward movement will be postponed because of the continuous stagnation. These hypotheses are not subject of the present paper. Its purpose is to discuss the influence of global recession and crisis on migrations in SEE. The crisis affects migration in many ways by influencing the economy, public policies, immigrants and their families[29]. Within this multicolored palette, the present paper will choose to focus mainly on public policies and the social effects.

The study has another aim too: to de-economize migration and to prevent the crisis from becoming the only frame of reference. Such an approach – which is qute common – would limit the analysis and would prevent us from understanding the dynamics of migration as determined by a multitude of factors, among which the economic ones are just one of the components, still an important one.

The second reason to refuse to turn the crisis into a “fetish” is its transience. A quick glance at official papers, analyses, or statements of opinion dated a few years ago, would show that most originate from and set as a prerequisite economic growth. In this optimistic perspective, migration is seen as a factor and a resource for economic growth and a tool for the mitigation of the demographic crisis. Today it is seen as a burden which we want to break free of. The Romanian and Bulgarian roma expulsed by N. Sarkozy are the most obvious and striking expression of this new vision. They allow us to see more clearly how politicians more radical than Sarkozy dream of dealing with migration once and for all.

The format of the paper would not allow for a complete reconstruction of the Balkan labor migrations. The focus will be on the last decade because it is the one that created the context which made our conference possible: the completion of the transition from forced to economic migration.  The geopolitical partner which sets the frameworks, directs and inspires the development of SE Europe is the European Union. It is only logical that the analysis will start with it. The infinite number of European problems will be reduced to two themes: communitarization of the European migration policy and europeanization of the Balkans.

The biggest challenge is how to represent synthetically the extreme intensity and diversity of the Balkan migrations. The issue of the Balkan communities in the EU has considerable public visibility: the Romanians are the biggest group of immigrants in two of the biggest immigrant countries in Europe – Spain and Italy[30], the Albanians – in Greece, the Serbs[31] – in Austria[32]. The analysis of the above represents the subject of a different study. For the purposes of our conference I have chosen two themes through which international labor migration is directly represented in SEE – immigration and remittances. This problematic approach will be supplemented by an attempt to determine the types of Balkan countries on the basis of their immigration profile.

Communitarization of the European policy on migration

For the purposes of our conference, I am going to single out five characteristics of the wide theme of European policy on migration:

• Overproduction of documents, programs, strategies, among which we have: the Global approach to migration (2005), three five-year programs – Tampere (1999), The Hague (2004), Stockholm (2009), the European pact on migration and asylum (2008), the Common immigration policy for Europe: principles, actions, and tools (2008). This testifies that the EU is acknowledging the importance of migration.
• Communitarization – transition of the migration policy from the third to the first pillar, from intergovernmental cooperation to that on the level of communities. The turning point for this was the 1^st of May 1999 when the Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force.
• Balance between European and national competencies. The growing community character of the migration policy does not completely annihilate the national level on which decisions about migration are made. The Lisbon Treaty preserves some of the national competencies, such as the option for member countries to determine the number of citizens of third countries they need. It is actively practised in the times of recession and crisis when most states undertake restrictive measures.
• Global approach. Its aim is to “export” migration policy outside the limits of the EU. The “global approach” formulated in 2005 is the outside dimension of the European policy on migration that is an integral part of other foreign policies of the EU. The external partners of the EU in this global transition include the Western Balkans and the Black Sea region.
• Threefold goal. The wide variety of measures and policies could be reduced to the achievement of three main goals:
• better management of economic migration;
• prevention and reduction of illegal migration;
• transforming migration and mobility into positive forces for development.

In a wider analysis I would have paid special attention to the protection of immigrants’ rights, especially because in 2010 we celebrate the tenth anniversary of the adoption of the UN’s International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families.

Europeanization of the Balkans

We are looking forward to reading the latest report of the EC on the achievements and challenges of the expansion of the Western Balkans, but it will be published a few days after our conference.[33] It will be interesting to compare our conclusions with the ones that the report makes.

The change of the migration profile of the Balkans is a strategic aim not only of the EU, but also of international organizations such as IOM and IOL. The Western Balkans are placed first in the Annual Report of IOM in the part dealing with the development of the capacity for migration policymaking: “Under the joint IOM-ILO Capacity Building, Information and Awareness Raising towards Promoting Orderly Migration in the Western Balkans project, funded by the EU, seven national labor migration training workshops with 140 participants from governments, NGOs and social partner organizations were organized in Albania, BH, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia, Macedonia”[34].

From the multiple findings and analyses in the latest EC report on the strategy for expansion for the 2009 – 2010[35] period, I choose to discuss the three that are most related to out theme: crisis, expansion and regional cooperation.

We have two pieces of news – one bad and one good – this is how we can summarize the situation in relation to the crisis. The first one is known: there are exceptions in relation to the global crisis but they are not found on the Balkans. The latest research of ILO shows that the gross world product was reduced by 1.1% in 2009, and while in some regions it is just going down, in others it is becoming negative. Southeastern Europe and the EU belong exactly to this second group[36]. In relation to employment, again it is SEE and the EU that are in the most affected regions[37]. In 2009 unemployment reached 6.6% on a world scale, while in Central and Southeastern Europe it was above 10%[38]. Again it is our region, together with the rest of the ex-communist block – Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States – that leads the sad statistics of reduction of productivity. The report on expansion specifies these tendencies.

“Economic activity in the Western Balkans and Turkey has contracted sharply since the second half of 2008, following reduced demand for their exports, less foreign direct investments and lower cross-border lending. Fiscal positions deteriorated in all economies. Unemployment, already high in several countries, started to rise further”[39].

