Balkans on the move

The article offers a synthesis of the exceptional intensity and diversity of migrations in Southeastern Europe with their typology and tendencies: : fromforcedmigrationstoreturns; fromethnictoeconomiclogic; frommassemigrationtotemporaryand circular migration; from emigration to immigration.Amongthediversityofthemigrationexperiencesinthedifferentcountries, thearticleoutlines four types: post-conflict. ElementsofwhichwefindinmostcountriesofformerYugoslavia, butismostrepresentedinBosniaandHerzegovina; ‘all inclusive– thisimageisusedtonamethemigration profilewhichincludesalltypesofmigration, a typicalexamplebeingAlbania;newemigrationchampion illustrated by Romania becauseofitsconsiderableandintensivemigration; immigration – ThecountryintheregionthatfirstbeganexperiencingthetransitionfromemigrationtolaborimmigrationisSlovenia.

Emigration still categorically prevails over immigration – with the exception of Slovenia, but the significance of immigration as the possible centre of migrational models in the not too distant future is increasing.

Anna Krasteva is doctor honoris causa of University Lille 3, France. She is director of CERMES (Centre for Refugees, Migration and Ethnic Studies) at the New Bulgarian University. She has edited more than twenty books and published articles in Bulgaria, USA, France, UK, Belgium, Russia, Switzerland, Germany, FYROM, Slovakia, Greece, Serbia, Turkey, Italy, the Netherlands, and Romania. She is editor-in-chief of the Southeastern Europe (Brill), member of the editorial board of Nationalism and ethnic politics (Routledge) and of other international journals.She worked as fellow at the Institute for advanced studies in Nantes, France (January-June 2010). Migration, ethnicity, citizenship, digital diaspora are among her main fields of research and teaching. She has been guest professor at several European universities. Anna Krasteva is member of a number of international scientific boards, e.g. of the Centre for Central, Eastern and Balkan Europe of the University of Bologna, of the Reseau des Maisons des Sciences de l’homme in France. She is an independent expert monitoring and evaluating projects for the European Commission, experienced in leadership and participation in numerous national, regional, and international projects.


« Migrationtodayisforwork »[2] – thisis theclearandconciseconclusionmadebytheInternationalLaborOrganizationthatissupportedbyfigures as well: thoseemployedandtheirfamiliescomprise 90% of all migrants. The statement of the International Organization for Migration is identical: « Labormigrationcontinuedtobeindemandamongcountriesoforiginanddestination, despitetheeconomiccrisis »[3].

SoutheasternEuropehasgonealongwaybeforebecomingpartofthisglobalmigrationnormality. The present article analyses the basic milestones along that way


The Balkans: the long (re)discovery of labor migration


From diversifying to bringing together the Balkan models of migration


The migration champion of Europe – the Balkans suddenly gained this reputation in the beginning of the 90ties. The above period is characterized by rather contradictory trends in the Eastern and Western sub regions. I am gong to analyze this unique dynamic and the diversity by a periodization of the major stages in the development of the migration situation and a typology of the main flows.

« There is hardly another region of the world where the current situation of migrations is still considerably influenced by thepast history as in the Balkans »[4]. The format of this article does not allow for a detailed discussion of the historical trends, but also excludes the possibility for the present condition to be analyzed outside the context of the radical historical changes that took place in the past two decades. I would like to differentiate three periods after the fall of the Berlin wall.

The first period is from 1989 to the mid 90ties which also mark the end of the wars in former Yugoslavia. The period is characterized by three tendencies:

  • sudden and huge increase of the migration flows;
  • multiplication of the forms and considerable increase of the intensity of both labor and non-labor migration;
  • literal « flight » of the Western and Eastern Balkans towards two opposed migration poles.

I will discuss briefly each of these trends, starting with the last one. The Eastern Balkans are undergoing a transition from « politization to economization » of migration; the Wеstern – just the opposite, from « economization to politization ».