It is not realistic to expect candidate states to do better than the member states, but the comparative analysis does not confirm the asymmetry student-teacher and can be related better to the moderately optimistic news: “The economic downturn in the Western Balkans and Turkey in 2009 is of the same magnitude as the EU average, but less severe than in the EU member states that were the most affected”.[40]

The EU summarized the philosophy of expansion by the 3Cs – commitment, conditionality, communication. We notice a certain shift of accents: the Balkan political discourses prefer to stress on EU’s commitment to incorporate its south-eastern region as well; European politicians put a clear stress on the conditions, the economic and political requirements that the aspiring members should meet. Every diversion is openly criticized: the irregularities and the violence during the elections in Macedonia in 2008 reduced the speed of joining the EU.

The Commission’s report of the end on 2009 is cautious and encouraging. Corruption and organized crime are not a Balkan invention, but the EU definitely wants to protect itself from the growth of their critical mass within its own boundaries as a result of potential “import” on behalf of new of future members. The very process of expansion has been described by the EU as linear, having a clear goal and traced route. The different countries occupy a different place on the run: some, such as Montenegro and Albania, are in the very beginning, their membership applications were submitted relatively recently (in December 2008 and April 2009, respectively), Croatia is doing its final round[41].

More important for our conference are some of the measures such as the abolition of visas – for Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia as from the beginning of 2010. The expansion of the right to mobility is a possible remedy against the fragmentation of the region that was scarred by numerous new boundaries. It is also one of the expressions of expansion which make it most visible and valued not just by politicians abut also by citizens.

Expansion is seen as the most successful of the foreign policies of the EU[42]. The positive evaluation the EU gives to itself is confirmed by the considerably wide consensus among political elites and public opinion in SEE, that the EU is the most reliable option that would guarantee stability, security and prosperity for the region.

It is paradoxical and indicative that regional cooperation is subject of analysis in the European and not the regional part of the report. An undeniable merit of the EU is the support and promotion of cooperation as a form of interaction between states marked by recent or even current tensions: “In the Western Balkans, regional cooperation remains key and constitutes a central element of the Stabilization and Association process”[43].

The institutional structure is changing to reflect this new stage: the Stability Pact which operated in post-conflict situations is replaced by a new organ with a more positive title – Regional Cooperation Council.

Cooperation itself is seen in a much wider context: not just as intra-regional, but as development of relations with other neighboring countries – not just member states, but also candidates are included in the European strategy developed for the Danube region. Turkey is part of the program for economic cooperation in the Black Sea region[44].

The EU multiplies the political instruments for regional cooperation, but this is still a programmatic goal rather than a convincing and multifaceted reality: “Bilateral disputes and disagreements relating to Kosovo unduly affect the regional cooperation”[45]. The purpose of regional cooperation is twofold: to create a climate of trust and an environment for mutually beneficial contacts; and for the states in the region to take responsibility for its stabilization. Some encouraging examples, such as MARRI – Migration, Asylum, Refugees Regional Initiative, exist in the sphere of migration. Its members are six countries form the Western Balkans – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Croatia. Its aim is to develop the capacity of the Balkan countries to cooperate, align their policies and contribute to the stabilization and development of the region. MARRI’s headquarters is in Skopje. It was established in 2003 as the development of an idea of the Stability Pact, but later its members continued to work independently. The work of the renowned expert on ethnicity problems Professor Mitya Zagar initiated the debate on an integrated diversity and migration management in relation to the strategies, policies and possible scenarios[46].

Policies on regional cooperation have the chance to succeed because they are based on the belief of Western Balkans citizens that “free circulation of people and goods will help the region to have a peaceful and prosperous future”[47]. It is shared by 8 out of 10 citizens from the region and is especially strong in Macedonia and Serbia where more than 9 out of 10 are convinced that mobility and trade are the keys to stability and development.

This example allows a gradual transition from European to regional level, from the European perspective on the Balkans towards a Balkan perspective on the Balkans.

The Balkans: the long (re)discovery of labor migration

From diversifying to bringing together the Balkan models of migration

The migration champion of Europe – the Balkans suddenly gained this reputation in the beginning of the 90ties. The above period is characterized by rather contradictory trends in the Eastern and Western sub regions. I am gong to analyze this unique dynamic and the diversity by a periodization of the major stages in the development of the migration situation and a typology of the main flows. Both are of a work-in-progress and mainly hypothetical character, and their purpose is to propose the basis for a constructive debate during the conference.

“There is hardly another region of the world where the current situation of migrations is still considerably influenced by the past history as in the Balkans”[48]. The format of this report does not allow for a detailed discussion of the historical trends, but also excludes the possibility for the present condition to be analyzed outside the context of the radical historical changes that took place in the past two decades. I would like to differentiate three periods after the fall of the Berlin wall.

The first period is from 1989 to the mid 90ties which also mark the end of the wars in former Yugoslavia. The period is characterized by three tendencies:

• sudden and huge increase of the migration flows;
• multiplication of the forms and considerable increase of the intensity of both labor and non-labor migration;
• literal “flight” of the Western and Eastern Balkans towards two opposed migration poles.

I will discuss briefly each of these trends, starting with the last one. The Eastern Balkans are undergoing a transition from politization to economization of migration; the Wеstern – just the opposite, from economization to politization.

After the post communist changes in Romania and Bulgaria, as well as in Albania, a quick and radical transition form closed to open society took place. During communism, migrations – both outward, and inward – were strictly controlled by the state. They were kept to a minimum in both directions and were discusses solely in the light of state security and interest. Any desire for professional realization abroad was treated as political betrayal of the regime.

One of the first and most sought-after freedoms of the post-communist transition was the freedom of movement and every one in ten citizens in Bulgaria and every one in four in Albania took advantage of it.

The Yugoslavian model is open and emigration and circular labor migration are its natural expression. The outburst of conflicts and wars opened the floodgates of vigorous dislocations. The economic logic of mobility during the times of the Federation was drastically replaced by the political and military logic of the forced dislocations.

Out of the four types of migration which Martin Edwards-Baldwin (2005) uses to characterize the Balkan migrations in the first half of the 90ties, three are non-labor: forced, ethnic, and trafficking. Ten million of the 80-million population entered the migration flows[49].