After the post communist changes in Romania and Bulgaria, as well as in Albania, a quick and radical transition form closed to open society took place. During communism, migrations – both outward, and inward – were strictly controlled by the state. They were kept to a minimum in both directions and were discusses solely in the light of state security and interest. Any desire for professional realization abroad was treated as political betrayal of the regime.

One of the first and most sought-after freedoms of the post-communist transition was the freedom of movement and every one in ten citizens in Bulgaria and every one in four in Albania took advantage of it.

The Yugoslavian model is open and emigration and circular labor migration are its expression. The outburst of conflicts and wars opened the floodgates of vigorous dislocations. The economic logic of mobility during the times of the Federation was drastically replaced by the political and military logic of the forced dislocations.

Out of the four types of migration which Martin Edwards-Baldwin (2005) uses to characterize the Balkan migrations in the first half of the 90ties, three are non-labor: « forced », ethnic », and trafficking ». Ten million of the 80-million population entered the migration flows[5].

The second period started after the Dayton Agreement of 1995 and ended in the first decade of the new century with the accession of Slovenia (2004), Romania (2007), and Bulgaria (2007). It has two characteristic trends: transition to post-conflict migration flows on the Western Balkans and gradual and slow europeanization of the migration on the Eastern Balkans. The policy of voluntary return of the forcefully displaced was given absolute priority. If the migration panorama in former Yugoslavia has to nurse the wounds caused by the conflicts, the refugee profile of Romania and Bulgaria is acquiring a European appearance: it does not originate in neighboring countries but in far-away ones – the classic sources of global refugee flows – Afghanistan, Irak, Somalia, etc. Immigration is gradually beginning to receive political and economic visibility. This is a period of gradual rehabilitation of labor migration. It is no longer one form of migration along many others, but occupies an ever central position in the migration panorama.

At the moment we are in the third period, when European integration is already a reality, forthcoming or pending for the whole region. Labor migration gradually occupies a central position as the main source of both emigration and immigration.

The economization of migration began to gradually diminish the differences of the early 90ties; we witness an increasing convergence of the types of migration flows and trends. The signs of radical change in the migration situation as a result of the crisis are still missing, which is an argument for refraining from formulating a new – « crisis » – period.

Labor emigration still prevails over labor immigration. Seventy thousand of the 24.7 million population of the Western Balkans have the desire to emigrate – the potential emigration is « considerable » but not « mass »[6].

Southeastern Europe has travelled far to rehabilitate the economic push factors and make the theme of labor migration legitimate and central.


Trends: from extraordinary to ordinary flows


If I assume the impossible task of summarizing by a single word the complex, contradictory, and diverse Balkan migrations at the beginning of the 21st century, it would be  normalization. This movement takes a variety of expressions; I’ll delineate four main trends[7]:

  • From forced migrations to returns. Conflicts and wars in former Yugoslavia produced huge numbers of IDPs and refugees. Fifteen years later, return still remains an « unfinished business »[8]. Many IDPs and refugees will never return to their native places, because these places are not the same, and interethnic structures have changed. Return, has, however, become a viable alternative to displacement.
  • From ethnic to economic logic. Second only to forced migrations, ethnic migrations have been an important type of human mobility in the end 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. A decade later the same populations return to the same destinations, but the logic is no longer ethnic but economic. One third of a million Bulgarian citizens of Turkish origin, who, on the eve of change, were made by the communist authorities to leave for Turkey, are a case in point. A few years later on, the economic difficulties push many representatives of the biggest minority group in Bulgaria to find jobs either in Turkey, or in Germany, as network theory rightly anticipates.
  • From mass emigration to temporary or circular migration. Women gathering strawberries in Spain returning home for the winter; men working in construction abroad with their families remaining at home; highly qualified professionals moving from one job to another, irrespective of the country – temporary and circular migration take a diversity of forms. Nowadays it affects all professions – from seasonal workers to experts. Return becomes a usual element of labor mobility plans. More than half (60%) of those who plan to migrate, intend to do so just for just a few years[9].
  • From emigration to immigration. Bosnians, Serbs, and Macedonians in Slovenia; Austrians, Germans, and Dutch in Croatia; Chinese almost everywhere; Russians, Ukrainians, and British in Bulgaria; Moldovan in Romania – immigration in SEE is a fact. The pull factors vary from the soft climate and beauty of the Adriatic coast, to the relatively low cost of real estate in Bulgaria and Romania, to the economic niches in the relatively new market economies. Emigration still largely prevails over immigration, but EU integration may reverse the picture, as it has already done so in Slovenia. The Mediterranean model that transformed Spain, Italy and Greece from emigration to immigration countries only two-three decades ago could be realized in several Balkan countries[10].