The second period started after the Dayton Agreement of 1995 and ended in the first decade of the new century with the accession of Slovenia (2004), Romania (2007), and Bulgaria (2007). It has two characteristic trends: transition to post-conflict migration flows on the Western Balkans and gradual and slow europeanization of the migration on the Eastern Balkans. The policy of voluntary return of the forcefully displaced was given absolute priority. If the migration panorama in former Yugoslavia has to nurse the wounds caused by the conflicts, the refugee profile of Romania and Bulgaria is acquiring a European appearance: it does not originate in neighboring countries but in far-away ones – the classic sources of global refugee flows. Immigration is gradually beginning to receive political and economic visibility. This is a period of gradual rehabilitation of labor migration. It is no longer one form of migration along many others, but occupies an ever central position in the migration panorama.

At the moment we are in the third period, when European integration is already a reality, forthcoming or pending for the whole region. Labor migration gradually occupies a central position as the main source of both emigration and immigration.

The economization of migration began to gradually diminish the differences of the early 90ties; we witness an increasing convergence of the types of migration flows and trends. The signs of radical change in the migration situation as a result of the crisis are still missing, which is an argument for refraining from formulating a new – “crisis” – period.

Labor emigration still prevails over labor immigration. Seventy thousand of the 24.7 million population of the Western Balkans have the desire to emigrate – the potential emigration is “considerable” but not “mass”[50].

Southeastern Europe has travelled far to rehabilitate labor migration, and make the theme of our conference legitimate and central.

Trends: from extraordinary to ordinary flows

If we assume the impossible task of summarizing by a single word the complex, contradictory, and diverse Balkan migrations at the beginning of the 21^st century, it would be normalization. This movement takes a variety of expressions; I’ll delineate four main trends[51]:

• From forced migrations to returns. Conflicts and wars in former Yugoslavia produced huge numbers of IDPs and refugees. Fifteen years later, return still remains an ‘unfinished business’ (Bobic 2010). Many IDPs and refugees will never return to their native places, because these places are not the same, and interethnic structures have changed. Return, has, however, become a viable alternative to displacement.
• From ethnic to economic logic. Second only to forced migrations, ethnic migrations have been an important type of human mobility in the end 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. A decade later the same populations return to the same destinations, but the logic is no longer ethnic but economic. One third of a million Bulgarian citizens of Turkish origin, who, on the eve of change, were made by the communist authorities to leave for Turkey, are a case in point. A few years later on, the economic difficulties push many representatives of the biggest minority group in Bulgaria to find jobs either in Turkey, or in Germany, as network theory rightly anticipates.
• From mass emigration to temporary or circular migration. Women gathering strawberries in Spain returning home for the winter; men working in construction abroad with their families remaining at home; highly qualified professionals moving from one job to another, irrespective of the country – temporary and circular migration take a diversity of forms. Nowadays it affects all professions – from seasonal workers to experts. Return becomes a usual element of labor mobility plans. More than half (60%) of those who plan to migrate, intend to do so just for just a few years[52].
• From emigration to immigration. Bosnians, Serbs, and Macedonians in Slovenia; Austrians, Germans, and Dutch in Croatia; Chinese almost everywhere; Russians, Ukrainians, and British in Bulgaria; Moldovan in Romania – immigration in SEE is a fact. The pull factors vary from the soft climate and beauty of the Adriatic coast, to the relatively low cost of real estate in Bulgaria and Romania, to the economic niches in the relatively new market economies. Emigration still largely prevails over immigration, but EU integration may reverse the picture, as it has already done so in Slovenia. The Mediterranean model that transformed Spain, Italy and Greece from emigration to immigration countries only two-three decades ago could be realized in several Balkan countries[53].

Typology of the Balkan migrations

For the purposes of our conference I would divide the wide variety of the Balkan migration flows into two large groups: non-labor and labor.

1. I. Non-labor migration
2. Trafficking
3. Retirement
4. Asylum

1. II. Labor migration
2. Emigration, including circular migration and the free movement of people
3. Immigration, including that of representatives of the historical Diaspora
4. Return

We see that the group of non–labor migration is extremely heterogeneous. At one end of the spectrum we have human trafficking. The biggest “exporters” are Albania and Romania, followed by Bulgaria. All countries from the region are transit ones, while Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina have also become a destination. 2009 saw the end of IOM’s five-year program spreading over 10 SEE countries aimed at capacity building to support the victims of human trafficking[54]. If trafficking is the contemporary equivalent of slavery, leisuremigration is positioned at the other end of the spectrum, where voluntary action and comfortable life are found. The typical groups are the Germans and Austrians in Croatia, and the British in Bulgaria[55]. Some of the representatives of these groups are retired people, all attracted by the milder climate and the opportunity to increase their quality of life permanently or for a certain period of the calendar year. By definition, asylum seeking is political migration.

The definition “non-labor” is conditional and is created for the purposes of the conference. I am not willing to discuss the forced activities of the victims of human trafficking as a form of labor. The other two forms of migration in the first category are related to labor: those who have been granted refugee status have equal rights to the labor market as the rest of the citizens; some of the representatives of retirement migration start their own business. In both cases employment is neither the reason, nor the main characteristic of these types of migration.

Therepresentativesofthethreetypesofmigrationaboveareconsiderablylessinnumbersthantherepresentatives of labor migration. This, of course, is good news for a region that has recently started the transition form conflict to peaceful forms of mobility.

Laboremigration has stable traditions on the Balkans, where it is referred to by the word gurbet – a term that travels across borders. It is among the most stable sources of labor migration in Europe: until the 90s this role was preformed by Yugoslavia and Turkey. After the democratic changes, all countries joined the outward flows, and Albania became the largest exporter[56]. The top five destinations for SEE migrants[57] are Germany, Italy, Greece, Switzerland, and Austria[58].

EU expansion has direct effect on the migration flows and has its qualitative and quantitative dimensions. The first is related to the access granted to the inhabitants of the Balkans to a new migration category – “the free movement of people”. The second is related to the increase of emigration. This phenomenon represents such a tangle of myths, media speculations, realities, and political discourses, that to untangle we would need a separate conference. Here I will mention two equally significant facts.