For the purpose of this article I would divide the wide variety of the Balkan migration flows into two large groups: 1) « non-labor migration » (trafficking, retirement, asylum); 2) « labor migration » (emigration, including circular migration and the free movement of people and immigration, return, including that of representatives of the historical diaspora).

We see that the group of non-labor migration is extremely heterogeneous. At one end of the spectrum we have human trafficking. The biggest « exporters » are Albania and Romania, followed by Bulgaria. All countries from the region are transit ones, while Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina have also become a destination. 2009 saw the end of IOM’s five-year program spreading over 10 SEE countries aimed at capacity building to support the victims of human trafficking. If trafficking is the contemporary equivalent of slavery, leisure migration is positioned at the other end of the spectrum, where voluntary action and comfortable life are found. The typical groups are the Germans and Austrians in Croatia, and the British in Bulgaria[11]. Some of the representatives of these groups are retired people, all attracted by the milder climate and the opportunity to increase their quality of life permanently or for a certain period of the calendar year. By definition, asylum seeking is political migration.

The definition « non-labor » is conditional. I am not willing to discuss the forced activities of the victims of human trafficking as a form of labor. The other two forms of migration in the first category are related to labor: those who have been granted refugee status have equal rights to the labor market as the rest of the citizens; some of the representatives of retirement migration start their own business. In both cases employment is neither the reason, nor the main characteristic of these types of migration.

The representatives of the three types of migration above are considerably less in numbers than the representatives of labor migration. This, of course, is good news for a region that has recently started the transition form conflict to peaceful forms of mobility.

Labor emigration has stable traditions on the Balkans, where it is referred to by the word « gurbet » – a term that travels across borders. It is among the most stable sources of labor migration in Europe: until the 90s this role was performed by Yugoslavia and Turkey. After the democratic changes, all countries joined the outward flows, and Albania became the largest exporter[12]. The top five destinations for SEE migrants[13] are Germany, Italy, Greece, Switzerland, and Austria[14].

EU expansion has direct effect on the migration flows and has its qualitative and quantitative dimensions. The first is related to the access granted to the inhabitants of the Balkans to a new migration category – « the free movement of people ». The second is related to the increase of emigration. This phenomenon represents such a tangle of myths, media speculations, realities, and political discourses, that to untangle we would need a separate article. Here I will mention two equally significant facts.

The first is the increase of flows from the new member countries: from 0.3 million in 2001, the number of Romanians reached 1.7 million in 2008, the respective figures for the Bulgarians are 0.1 and 0.3 million. The enlargements of 2004 and 2007 had a different impact on the migration flows: in 2001 there were twice as much citizens of EU-10 in the EU than Romanians and Bulgarians; in 2008 the situation reversed both in absolute and relative terms[15]. Balkan citizens are more eager to consume the right of free movement.

The second fact is that the mobility of the new member states is not an exception but a confirmation of the right to high mobility that the old ones enjoyed: « 75% of the foreigners in the EU-27 live in Germany, Spain, UK, France and Italy; at the same time, citizens of these countries are among the most numerous EU foreigners living in another member state »[16]. The profile of the (South) Eastern European labor migrant unfolds in the wide expanse between the two poles, which I would call « europlumbers » and « eurostars »[17].

The jobs of the first group often fall under the term « 3D » – difficult, dirty and dangerous. Migrants from SEE are a typical illustration of the dual labor market theory according to which there are sectors which are not attractive for the locals and are being filled by foreign workforce[18]. In this case the sectors are construction, tourism, hospitality, domestic help, and care for the elderly.

The second category of migrants is at the centre of political and academic discourse in all countries, but has been given a different label: « brain drain ». Opinions are in agreement: this is a serious curse for the fragile economies because it disempowers the most highly qualified and innovative segment of the workforce[19]. Because of the large scale and impact of the phenomenon, it is being associated with the negative term « brain drain ». This conceptual apparatus expresses the state’s perspective that is justifiably worried by the loss of highly qualified work resource. If I use the positive term « eurostars », it is for introducing the migrants’ perspective. The most dynamic, entrepreneurial, and highly-qualified of them want to make full use of their right to mobility, all the more that for many it is a key element of their professional career.


Immigrationorthenewattractiveness of SEE


Three groups of labor migration may be distinguished in SEE:

  • Small, middle, and sometimes bigger business people and entrepreneurs and self-employed immigrants;
  • Immigrants employed by other immigrants, by local business people – or very rarely – by the administration;
  • Highly-skilled experts, consultants, and investors.

Immigrants’ origin varies in the different countries, but on the whole, we can say that the first group consists mainly of tradesmen and business people from the Near and Middle East Arab countries such as Syria, Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, from China, etc. Representatives of the same countries are found in the second group, but it comprises of more nationalities – Moldavians in Romania, Russians in Bulgaria, citizens of former Yugoslavia countries in Slovenia. In periods of economic development, immigrant workforce fills certain shortages: in construction – Ukrainians in Romania, Vietnamese in Bulgaria; in the textile industry – Chinese in Romania[20].

The third group originates from the EU, the USA and other developed countries: every one in four immigrants in Romania is from the EU – 24% from Italy and 18% from Spain[21]; the same (26%) is the relative percentage of EU citizens in Croatia.

Trade and hospitality are the main economic niches where many of the immigrants are concentrated.

The highly qualified professionals from the developed countries work with the foreign investors, at the representations of international organizations, and as consultants for local institutions.

The quantitative expression of immigration[22] is quite modest so far: 0.6% of the population in Romania[23], and 1.4% in Bulgaria[24].This group’s political and symbolic significance is much higher. The first is related to the specifics of immigration in the new EU member states and the need for adapted public policies. An interesting paradox seen in countries with new immigration, such as Romania and Bulgaria, is that its profile is more positive than that of countries who have had decades of migration history: the ratio between the first two groups is in favor of the first – many immigrants have their own business and create employment opportunities for their families and other workers.

The symbolic dimension of immigration is of great importance as well. For countries abandoned by a multitude of emigrants seeking work and opportunities abroad, immigrants, who invest similar energy, labor, and existential meaning are the bearers of a strong message of attractiveness and new opportunities.




The European and regional levels of analysis become more concrete and specific when we add the national one. Every country has its unique migration profile. My task is to spread the diversity along some analytical axes and offer a typology. Among the various migration experiences in the different countries, the article outlines four types:

  • Post-conflict. Elements of which we find in most countries of former Yugoslavia, but is most represented in Bosnia and Herzegovina;
  • ‘All inclusive’ – this image I use to name the migration profile which includes all types of migration. A typical example is Albania;
  • New emigration « champion ». The country that attracts the attention of the European public because of its considerable and intensive migration is by all means Romania.
  • Immigrational. The country in the region that first began experiencing the transition from emigration to labor migration is Slovenia.

The brief analyses that follow do not aim to deal with the unrealistic task of presenting in depth and detail the respective countries, but single out the elements in their migration profile that make them representative of the given model.


The post-conflict model:

Bosnia and Herzegovina


It is not by coincidence that Bosnia and Herzegovina is the country where the policy on migration is overinstitutionalized: all fourteen governments had ministries responsible for refugees and return. It is not by accident that the responsible institution in Bosnia and Herzegovina is called « Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees ». The suffering of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who paid the highest migration price in the conflicts and wars in former Yugoslavia, calls for institutional – both national and international – counterbalancing.