The first is the increase of flows from the new member countries: from 0.3 million in 2001, the number of Romanians reached 1.7 million in 2008, the respective figures for the Bulgarians are 0.1 and 0.3 million. The expansions of 2004 and 2007 had a different impact on the migration flows: in 2001 there were twice as much citizens of EU-10 in the EU than Romanians and Bulgarians; in 2008 the situation reversed both in absolute and relative terms[59]. Balkan citizens were more eager to consume the right of free movement.

The second fact is that the mobility of the new member states is not an exception but a confirmation of the right to high mobility that the old ones enjoyed: “75% of the foreigners in the EU-27 live in Germany, Spain, UK, France and Italy; at the same time, citizens of these countries are among the most numerous EU foreigners living in another member state”[60]. The profile of the (South)Eastern European labor migrant unfolds in the wide expanse between the two poles, which I would call “europlumbers” and “eurostars”[61].

The jobs of the first group often fall under the term 3D – difficult, dirty, dangerous. Migrants from SEE are a typical illustration of the dual labor market theory according to which there are sectors which are not attractive for the locals and are being filled by foreign workforce[62]. In this case the sectors are construction, tourism, hospitality, domestic help, and care for the elderly.

The second category of migrants is at the centre of political and academic discourse in all countries, but has been given a different label: “brain drain”. Opinions are in agreement: this is a serious curse for the fragile economies because it disempowers the most highly qualified and innovative segment of the workforce[63]. Because of the large scale and impact of the phenomenon, it is being associated with the negative term “brain drain”. This notional apparatus expresses the state’s perspective that is justifiably worried by the loss of highly qualified work resource. If I used the positive term “eurostars”, it would be to introduce the migrants’ perspective. The most dynamic, entrepreneurial, and highly-qualified of them want to make full use of their right to mobility, all the more that for many it is a key element of their professional career. From an analytical point of view the cases when “europlumbers” feel almost as “eurostars” are exceptionally interesting[64]. It could be the theme of a different conference devoted to emigration, while the present one discusses the ways in which labor migration is projected in SEE.

I will focus on two of these projections: remittances and immigration.

Remittances

The first indicator to which sending countries refer at time of crisis are migrant remittances. Miracles in the sphere of economics are an exception and the expectation that remittances would reduce is confirmed: they went down by 6%; from 336 billion USD in 2008 to 316 billion USD in  2009. There is also some good news.

The first piece of good news is that the World Bank revised its forecast and the current expectations are for growth by 6.2% in 2010 and 7.1% in 2011.[65] Human solidarity proves stronger than economic analytics.

The second piece of news is for a considerably stable tendency in the increase of remittances, regardless of the fluctuations related to the crisis: in 2000 the amount was 132 billion USD and in less than ten years it grew more than three times[66].

The most interesting is the third piece of news: migrant remittances are fitter when it comes to surviving the crisis than direct foreign investments[67].

All countries in SEE with no exception receive migrant remittances. The considerable differences are in two directions: whether they exceed the direct foreign investments and what part of the GDP they contribute.  In this respect fluctuations in the region are significant: in the years of economic growth before the crisis, remittances were less than the direct foreign investment in Bulgaria and Croatia, but were three times more in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and five times more in Albania and Macedonia[68].

Workers’ remittances in selected countries

	ALB	BiH	BUL	CRO	RO	MKD
US$, billion	0.7	1.2	0.6	1.4	1.6	0.4
% of GDP	17.0	19.7	3.8	6.1	3.6	12.2
% of FDI	546.9	365.9	53.6	89.8	111.0	599.1

Source: Shipu and Sigfried 2006

Among the top 20 recipients of remittances in the world we come across one Balkan country – Serbia (in the 20^th place). Further ahead in the rankings of remittances as part of the GDP we see Bosnia and Herzegovina on 14^th place (15%) and Albania – on the 12^th place (12%).[69]

Having relatives abroad as a source of economic support is valid for many of the inhabitants of SEE, and is most typical of the Albanians living in Albania, Kosovo, and Macedonia: three fourths of the Macedonian Albanians and 8 out of 10 of the Kosovo Albanians who have family members abroad, receive financial support from them[70]. The monthly amounts which the migrants send to their families are considerable according to Balkan standards: 160 Euro for Albania, 170 – for Bosnia and Herzegovina, 24 – for Macedonia, and 300 – for Kosovo. In Kosovo, one in four families receives half of its monthly income from relatives abroad. Remittances cover one fifth to half of the monthly earnings of the family: the respective figures in Euro are 154 out of 500 for Albania, 172 out of 538 for Bosnia and Herzegovina, 200 out of 718 for Montenegro, 231 out of 698 for Serbia, and 242 out of 592 for Macedonia[71].

The conjuncture of the crisis obscures another, non-material, but extremely important dimension of remittances – the transfer of social capital, of ideas, of a more active, entrepreneurial behavior open to reasonable risk, which is conceptualized as “social remittances”[72].

Remittances are the analytical entry point into studying migrants not just as a workforce, but also as human beings with strong family attachments and responsibilities. It is impressive to observe how the most fragile and most human dimension of migration survives the economic crisis in the most stable way.

Immigration or the new attractiveness of SEE

The newer and more unexpected the phenomenon, the bigger the public interest it attracts. The number of immigrants to Albania is insignificant; the net balance is strongly negative: -6.5[73], but this is what comes first in IOM’s immigration profile of the country (ibid).

Three groups of labor migration may be distinguished in SEE:

• Small, middle, and sometimes bigger business people and entrepreneurs and self-employed immigrants;
• Immigrants employed by other immigrants, by local business people – or very rarely – by the administration;
• Highly-skilled experts, consultants, and investors.