The other logical and expected fact is that in the decade after the Dayton Agreement, the return from exile comes into the centre of migration policy. Fifty percent of the refugees and temporarily displaced persons[25] returned in that period; after that the return continued but at a much lower rate.

The return is not always a smooth process: some refugees are returned from countries that no longer offer their hospitality, while the home countries are not able to provide housing or other solutions which would make the return possible. Sixty percent of the returnees from Germany are made to settle in towns or villages different from their own that leads to changing their status of refugees to that of displaced people[26].

Nowadays we can outline two tendencies: the first one is the terminal fading of returns[27]. The other is the introduction of higher criteria by which the international community evaluates its impact. The term « sustainable return »[28] that links it more explicitly to the right to jobs, homes, and healthcare is being used.

Both tendencies illustrate the coming of the end of a migration model, marked by forced migration, and the transition to a normal model of migration. Citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina are among the most mobile in Europe; they form the largest immigration group in Slovenia, the third largest in Austria and the fifth largest in Sweden[29]. Emigrants reach the impressive number of 1 350 000 (ibid) coming form a population of just 3.8 million, according to IOM site.

I will conclude with a new and interesting tendency. Over the past few years there has been an abrupt fall in the attractiveness of the traditionally most prestigious destination – the USA; while the attractiveness of Slovenia has risen: the migration towards a neighboring Balkan country grew more than 6 times from 2000 onwards.[30]. This fact could be seen as the symbolic reconciliation with the region and also as a positive rating of the opportunities for professional realization that it provides.


‘All inclusive’:



« Country on the move »[31]. « Migration is one of the most important social and economic phenomena affecting Albania. Since 1990, almost a quarter of the Albanian population has left the country along with a large urban-rural migration ». The characterizations of researchers and international organizations such as IOM introduce the first two aspects of the Albanian model: huge numbers – every one in four Albanians is a migrant; as well as the deep socio-economic impact. The very structure of Albanian population is being changed. On the one hand, Albania has positive demographics – one of the highest in Europe. On the other, emigration is age and gender selective, which leads to two negative consequences: reduction of the relative quota of employable young people; and the accelerated ageing of the Albanian population[32]. Demographic imbalance is a serious issue. Equally serious is the socio-economic imbalance: the level of remittances is three times higher than the direct foreign investment and nearly twice as much as the help that comes from international sources. The centre of development is moving form the country to its Diaspora: « Diaspora becomes increasingly important for the growth and the socio-economic development of the country »[33].

Another dimension of the Albanian model is found in the variety of the forms of migration. This is a small country producing large traffic. The pair « irregular migration – forced return » is clearly manifested: several hundred thousand Albanians have been returned from the European countries. Typical of the Albanian experience are some « exotic » forms of migration such as the 5000 Albanians who sought asylum at the embassies of western countries in Tirana (June-July 1990), the ships overloaded with would-be emigrants traveling to Italy, the wave of migrants after the crisis with the financial pyramids[34].

A number of researchers stress the specific character and uniqueness of the case of Albania: « laboratory for the study of migration and development »[35], « new migration order »[36], « significant and unique case »[37].

Some Western perceptions describe the Balkan migrations as « Balkanized »: exotic, tending to be irregular, multiple – both in terms of forms and numbers. Albanian migrations are often perceived as their closest illustration.


New emigration « champion »: Romania


« Visible, but not numerous » – this is how the French researcher of Romanian origin Dana Diminescu summarized Romanian migration in the EU just seven years ago[38]. Time has accentated the first characteristic and made the second invalid: Romanian immigrants in the EU are around 2.5 – 2.7 million. According to OECD data, before the crisis, just in Italy the number is quarter of a million in 2008 – 796 000, twice as much than in the previous year. The situation in Spain is completely symmetrical: 797 000.

To a great extent, Romanian emigration offers a synthesis of the specifics of the outward flows from SEE. It is best explained by the neoclassical economic theory which has two conceptual centers: the differences in salaries and the geographical differences in the supply and demand of the workforce[39]. Romania is characterized by both oversupply of labor and low income: « the first year of economic restructuring brought also a diminishing of the real earning. Considering the value of 1990 as a reference point (100%) in 2000 the real earning barely reached 59% of this value. Although the real earnings increased constantly in 2006 they still represented only 97.4% of the 1990 value »[40]. Two external, European, factors made migration flows easier and more numerous: the opening of the Schengen Area for visa-free travel in 2001 and EU membership in 2007.

The case of Romania illustrates two of the advantages of emigration for the sending countries: reduction of the pressure on the local labor market and remittances. Romania never reached the unemployment levels of neighboring Eastern European countries; unemployment fell from 10.04% in 1997 to 4.1% in 2007 before the crisis[41]. Romanian President Traian Băsescu summarized in an attractive way the two advantages by appealing to emigrants not to return because the country needed their remittances[42], and also because it could not offer them any jobs.

Romania illustrates the appetite that the population of SEE has for emigration, stimulated by European integration and the free movement of labor. Economic theories of migration argue that labor mobility will continue to attract many citizens of the new or future member states until considerable differences in the earnings and quality of life continue to exist.


The immigration model:



The transition form emigration to immigration increases the countries’ self-confidence and the discourses on immigration often precede its stable and sizeable qualitative expression. The country where reality is quite close to the discourse, is Slovenia which net balance is 2.2. The percentage of foreign population is about to reach European levels: 8.1%. The percentage of immigrant in the labor market is even higher: 10%. The citizens of other EU member states are not many – 0.2% of the population[43], but relatively more numerous than that in Bulgaria and Romania[44].

Two aspects are to be emphasized: the regional policy of Slovenia and the clearly regional profile of the immigrants. Four of the top five foreign nationalities are from former Yugoslavia: 47.3% of all immigrants are from Bosnia and Herzegovina, 20.1% – from Serbia, 10.9% – from Macedonia, and 10.2% – from Croatia[45]. Ninety-five percent of the work permits are for nationals of the former Yugoslav republics, the majority are issued to people from Bosnia and Herzegovina. The regional migration policy of the country has two dimensions: bilateral and multilateral. Slovenia has entered into agreements with Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina for the employment of their nationals and after the crisis will most probably continue establishing similar agreements. The more ambitious goal is to provoke a debate about the creation of a zone for free movement of the workforce in the Western Balkans in the period before the EU accession of the rest of the countries[46].

The Slovenian example presents an interest on two levels: « regionalization » and « europeanization ». The country is characterized by intensive regional migration, which is being supported[47] by the active policy of the country in the Western Balkans. Slovenia is a leader in the implementation of the Mediterranean model of transition from emigration to immigration. This is precisely the motorway that would shade the Balkan specifics and would gradually lead to the acquisition of a European migration profile.

There are, of course, no pure models, and there are no countries that belong to a single model. Labor immigration exists in all of the countries, together with high levels of labor emigration. Croatia can be characterized as a mixed type between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Slovenia, as well as – in different ratios – Macedonia and Serbia. Moldova is similar to Albania, Bulgaria comes close to the migration profile of Romania, but operates on a smaller scale. Time will show how the migration models of Montenegro and Kosovo will crystallize.



Looking for a job and not seeking asylum: labor migration, jobs and better quality of life as top reasons for human mobility present a huge achievement that occurred over the past two decades – both for the ones who left the closed societies of countries like Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania, and for the post-conflict and post-war countries of former Yugoslavia. This is the first positive conclusion.

The second one is the possibility to discuss the Eastern and the Western Balkans as a single analytical entity. Fifteen years ago this was impossible; the two parts of the region were developing in opposite directions: transition from closed to open, and from political to economic migrations in Bulgaria, Romania, and Albania; and just the opposite transition in former Yugoslavia. The present decade brought together the migration development of the two parts of the region.