Immigrants’ origin varies in the different countries, but on the whole, we can say that the first group consists mainly of tradesmen and business people from the Near and Middle East Arab countries such as Syria, Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, China, etc. Representatives of the same countries are found in the second group, but it comprises of more nationalities – Moldavians in Romania, Russians in Bulgaria, citizens of former Yugoslavia countries in Slovenia. In periods of economic advance, immigrant workforce fills certain shortages: in construction – Ukrainians in Romania, Vietnamese in Bulgaria; in the textile industry – Chinese in Romania[74].

The third group originates from the EU, the USA and other developed countries: every one in four immigrants in Romania is from the EU – 24% from Italy and 18% from Spain[75]; the same (26%) is the relative percentage of EU citizens in Croatia[76].

Trade and hospitality are the main economic niches where many of the immigrants are concentrated.

The highly qualified professionals from the developed countries work with the foreign investors, at the representations of international organizations, and as consultants for local institutions.

The quantitative expression of immigration[77] is quite modest so far: 0.6% of the population in Romania[78], and 1.4% in Bulgaria[79].

This group’s political and symbolic significance is much higher. The first is related to the specifics of immigration in the new EU member states and the need for adapted public policies. An interesting paradox seen in countries with new immigration, such as Romania and Bulgaria, is that its profile is more positive than that of countries who have had decades of migration history: the ratio between the first two groups is in favor of the first – many immigrants have their own business and create employment opportunities for their families and other workers.

The symbolic dimension of immigration is of great importance as well. For countries abandoned by a multitude of emigrants seeking work and opportunities abroad, immigrants, who invest similar energy, labor, and existential meaning, are the bearers of a strong message of attractiveness and new opportunities.

Typology of the national migration models

The European and regional levels of analysis become more concrete and specific when we add the national one. Every country has its unique migration profile and model, and the conference will contribute to their understanding. In this introductory problematic paper, my task is to spread the diversity along some analytical axes and offer a synthesized typology. Among the various migration experiences in the different countries, the paper outlines four types:

• Post-conflict. Elements of which we find in most countries of former Yugoslavia, but is most represented in BosniaandHerzegovina;
• All inclusive – this image I use to name the migration profile which includes all types of migration. A typical example is Albania;
• New emigration “champion”. The country that attracts the attention of the European public because of its considerable and intensive migration is by all means Romania.
• Immigrational. The country in the region that first began experiencing the transition from emigration to labor migration is Slovenia;
• Large scale, wide range all inclusive: Ukraine. SEE and the post-soviet space are usually analyzed separately because each group has its own pronounced specifics. For the purposes of the conference, the typology includes Ukraine too.

The brief analyses that follow do not aim to deal with the unrealistic task of presenting in depth and detail the respective countries, but single out the elements in their migration profile that make them representative of the given model.

The post-conflict model – Bosnia and Herzegovina

It is not by coincidence that Bosnia and Herzegovina is the country where the policy on migration is overinstitutionalized: all fourteen governments had ministries responsible for refugees and return[80]. It is not by accident that the responsible institution in Bosnia and Herzegovina is called Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees. The suffering of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who paid the highest migration price in the conflicts and wars in former Yugoslavia, calls for institutional – both national and international – counterbalancing.

The other logical and expected fact is that in the decade after the Dayton Agreement, the return from exile comes into the centre of migration policy. Fifty percent of the refugees and temporarily displaced persons[81] returned in that period; after that the return continued but at a much lower rate:

Return of citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the support of IOM in the period 2001 – 2009

2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	Total
1566	1355	844	295	101	54	28	16	73	4332

Source: B&H Ministry of security 2010 : 40

The return is not always a smooth process: some refugees are returned from countries that no longer offer their hospitality, while the home countries are not able to provide housing or other solutions which would make the return possible. Sixty percent of the returnees from Germany are made to settle in towns or villages different from their own that leads to changing their status of refugees to that of displaced people[82].

Nowadays we can outline two tendencies: the first one is the terminal fading of returns[83]. The other is the introduction of higher criteria by which the international community evaluates its impact. The term sustainable return[84] that links it more explicitly to the right to jobs, homes, and healthcare is being used.

Both tendencies illustrate the coming of the end of a migration model, marked by forced migration, and the transition to a normal model of migration. Citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina are among the most mobile in Europe; they form the largest immigration group in Slovenia, the third largest in Austria and the fifth largest in Sweden[85]. Emigrants reach the impressive number of 1 350 000 (ibid) coming form a population of just 3.8 million[86].

I will conclude with an extremely curious tendency directly related to the topic of the conference on labor migration in the region. Over the past few years there has been an abrupt fall in the attractiveness of the traditionally most prestigious destination – the USA (from 15 000 emigrants in 2000 to 3 789 in 2006); while the attractiveness of Slovenia has risen: the migration towards a neighboring Balkan country grew more than 6 times (from 2016 emigrants in 2000 to 12 477 in 2007)[87].

This fact could be seen as the symbolic reconciliation with the region and also as a positive rating of the opportunities for professional realization that it provides.

All inclusive: Albania

“Country on the move”[88] “Migration is one of the most important social and economic phenomena affecting Albania. Since 1990, almost a quarter of the Albanian population has left the country along with a large urban-rural migration”[89]. The characterizations of researchers and international organizations such as IOM introduce the first two aspects of the Albanian model: huge numbers – every one in four Albanians is a migrant; as well as the deep socio-economic impact. The very structure of Albanian population is being changed. On the one hand, Albania has positive demographics – one of the highest in Europe. On the other, emigration is age and gender selective, which leads to two negative consequences: reduction of the relative quota of employable young people; and the accelerated ageing of the Albanian population[90]. Demographic imbalance is a serious issue. Equally serious is the socio-economic imbalance: the level of remittances is three times higher than the direct foreign investment and nearly twice as much as the help that comes from international sources[91]. The centre of development is moving form the country to its Diaspora: “Diaspora becomes increasingly important for the growth and the socio-economic development of the country”[92].

Another dimension of the Albanian model is found in the variety of the forms of migration. This is a small country producing large traffic. The pair “irregular migration – forced return” is clearly manifested: several hundred thousand Albanians have been returned from the European countries[93]. Typical of the Albanian experience are some “exotic” forms of migration such as the 5000 Albanians who sought asylum at the embassies of western countries in Tirana (June-July 1990), the ships overloaded with would-be emigrants traveling to Italy, the wave of migrants after the crisis with the financial pyramids[94].

A number of researchers stress the specific character and uniqueness of the case of Albania: “laboratory for the study of migration and development” (King 2005), ‘new migration order” (Van Hear 1998), ‘significant and unique case” (Vulnerati 2007).

Some Western perceptions describe the Balkan migrations as “Balkanized”: exotic, tending to be irregular, multiple – both in terms of forms and numbers. Albanian migrations are often perceived as their closest illustration.

New emigration “champion”: Romania

“Visible, but not numerous” – this is how the French researcher of Romanian origin Dana Diminescu summarized Romanian migration in the EU just six years ago[95]. Time has accelerated the first characteristic and made the second invalid: Romanian immigrants in the EU are around 2.5 – 2.7 million. Just in Italy the number is quarter of a million in 2008 – 796 000, twice as much than in the previous year. The situation in Spain is completely symmetrical: 797 000[96].

To a great extent, Romanian emigration offers a synthesis of the specifics of the outward flows in SEE. It is best explained by the neoclassical economic theory which has two conceptual centers: the differences in salaries and the geographical differences in the supply and demand of the workforce[97]. Romania is characterized by both oversupply of labor and low income: “the first year of economic restructuring brought also a diminishing of the real earning. Considering the value of 1990 as a reference point (100%) in 2000 the real earning barely reached 59% of this value. Although the real earnings increased constantly in 2006 they still represented only 97.4% of the 1990 value”[98]. Two external, European, factors made migration flows easier and more numerous: the opening of the Schengen Area for visa-free travel in 2001 and EU membership in 2007.  The case of Romania illustrates two of the advantages of emigration for the sending countries: reduction of the pressure on the local labor market and remittances. Romania never reached the unemployment levels of neighboring Eastern European countries; unemployment fell from 10.04% in 1997 to 4.1% in 2007 before the crisis[99]. Romanian President Traian Băsescu[100] recently summarized in an attractive way the two advantages by appealing to emigrants not to return because the country needed their remittances[101], and also because it could not offer them any jobs.

Romania illustrates the appetite that the population of SEE has for emigration, stimulated by European integration and the free movement of labor. Economic theories of migration argue that labor mobility will continue to attract many citizens of the new or future member states until considerable differences in the earnings and quality of life continue to exist.

The immigration model: Slovenia

The transition form emigration to immigration increases the countries’ self-confidence and the discourses on immigration often precede its stable and sizeable qualitative expression.  One of the countries, where reality is quite close to the discourse, is Slovenia. The other one is Croatia, which also has a positive net migration balance (0.5 according to IOM data, 2010). The net balance of Slovenia is 2.2. The percentage of foreign population is about to reach European levels: 8.1%[102]. The percentage of immigrant is labor is even higher: 10%[103]. The citizens of other EU member states are not many – 0.2% of the population[104], but relatively more numerous than that in Bulgaria and Romania.[105]

Two aspects are of material importance for the theme of our conference: the clearly regional profile of the immigrants and the regional policy of Slovenia. According to data provided by Eurostat, of the top five foreign nationalities, four are from former Yugoslavia: 47.3% of all immigrants are from Bosnia and Herzegovina, 20.1% – from Serbia, 10.9% – from Macedonia,and 10.2% – from Croatia[106]. Ninety-five percent of the work permits are for nationals of the former Yugoslav republics, the majority are issued to people from Bosnia and Herzegovina[107]. The regional migration policy of the country has to dimensions: bilateral and multilateral. Slovenia has entered into agreements with Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina for the employment of their nationals and after the crisis will most probably continue establishing similar agreements. The more ambitious goal is to provoke a debate about the creation of a zone for free movement of the workforce in the Western Balkans in the period before the EU accession of the rest of the countries (ibid).

The Slovenian example presents an interest on two levels: regionalization and europeanization. The country is characterized by intensive regional migration, which is being supported[108] by the active policy of the country in the Western Balkans. Slovenia is a leader in the implementation of the Mediterranean model of transition from emigration to immigration. This is precisely the motorway that would shade the Balkan specifics and would gradually lead to the acquisition of a European migration profile.

Large scale, wide range all inclusive: Ukraine

With a population of 45 million – nearly twice the number of all the people on the Western Balkans – Ukraine is a specific case that does not easily render itself to comparison.  In the proposed working typology it comes closest to the all inclusive model, but operates on a much larger scale and has a wider span. The great numbers that are part of the flows is the first, obvious and predictable difference when we compare Ukraine to Albania. The second is more significant: flows come in great numbers both inwards and outwards.

What are the numbers and which flow is more numerous – international organizations do not always reach consensus on these key questions. The UN believes that the migration balance is positive; the World Bank and IOM tip the balance to the other side and report a slight negative balance of -0.3%[109]. Among the multitude of factors that make prestigious international organizations disagree, I will single out just two:

• problems in Ukrainian statistics leading to insufficient registration of departures;
• a high percentage of irregular migration.

We would be interested to hear from the Ukrainian participants in the conference who might be able to shed some light on the issue.