Labor migration today is central to all national migration models in SEE in relation to all flows – both inward and outward.

Labor emigration still prevails over immigration – with the exception of Slovenia and Croatia, but the significance of immigration as a possible centre of migration models in the midterm future is growing.

The day when pull factors will reach the strength of push factors the citizens of the region will celebrate the end of « balkanization » and will welcome a new image of an attractive and hospitable region. This day is not tomorrow, but it is in the foreseeable future. Millions of emigrants have divested the region of significance: the « roads » became more attractive than the « roots ». Other phenomena complicate but also bring light to the picture: returnees; circular migrants who earn abroad and spend at home; immigrants who invest labor, capital, and existential value.


[1]DoctorhonoriscausaoftheUniversityofLille 3, France and director of CERMES (Centre for Refugees, Migration and Ethnic Studies) at the New Bulgarian University, Sofia

[2] ILO, International labor migration: a rights-based approach, 2010,Available online:

[3] IOM, Report of the director general on the work of the Organization for the year 2009, p. 17. Available online:

[4]Corrado Bonifazi & MarijaMamolo,« Past and current trends of Balkan migrations  Corrado Bonifazi & MarijaMamolo,« Past and current trends of Balkan migrations », Espaces, populations, societies, N 3, 2014, p. 519.

[5]Martin Baldwin-Edwards,« Balkan migrations and the European Union: patterns and trends »,Romanian Journal of European Studies, N 4, 2010, 31 – 44.

[6].Gallup, impact of migration, Balkan Monitor, Insights and perceptions: voices of the Balkans, June 2009, p. 7. Available online:

[7] Anna Krasteva,« Introduction »,In Anna Krasteva, Anelia.Kasabova, Diana. Karabonova (eds),Migrations from and to Southeastern Europe, Ravenna, Longo Editore, 2010, pp. 9 – 14.

[8]MirjanaBobic, « Serbian unfinished business », Refugees and IDPS, In Anna Krasteva & Anelia Kasabova &Diana Karabonova, (eds),Migrations from and to Southeastern Europe, Ravenna, Longo Editore, 2010, pp. 211 – 224.

[9]. Gallup, impact of migration, Balkan Monitor, Insights and perceptions: voices of the Balkans, June 2009, p. 7. Available online:

[10]Anna, Krasteva, « Introduction »,In Anna Krasteva, AneliaKasabova, DianaKarabonova (eds),Migrations from and to Southeastern Europe, Ravenna, Longo Editore, 2010, pp. 10 – 11.

[11]Anna Krasteva,« L’immigration en Bulgarie : culture d’entreprise et questions d’intégration », Hommes et migrations, N 1275, 2008,112 – 126.

[12]Corrado Bonifazi& MarijaMamolo,« Past and current trends of Balkan migrations », Espaces, populations, societies, N 3, 2014, p. 519.

[13]Gallup’s study is for the Western Balkans.


[15]Katia Vasileva,« Population and social conditions », In Eurostat, N 94, 2009, p. 6.

[16]Idem, p. 1.

[17]The successful term belongs to AdrianFavell,Eurostars and eurocities, Free movement and mobility in an integrated Europe,Oxford, Blackwell, 2008.

[18]Michael Piore,Birds of passage: migrant labor and industrial societies, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1979; Michael Piore,« United States immigration policy and unsanctioned migrants », InIndustrial and labor migration review, vol. 33, N 3, 1980, pp. 312 – 314; Michael Piore,« Economics and sociology », In Revue economique, vol. 53, N 2, 2002, pp. 291 – 300.

[19]Andreas Breinbauer, « Brains on the move », In Anna Krasteva & Anelia Kasabova, &Diana Karabonova, (eds),Migrations from and to Southeastern Europe, Ravenna, Longo Editore, 2010, pp. 93 – 120.

[20]Sebastian Lazariou,« Romania », In Migration flows in Southeast Europe, a compendium of national perspectives, Belgrade, Group 484, p. 158.