I am going to summarize the complex migration profile of Ukraine in 6 characteristics; the first three are made from a European perspective, and the rest – from an Eastern European and pro-Soviet perspective:

• The growing significance of the country as neighbor of the EU with a 500-kilometer border with the new member states of Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, and the worries especially related to the permeability of the latter. The consolidation of the Ukrainian borders is a challenge for the national, regional, and European security. In order to have an adequate response, a number of tools and programs are being implemented, out of which I will quote as an example the Söderköping Process. Тhis multilateral initiative was launched in 2001 and aims to improve cooperation in the field of asylum, migration and border management. As part of the process, Ukraine is cooperating with a wide range of states – both from the EU and the post-Soviet area such as – Belarus, Moldova, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. The initiative is currently being transformed but continues to operate and was first chaired by Hungary in January 2010.
• The high percentage of irregular migration which IOM describes in rather strong terms: “Ukraine currently supplies significant labor force, but only an insignificant part of migrant workers from Ukraine become legal migrants in their destination countries. The majority are working undocumented, making them irregular migrant workers”[110];
• Another important element – equally significant for the immigration profile and the immigration image – is trafficking: this country is among the biggest sources of trafficking for prostitution and forced labor in Western Europe, Turkey, and Russia [111]. This image is reinforced by the role of Ukraine as a transit stop for large flows of irregular migration[112];
• The European image of Ukraine is that of a mighty migration source, but is also one of the world’s immigration leaders – it ranks among the top five countries for absolute number of immigrants[113] ;
• Ukraine is a typical example of the pro-Soviet area that was tailored anew by the geopolitics and politics, where individuals still continue to pull the threads between the separate countries – the vast majority of both transit and settled immigrants are from the countries of the former USSR;
• A curious phenomenon is the feminization of immigration. It would be valuable if the conference studied the gender dimension with its (un)expected symmetries: the majority of the Ukrainian community in Bulgaria are women; more than half – 57.2% – of the immigrants in Ukraine – as well.

There are, of course, no pure models, and there are no countries that belong to a single model. Labor immigration exists in all of the countries, together with high levels of labor emigration. Croatia can be characterized as a mixed type between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Slovenia, as well as – in different ratios – Macedonia and Serbia. Moldova is similar to Albania, Bulgaria comes close to the migration profile of Romania, but operates on a smaller scale.  Time will show how the migration models of Montenegro and Kosovo will crystallize.

City policies:

new prospects for the integration of immigrants

Whether the regional level in the management of migration and integration would become equally significant as the national or European levels would remain an open question that the conference would most probably leave unresolved. However, this event could contribute to its rationalization with information and ideas. I would open the debate with three groups of considerations:  on European, regional and local levels.

One of the most original and long-term directions in integration policy is the autonomization of cities. From splendid capitals to modest settlements – cities are more often and more ambitiously engaged in the development of their own integration strategies. Because of two different reasons. The fist because the city[114] is the privileged place for including the immigrants in the accepting society. The second, and less obvious, but also significant from a political point of view – because cities can develop integration policies that are different from the national and achieve strikingly better results. Austria is at the bottom of the integration index ranking, but Vienna is among the most convincing European examples of a diverse and interesting integration policy.

In addition to the general advantages, equally valid for the region as well, in terms of Eastern Europe, I would add one more argument in favor of city policy. It is related to the democratic potential of the approach because it directs cities to actively participate in networks such as Creative Cities, Eurоcities, and Open Cities. They allow hierarchical relations such as these between central and local authorities, to be complemented by the horizontal ones of relations with similar or positively different cities.

I would illustrate these arguments by citing a good practice – the participation of Sofia in the Open Cities network. Like many other networks with attractive names, it promotes a dynamic understanding of migration as a resource. It develops on three levels:

• Leadership and management on which the strategic vision for the city is defined;
• Inclusion and integration where a range of measures – starting with meeting the immigrants to their integration – is displayed;
• Internationalization where migration is seen as a factor for international visibility, attractiveness and dynamism of the city.

A new migration strategy is currently being developed in Bulgaria. The first public debate defined security as its core and main focus. Sofia’s participation in the Open Cities project is an opportunity for the capital to work towards a more open and positive understanding of migration.

Conclusion

Looking for a job and not seeking asylum. Labor migration, jobs and better quality of life as top reasons for human mobility present a huge achievement that occurred over the past two decades – both for the ones who left the closed societies of countries like Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania, and for the post-conflict and post-war countries of former Yugoslavia. This is this fist positive conclusion.

The second is the possibility to discuss the Eastern and the Western Balkans as a single analytical entity. Less than ten years ago this was almost impossible; the two parts of the region were developing in opposite directions: transition form closed to open, and from political to economic migrations in Bulgaria, Romania, and Albania; and just the opposite transition in former Yugoslavia. The present decade brought together the migration development of the two parts of the region.

Labor migration today is central to all national migration models in SEE in relation to all flows – both inward and outward.

The crisis produces less positive conclusions. Southeastern Europe is among the most afflicted regions in the world but still has not reached the dire condition of the most adversely affected countries in the EU. The crisis affects migration mostly by reducing the outward flows; it has still not led to the creation of significant flows of return.

Migrant transfers prove to be more crisis-resistant than foreign investment and financial capital flows. The human face of globalization displays more solidarity and more strength than that of economy.

Labor emigration still prevails over immigration – with the exception of Slovenia and Croatia, but the significance of immigration as a possible centre of migration models in the midterm future is growing.

The day when pull factors reach the strength of push factors the citizens of the region will celebrate the end of “balkanization” and will welcome a new image of an attractive and hospitable region. This day is not tomorrow, but it is in the foreseeable future. Millions of emigrants have divested the region of significance: the “roads” became more attractive than the “roots”. Other phenomena lead to various complications but still bring light to the picture: returnees; circular migrants who earn abroad and spend at home; immigrants who invest labor, capital, and existential value.

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68.  Wallerstein I. and E. Balibar (1991) Race, class, nation. Ambiguous identities. Verso.

69.  Zagar M. (2009) A hypothetical case of integrated diversity and migration management: scenarios, strategies and policies – considering possible applications for the MARRI region. Ljubljana.A text prepared for MARRI within the framework of the MARRI 2008-9 Migration Strategy and Policy Paper.

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[1] Plenary paper at the international conference Migration and employment: European and regional perspectives, Sofia, 3-5.11.10.

[2] Doctor honoris causa at the University of Lille 3, Director of the Centre for Migration Studies and the Department of Political Sciences of the New Bulgarian University.

[3] (ILO 2010a)

[4] (IOM 2010: 17)

[5] (Cerna and Hynes 2009)

[6] (Papademetriou and Terrazas 2009, Barbulescu 2009)

[7] (Koser 2009: 1)

[8] (Koser 2009: 2)

[9] (Hoerder 2009)

[10] (Wallerstein 1981, 1991)

[11] (Barbulescu 2009)

[12] (Pons-Vognon 2010)

[13] (Castle 2009, Koser 2009)

[14] It continued afterwards, but the figures are not included in the OECD International Migration Outlook 2010 (Gurria 2010).

[15] (Gurria 2010)

[16] Global youth unemployment reached 13.4% in 2009 and this is its peak since 1991 when statistics began to be kept (ILO 2010).

[17] (Gurria 2010)

[18] (Gurria 2010)

[19] (Castle 2009, Koser 2009)

[20] (Koser 2009: 2)

[21] (Gurria 2010)

[22] For the period 2000 – 2007

[23] (Gurria 2010) The other two are the USA and Australia, at first and fifth place respectively.

[24] (Gurria 2010)

[25] (Castle 2009)

[26] (Castle 2009)

[27] (OECD 2010)

[28] (OECD 2010)

[29] (Papademetriou and Terrazas 2009)

[30] In Hungary as well.

[31] Data include Serbia and Montenegro

[32] (Vasileva 2009)

[33] 10.11.10.

[34] (IOM 2010: 17)

[35] (COM 2009)

[36] (Jansen and Uexkull 2010: 33)

[37] (Jansen and Uexkull 2010: 33)

[38] (ILO 2010)

[39] (COM 2009: 3)

[40] (COM 2009: 3-4) I will let economist say the final word on whether the conclusion about SEE is pessimistic of moderately optimistic. According to ILO, our region, together with the rest of the post-communist block, experienced in 2009 the most severe shock in relation to economic growth in comparison to all other regions (ILO 2010).

[41] Most stream-lined are the formulations about Turkey: “Turkey has reached a more demanding stage requiring a new impetus for reform” (COM 2009: 2).

[42] (Leigh 2009)

[43] (COM 2009: 3)

[44] (COM 2009)

[45] (COM 2009: 6)

[46] (Zagar 2009)

[47] (Gallup 2009: 7)

[48] (Bonifazi and Mamolo 2004: 519)

[49] (Edwards-Baldwin 2005)

[50] (Gallup 2009)

[51] (Krasteva 2010)

[52] (Gallup 2009)

[53] (Krasteva 2010: 10 – 11)

[54] (IOM 2010)

[55] (Krasteva 2008)

[56] (Bonifazi and Mamolo 2004)

[57] Gallup’s study is for the Western Balkans.

[58] (Gallup 2009)

[59] (Vasileva 2009: 6)

[60] (Vasileva 2009: 1)

[61] The successful term belongs to Adrian Favell (2009).

[62] (Piore 1979, 1980, 2002)

[63] (Breinbauer 2010)

[64] (Krasteva 2010)

[65] (Ratha et al 2010: 1)

[66] (Manssor and Quillin 2007)

[67] (Ratha et al 2010: 3)

[68] (Shipu and Sigfried 2006)

[69] (Gallup 2009: 6) The data are for different years, hence the differences for the separate countries.

[70] (Gallup 2009: 6)

[71] (Gallup 2009: 6)

[72] (Levitt 1998: 926)

[73] (IOM 2007)

[74] (Lazaroiu 2007: 158)

[75] (Dobre and Ariton 2008)

[76] (МВнР Хърватия 2010)

[77] IOM date do not differentiate between labor and non-labor immigration. The higher values in the countries of former Yugoslavia – 5.3% for Serbia (IOM Serbia 2010), 15.9% for Croatia (IOM Croatia 2010) are due to the scale of the migrations.

[78] (IOM Romania 2010)

[79] (IOM Bulgaria 2010)

[80] (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2010)

[81] (Marinkovic 2007)

[82] (Marinkovic 2007: 65)

[83] Similar tendencies exist in relation to the return of Serbs to Croatia (Mesic and Bagic 2010).

[84] (Mesic and Bagic 2010)

[85] (B&H Ministry of security 2010)

[86] (IOM B&H 2010)

[87] (B&H Ministry of security 2010: 64)

[88] (Carletto et al 2006)

[89] (IOM 2007: 23)

[90] The relative portion of the population under the age of 15 is reduced from 33% to 29.3% for the period 1989-2001, while that over 65 has risen from 5.31% to 7.5% (Vulnerati 2007)

[91] (IOM 2007)

[92] (Vulnerati 2007: 76)

[93] (IOM 2007) 42 254 до 2006 г.

[94] (Vulnerati 2007: 76)

[95] (Diminescu 2004)

[96] (OECD 2010)

[97] (Borjas 1989)

[98] (Dobre and Ariton 2008: 188)

[99] (Dobre and Ariton 2008: 185)

[100] Trud newspaper, 10.08.10

[101] Romania is the biggest net recipient of remittances in the EU. In terms of GDP it occupies top position together with Bulgaria. At the same time the 42% reduction of Romanian remittances in 2009 considerably exceeds the average in Europe – 18% (Comini and Faes-Cannito 2010).

[102] (IOM data, 2010)

[103] (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010, data on Slovenia)

[104] (Vasileva 2009: 3)

[105] According to Eurostat data, EU citizens in Bulgaria and Romania are invisible for the statistics – 0.0% of the population (Vasileva 2009: 3).

[106] (Vasileva 2009: 5)

[107] (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010, data on Slovenia)

[108] State policy, of course, takes into account the economic conjuncture: because of the crisis, seasonal jobs for foreigners in construction, hospitality, and tourism are closed at present (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010, data on Slovenia).

[109] IOM 2010

[110] IOM 2008: 12

[111] IOM 2010.

[112] Measures against irregular migration are a priority for the Ukrainian migration policy – White paper 2006.

[113] IOM 2008: 11

[114] Immigration in rural regions is not the subject of analysis in the present text.

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