[21]S. Dobre& V. Ariton,« Romania. Migration and development: creating regional labor markets and labor market circulation as response to regional market demands »,Paper for Group 484, 2008.

[22]IOMdatedonotdifferentiatebetweenlaborandnon-laborimmigration. ThehighervaluesinthecountriesofformerYugoslavia– 5.3% for Serbia (cf. IOM Serbia, 2010, Available online:, 15.9% for Croatia (IOM Croatia. 2010, Available online: are due to the scale of the migrations.

[23]IOM Romania, 2010, Available online:

[24]IOM Bulgaria, 2010, Available online:

[25]Drasko Marinkovic,« Bosnia and Herzegovina », In Migration flows in Southeast Europe, a compendium of national perspectives, Belgrade, Group 484, 2007, pp. 43 – 75.

[26]Idem,p. 65.

[27]Similar tendencies exist in relation to the return of Serbs to Croatia, cf. Milan Mesic & DraganBagic,« Serb returnees in Croatia – the question of return sustainability », In International migration, vol. 48 (2), 2010, pp. 133 – 160.

[28]Milan Mesic & DraganBagic,« Serb returnees in Croatia – the question of return sustainability », In International migration, vol. 48 (2), 2010, pp. 133 – 160.

[29] Cf. B&H, Ministry of security B&H,Migration profile, Sarajevo, March 2010.

[30]Cf. B&H, Ministry of security B&H,Migration profile, Sarajevo, March 2010, p. 64.

[31]Calogero Carletto &Benjamin Davis &Marco Stampini& Alberto Zezza, « A country on the move: international migrations in post-communist Albania »,International Migration Review, 40 (4), 2006, pp. 767 – 85.

[32]Therelativeportionofthepopulationundertheageof15 is reduced from 33% to 29.3% for the period 1989-2001, while that over 65 has risen from 5.31% to7.5% Julie Vulnetari,« Albanian migration and development: state of the art review », IMISCO working paper, September 2007.

[33]Julie Vulnetari,« Albanian migration and development: state of the art review », IMISCO working paper, September 2007, p. 76.

[34]JulieVulnetari,« Albanian migration and development: state of the art review »,IMISCO working paper, September 2007, p. 76.

[35]RusselKing, « Albania as a labotary for the study of migration and development », Journal of South Europe and the Balkans, 7(2), 2005, pp. 13 – 56.

[36]NiclolasVan Hear, New Diasporas, London, UCL Press, 1998.

[37]JulieVulnetari, « Albanian migration and development: state of the art review »,IMISCO working paper, September 2007.

[38]Dana Diminescu,Visibles, mais peu nombreux. Les circulations migratoires roumaines,Paris, MSH, 2004.

[39]George Borjas, « Economic theory and international migration », International Migration Review, N 3, 1989, pp. 457 – 485.

[40]Suzana Dobre & ValentinAriton,« Romania. Migration and development: creating regional labor markets and labor market circulation as response to regional market demands »,Paper for Group 484, 2008, p. 188.

[41]Idem,p. 185.

[42]Romania is the biggest net recipient of remittances in the EU. In terms of GDP it occupies top position together with Bulgaria. Atthesametimethe 42% reductionofRomanianremittancesin 2009 considerably exceeds the average in Europe – 18%; cf. Daniela Comini & FrancaFaes-Cannito, « Remittances from the EU down for the first time in 2009, flows to non-EU countries more resilient »,Eurstat, 2010, N 40.

[43]K.atiaVasileva,« Population and social conditions », In Eurostat, N 94, 2009, p. 3.

[44]AccordingtoEurostatdata, EUcitizensinBulgariaandRomaniaareinvisibleforthestatistics – 0.0% of the population, cf. idem, p. 3.

[45]Idem, p. 5.


[47]Statepolicy, ofcourse, takesintoaccounttheeconomicconjuncture: because of the crisis, seasonal jobs for foreigners in construction, hospitality, and tourism are closed at present.


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